



Constructing 'Pakistan' through Knowledge Production in International Relations and Area Studies

Ahmed W. Waheed

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*Dedicated to
my Dad
Here is to proving, I am nothing without you.*

FOREWORD

A few years ago, I was invited to speak at a training course in Lahore. Family and friends looked at me with barely concealed concern when I told them I was thinking of going. But isn't that really dangerous, they asked? Oh, you're so brave to go somewhere like that. As a critical terrorism studies scholar I knew rationally that the risks were miniscule. I was more likely to have a car accident on the way to the airport than to be hurt in a violent incident. Nevertheless, at an emotional level, I couldn't quite shake my nervousness. I emailed the organizer, a former military officer turned academic, with a list of questions about the kind of security which would be in place, and the potential risks to my safety. He assured me that everything would be fine. There was plenty of security in place for the training course. Besides, it wasn't Peshawar. There was little history of militancy in Lahore.

In the end, with a small flutter of anxiety in my stomach, I boarded the plane for Pakistan.

I have since been to Pakistan three times to speak on the same annual training course. Every trip has been an enjoyable, eye-opening adventure in a wondrous, colorful, vibrant, ancient and modern city. I have never felt unsafe walking or driving its streets, and without exception, everyone I have met there has been welcoming, friendly and courteous, to a degree I have experienced in very few countries. As a consequence, I love Lahore. I love its food, its culture, its bustling streets, its city parks, its markets, its people, its mysteries and contradictions. It is one of my favorite cities in the world, and as an academic, I have been privileged

enough to visit many of the world's great cities. If I was invited to visit Pakistan again, particularly Lahore, I would not hesitate to accept.

The shame of this however, is that the first time I walked the streets of Lahore and strolled among the throngs of visitors to the Red Fort, I was genuinely surprised. I was surprised that it felt so normal, and that people were so friendly and happy to be with their families and friends, enjoying a regular Sunday afternoon off before the start of the working week. I was surprised at the lack of tension. I was surprised that there wasn't any sense of crisis or emergency, and that people could be so free and easy. I was surprised that it didn't seem at all like the image I had in my mind.

The real shame of it was that I should not have been surprised. I should have known better. The shame of it was that after twenty years of being an international relations (IR) scholar, and more than ten years of being a terrorism studies scholar, I was surprised that Pakistan was not a cauldron of violence, chaos, extremism, corruption and state failure. How could such preparation leave me so unprepared for what I found there? How could my academic knowledge of Pakistan be so out of step with the reality I experienced when I walked its streets and talked to its people? How could there be such a gap between what I 'knew' about Pakistan from all the books and articles I have read about it, and what I 'know' now that I have actually been there?

In part, it is this jarring dissonant experience which makes this book by Ahmed Waheed so resonant for me. It is a book that perfectly explains how an experienced IR scholar who 'knows' a lot about a country like Pakistan from years of absorbing the dominant knowledge of the field can discover that in fact, he 'knows' very little about 'Pakistan'. In other words, *Constructing 'Pakistan' through Knowledge Production in International Relations and Area Studies* is a powerful work of deconstruction and decolonization in IR. In a robustly theorized and meticulously researched analysis, Ahmed Waheed excavates the knowledge structures and processes which go into creating the common sense knowledge of 'Pakistan' within the field of IR. More importantly, he reveals the knowledge-power dynamics at play in these processes, the great power interests they serve, the silences and obfuscations about western interference and non-western history they conceal, and most importantly, the material and political consequences they engender.

As such, *Constructing 'Pakistan' through Knowledge Production in International Relations and Area Studies* is a tour de force of critical IR scholarship which adds to the growing body of literature which is attempting to decolonize IR. It is the perennially silenced voice of a Pakistan scholar contesting what passes for the 'knowledge' about his own country. It is a voice and a perspective that all IR scholars need to listen to and acknowledge, if we are to ever get beyond its inherent Eurocentrism, coloniality and ties to power.

I have been teaching critical terrorism studies (CTS) for more than a decade now. I firmly believe that CTS has made a real contribution to contesting what passes for common sense knowledge about terrorism and the war on terror, and offering alternative ways of understanding political violence. In many ways, what I have tried to do for the dominant IR knowledge of 'terrorism' over the past few years is what Ahmed Waheed is attempting to do for IR knowledge about Pakistan. We have both subjected the knowledge-construction processes of these two subjects to sustained critical analysis, and we have found them to be greatly wanting—Eurocentric, colonial and violence-producing in their effects. Moreover, the two projects overlap, not least because within terrorism studies one of the primary discursive constructions of Pakistan is as a major source of terrorism and violent extremism around the world. Within terrorism studies, Pakistan is discursively constructed as an epicenter of global violence, and a salutary warning of any number of contemporary ills and threats: violent Islamic extremism, potential nuclear terrorism, suicide bombers, state collusion with terrorists, state terrorism, the war on terror. From this perspective, the critical deconstruction of the dominant IR terrorism discourse also involves the deconstruction of the dominant discourse about Pakistan and its relationship to terrorism.

Last year, when I was teaching my course on CTS, a student challenged me by asking why there were so few nonwhite scholars on the reading list. It came as a shock to realize that even though CTS had written of its commitment to go beyond the Eurocentrism of the field back in 2007 when we first started the project, so little progress had been made. Today, the vast majority of voices in terrorism studies, including CTS, are white western scholars situated in the global north. For the most part, they write about global south 'others'. Ahmed Waheed's book explains how and why this state of affairs dominates both IR and area studies. In any event, as a consequence, I made it my task this year to

try and decolonize my curriculum, in part through pluralizing the voices of scholars in my reading lists. I enlisted my students in the project too, assigning them the task of imagining what decolonized CTS would look like and mapping it out. There is still some distance to go, but the path is now well and truly set; there is no going back to a mostly white reading list.

I am grateful to have had the opportunity to read this outstanding book. It is not only a fine example of the very best kind of critical, engaged, normative scholarship, but it is tremendously important and greatly needed at the present historical juncture. There has arguably never been a more opportune time than the present day to push forward the decolonial agenda in IR, or indeed, in terrorism studies. This book will make a powerful contribution to this movement. Certainly, I know that I will be using it in my own research and teaching about the dominant discourses of terrorism. In this sense, it will be an important part of the ongoing process of decolonizing the field of CTS.

More specifically, I believe that this book will also make a major contribution to studies of Pakistan. At least, I sincerely hope it will. I hope all the Pakistan area studies ‘experts’ who currently dominate the media, the think tanks and academic discourse will pay close heed to it, and take the opportunity to reflect on their role in the knowledge-construction process and the harm they may be contributing to. More than this, I hope that the relatively few Pakistan IR and area studies scholars will also read it and take confidence in moving forward with a more authentic, indigenous voice and perspective that doesn’t simply reproduce the dominant Eurocentric knowledge-producing processes. I hope they will follow Ahmed Waheed’s example of courageously adopting a critical attitude to the dominant ‘knowledge’ about Pakistan, and challenge the myopic distortions, self-serving myths, and dangerous omissions that currently populate the landscape of Pakistan studies. I hope they will find their own voice and viewpoint.

In sum, I congratulate Ahmed Waheed on the outstanding achievement of *Constructing ‘Pakistan’ through Knowledge Production in International Relations and Area Studies*, and I recommend it highly. It will be of genuine relevance to anyone in IR generally, as well as area studies, as it explains how knowledge about international politics and the subjects within it are constructed and the interests they frequently serve. It will be of relevance to anyone concerned with decolonizing IR, and

moving beyond its restrictive and violent Eurocentrism. It will be of relevance to anyone interested in contemporary terrorism and the war on terror, notably in the way in which it challenges many of today's dominant narratives and myths. And it will be of relevance to anyone interested in the complicated, wondrous, beautiful and endlessly fascinating country of Pakistan.

Richard Jackson
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Even though it is uncustomary to acknowledge the role of your Ph.D. supervisors, this far down the academic lane, I believe a little rebellion against this academic convention is in order. My supervisors, Professor Ray Kiely and Professor James Dunkerley, at Queen Mary University of London have made me the researcher I am today and will be tomorrow. They always had unflinching faith in me during my Ph.D., even when I used to be shaking in my shoes. Or maybe they were as scared as me and never showed (nerves of steel, I tell you!). In any case, only I know the task in front of them when I enrolled for my Ph.D., only I know how I got through and only I know it could not have been possible without these two giants by my side. This space will always be reserved for them in profound gratitude.

A special thanks to Faryal Khan, my postgraduate research student and research assistant, who was always available to help with the data collection but most importantly, I want to thank Ilsa Irfan, my under supervision for having helped me throughout the process from the acceptance of the book proposal to the submission of the manuscript. She has been a continuous source of optimism and inspiration. Her meticulous adherence to deadlines, superb organizational skills and intellectual prowess gave me the confidence to delegate quite a lot of work to her.

I am grateful to my father for his unflinching support throughout this strenuous time. It is always his faith in me, which has helped me through all sorts of difficult times. I am grateful to him for being my anchor in a very turbulent sea. My wife deserves the most appreciation

for withstanding and tolerating me during this time. She has been the woman behind my successes and was as important to this book getting done as I was. Thank you so much. A word of acknowledgement for my son: You are the reason I work hard and the reason I do what I do. I was motivated and inspired every day to show you that hard work never fails. The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step and if you keep walking you will get somewhere.

Finally, I am highly grateful and indebted to my editor Vishal Daryanomel and his people at Palgrave Macmillan who have made every effort to smoothen this journey. It has been truly amazing working with them.

In this book I have tried to gather and collate data, as meticulously as I could; however I am responsible for any and all unintentional omissions that might have found their way into this research.

CONTENTS

1	Introduction	1
	<i>Knowledge and Power</i>	7
	<i>Discourse and Representation</i>	13
	<i>International Relations, Area Studies and Think Tanks</i>	18
	<i>Analytical Framework</i>	25
	<i>Chapter Structure</i>	29
	<i>Bibliography</i>	30
2	The ‘Truth’ About Pakistan: Knowledge Production and Circulation in International Relations	39
	<i>The Academia and Knowledge Production</i>	42
	<i>The ‘Truth’ About Pakistan in International Relations</i>	47
	<i>Knowledge and Pedagogy in International Relations</i>	57
	<i>Knowledge and Policy-Proximity in International Relations</i>	62
	<i>Discourse Analysis of Most Cited International Relations Articles on Pakistan</i>	65
	<i>Conclusion</i>	74
	<i>Bibliography</i>	75
3	The ‘Truth’ About Pakistan: Knowledge Production and Circulation in Area Studies	81
	<i>The ‘Truth’ About Pakistan in Area Studies Journals</i>	85
	<i>The ‘Truth’ About Pakistan in South Asian Studies Centers</i>	96

<i>Discourse Analysis of Most Cited South Asian Studies</i>	
<i>Articles on Pakistan</i>	101
<i>Conclusion</i>	110
<i>Bibliography</i>	111
4 The ‘Truth About Pakistan’: Knowledge Production and Circulation in Think Tanks	115
<i>Knowledge Production and Think Tanks: An Overview</i>	118
<i>Discourse Analysis of Most Cited Think-Tanks Journal</i>	
<i>Articles on Pakistan</i>	125
<i>Conclusion</i>	132
<i>Bibliography</i>	134
5 Knowledge Production and Circulation in Pakistani International Relations	139
<i>External Factors in the Marginalization of Periphery</i>	
<i>Scholarship</i>	142
<i>Domestic Factors in the Marginalization of Periphery</i>	
<i>Scholarship</i>	150
<i>Conclusion</i>	155
<i>Bibliography</i>	157
6 Conclusion	161
<i>Bibliography</i>	177
Appendix A	181
Appendix B	201
Appendix C	213
Index	227

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1	Most ‘produced’ work on Pakistan in International Relations journals—recurring contributors on Pakistan	51
Table 2.2	Most cited work on Pakistan in International Relations journals	56
Table 3.1	Most ‘produced’ work on Pakistan in Area Studies journals—recurring contributors on Pakistan	88
Table 3.2	Most cited work on Pakistan in Area Studies journals	102
Table A.1	Journal articles published on Pakistan in top International Relations journals (2006–2016)	182
Table B.1	Journal articles published on Pakistan in top Area Studies journals (2006–2016)	202
Table C.1	Journal articles published on Pakistan in <i>Washington Quarterly</i> and <i>Survival: Global Politics and Strategy</i> (2006–2016) with author profile	214



CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Pakistan is a failed state. It's a fragile state; a failing state; a rogue state; a client state; a garrison state; an insecure state and a greedy state, to name just some of the many representations and categorizations that have been used to try and codify Pakistan's behavior in international politics. To better comprehend this, let us take the issue of Pakistan's state failure. The rhetoric of Pakistan's state failure has remained strong in US policy circles. In 2008, Senior US Congressman Frank Pallone declared that "Pakistan is essentially a failed state. I do not believe the central government controls most of the territory of the country".¹ David Kilcullen, special advisor for counterinsurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, predicted in 2009 that "Pakistan may fail within six months".² President Obama in a public speech "described Pakistan as 'fragile'".³ Congressman Rohrabacher, who was the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, in a 2012 letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, wrote

¹L. Jha, "Pakistan a Failed State: Frank Pallone," *Hindustan Times*, 2008, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-a-failed-state-frank-pallone/article1-356611.aspx>.

²A. Gupta, *Is Pakistan a Failing State? Policy Brief* (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2009), http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/IsPakistananaFailingState_AGupta_160609.

³Gupta.

that, “it has become increasingly clear to members of the US Congress that Pakistan is a failed state and no amount of US aid money will ever change that”.⁴ Just one year later in 2013, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, discussing the threats facing Pakistan reiterated his stance that “Pakistan is in a state of institutional failure. It’s not a failed state, but you could argue it is a failing state”.⁵ More recently, Daniel Markey, who held the South Asia portfolio on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the US Department of State (2003–2007) predicted that even though Pakistan “is a failing state in many ways [...] it could fail in ways that are far worse than at present”.⁶ These ‘truths’ about Pakistan has sanctioned consequent scenarios that herald an ominous doomsday. For instance, Cohen argues that “the failure of Pakistan would be a multidimensional geostrategic calamity, generating enormous uncertainties in a world that craves order and predictability”.⁷ Similarly, Root believes that “Pakistan, in short, is a failing state with an arsenal of nuclear weapons and a dedicated core of Muslim fundamentalists. The consequences for all of us could be dreadful, indeed”.⁸ The most likely possible dangers of Pakistan’s state failure would be: “a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism”.⁹ These assertions encapsulate the gist of the dominant political discourse on Pakistan’s state failure.

⁴H. Imtiaz, “Pen Friends: Rohrabacher Writes Letter to Gilani, Calls Pakistan a ‘Failed State,’” *Express Tribune*, 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/373354/pen-friends-rohrabacher-writes-letter-to-gilani-calls-pakistan-a-failed-state/>.

⁵J. Morrison, “Embassy Row: ‘A Failing State,’” *Washington Times*, 2013, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/4/embassy-row-afailing-state/?page=all>.

⁶D. Markey, *No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Pakistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10.

⁷S. Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 118.

⁸H. Root, “Pakistan: The Political Economy of State Failure,” *The Milken Institute Review* 7, no. 2 (2005): 74.

⁹F.W. Kagan and M. O’Hanlon, “Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem,” *New York Times*, November 18, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html?pagewanted=print>.

Many American foreign policy-makers have been vocal about the problematic nature of Pakistan's identity, but policy-makers, by the nature of their commitments, rarely have detailed knowledge about the issues that confront them. They therefore resort to relying upon different sources ranging from advisors to academic experts, to establish a representational framing of the policy to be adopted. For instance, how would it have been possible to speak of state failure had the concept not been first introduced in *Foreign Policy* magazine, still one of the widely read sources on International Relations?¹⁰ In that sense then, the construction of Pakistan's multidimensional identity is a representation; hence is discursive, political, relational, and social rather than 'true', 'real' or 'objective'. Consequently, to speak of identity as *discursive* and *political* is to argue that "representations of identity place foreign policy issues within a particular interpretative optic, one with consequences for which foreign policy can be formulated as an adequate response".¹¹ While foreign policy-makers play a vital role in the production and reproduction of representational identities,¹² the concerns of this research revolve around the sources from which foreign policy-makers draw their representations, which are again based on representations articulated by a larger number of individuals and institutions. This book consequently turns toward the field of International Relations to explore how representational identities are constructed and produced within the field and made cogent for policy-makers.

The negative understanding of Pakistan continues to dominate discourse, despite various challenges to the typological categorization of Third World States, and by extension Pakistan,¹³ on the grounds that

¹⁰Both authors Gerald B. Helman and Steve R. Ratner are now academics at the University of Michigan.

¹¹Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Routledge, 2006), 7.

¹²A seminal work in this regard is David Campbell's exposition on US Foreign Policy in David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

¹³Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Pinar Bilgin and Adam D. Morton, "Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences?" *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2002): 55–80, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993576>.

such categorizations are either useless¹⁴ or neocolonial.¹⁵ However, many of the insights offered by the critics of the dominant discourse on categorizing states are either ignored or overlooked in International Relations literature, thereby naturalizing quite unabatedly a specific interpretation of Third World states (and again, by extension, Pakistan). A similar ontological and epistemological debate between other mainstream positions on Pakistan and their critics ensues. It is through knowledge that a specific identity of Pakistan is constructed and a meaning assigned to it.¹⁶ For instance Shaikh's monograph, entitled 'Making Sense of Pakistan', readily affixes an identity to the Pakistani state and its people as a con-tortion that does not make sense. Similarly, before even beginning to examine the Pakistani state, Ziring establishes from the outset Pakistan's identity in his exposition entitled 'Weak State, Failed State, Garrison State: The Pakistan Saga'. Another example is Gregory's work, 'Pakistan's Security: The Insecure State'. The representational practices produced

¹⁴For instance, see J. Logan and C. Preble, "Fixing Failed States: A Dissenting View," in *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, ed. C. Coyne and R. Mathers (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 379–96; R. Wilde, "The Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the Failed States Concept," *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law* 9 (2003): 425–29; Anna Simons and David Tucker, "The Misleading Problem of Failed States: A 'Socio-Geography' of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007): 387–401, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590601153887>; A. Hehir, "The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no. 3 (2007): 307–32, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970701592256>.

¹⁵See R. Gordon, "Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion," *American University International Law Review* 12, no. 6 (1997): 903–74; Branwen Gruffydd Jones, "The Global Political Economy of Social Crisis: Towards a Critique of the 'Failed State' Ideology," *Review of International Political Economy* 15, no. 2 (April 16, 2008): 180–205, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290701869688>.

¹⁶Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (Oxford University Press, 2012); L. Ziring, "Weak State, Failed State, Garrison State: The Pakistan Saga," in *South Asia's Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament*, ed. T. Paul (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 170–95; Shaun Gregory, *Pakistan's Security: The Insecure State* (Routledge, 2007). Some others instances are A. Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Pakistan the Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947–2011)* (Oxford University Press, 2013); B. Riedel, "Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (July 1, 2008): 31–45, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208316746>; I. Kfir, "The Crisis in Pakistan: A Dangerously Weak State," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 3 (2007): 75–88.

within academic discourse through naturalization and categorization have imbued Pakistan with an identity created through an imposition of interpretation rather than being, as Campbell puts, “the product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own pre-established identity”.¹⁷

How are we to approach these ostensibly different articulations which aspire to affix a certain meaning to Pakistan? The profusion of the literature on the ‘perverse reality’ has, given Pakistan’s often cited geostrategic importance to western interests in the region, given rise to questions about the status and the nature of the Pakistani state, with scholars indulging in extensive inquiries seeking to answer questions such as ‘what is Pakistan?’ and ‘why is it the way it is?’ Within the International Relations literature purporting to understand Pakistan’s reality, there is a propensity to intellectually secure Pakistan within a resolute system of ontological ‘truths’. Scholarship seeking to unravel the supposed intricacies of Pakistan’s ostensibly amorphous identity usually tends: first, to focus on the Pakistani military, its link with extremism inspired militancy and its role in the democratic processes of the state¹⁸; secondly, to pursue a research agenda centering on exploring the Pakistani ‘nation’¹⁹; lastly, to

¹⁷David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 24.

¹⁸See for instance, A. Siddiq, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007); C. Fair, “Pakistan’s Democracy: The Army’s Quarry?” *Asian Security* 5, no. 1 (2009): 73–85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850802611552>; Ayesha Siddiq-Agha, *Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Build-Up 1979–99: In Search of a Policy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); C. Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm”; S. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ahmed, *Pakistan the Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947–2011)*; Aqil Shah, “Getting the Military Out of Pakistani Politics: How Aiding the Army Undermines Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (2011).

¹⁹Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan*; D. Kux, *Pakistan: Flawed Not Failed State* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2001); Ishtiaq Ahmed, “Pakistan’s National Identity,” *International Review of Modern Sociology International Review of Modern Sociology* 34, no. 1 (2008): 47–59, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41421657>; B.C. Upreti, “Nationalism in South Asia: Trends and Interpretations,” *Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science The Indian Journal of Political Science* 67, no. 3 (2006): 535–44, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856240>; Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan”; Sumit Ganguly, “Pakistan: Neither State Nor Nation,” in *Multination States in Asia: Accommodation or Resistance*, ed. Jacques Bertrand and André Laliberté (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 309; Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?* (London: Zed Books, 2002).

explore Pakistan's place in the world specifically through the prism of its relations with the United States, India and China.²⁰

These debates then depend on, produce and reproduce knowledge on Pakistan which consequently generates Pakistan's 'reality'. In essence then, Pakistan is what we *know* about it. Considering that knowledge does not exist independently of our theories, concepts, ideas and language, the 'reality' of Pakistan does not exist outside our appropriations and interpretations. This does not however mean that Pakistan does not exist independently of our thoughts and ideas. What it means is that the world "cannot be accessed, understood or rendered meaningful in the absence of speech and interpretation and [...] reality therefore ceases to constitute an already given empirical referent which knowledge and truth must correspond and refer to".²¹ Thus the argument here is not that Pakistan lacks materiality, but that we can only *know* Pakistan through discourse.²²

²⁰Harsh V. Pant, "The Pakistan Thorn in China—India—U.S. Relations," *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2012): 83–95; M. Beckley, "China and Pakistan: Fair-Weather Friends," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (2012): 9–22; M. Kugelman, "Can China Deliver in Pakistan?" *World Politics Review*, 2009, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4733/can-china-deliver-in-pakistan>. Ahmed Waheed, "Pakistan's Dependence and US Patronage: The Politics of 'Limited Influence,'" *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 4, no. 1 (2017): 1–26; Ahmed Waheed, *The Wrong Ally: Pakistan's State Sovereignty Under US Dependence* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018); Salamat Ali Tabbasum, "Political Economy of US Aid to Pakistan: Democratization or Militarization?" 1, no. 1 (2013): 22–31; Teresita C. Schaffer, "US Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities?," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2002): 169–83; C. Cohen and D. Chollet, "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking US Strategy toward Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (2007): 7–19; C. Cohen, *A Perilous Course: US Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007); A. Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The World's Most Unstable Region and the Threat to Global Security* (London: Penguin Books, 2009); Robert M. Hathaway, "Leverage and Largesse: Pakistan's Post-9/11 Partnership with America*," *Contemporary South Asia* 16, no. 1 (March 6, 2008): 11–24, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09584930701800362>; C. Christine Fair et al., *Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2010); P. Miller, "How to Exercise U.S. Leverage over Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2012): 37–52, <http://csis.org/publication/twq-how-exercise-us-leverage-over-pakistan-fall-2012>.

²¹Helle Malmvig, *State Sovereignty and Intervention: A Discourse Analysis of Interventionary and Non-interventionary Practices in Kosovo and Algeria* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2.

²²In the Pakistani context, few studies have sought to explore how we *know* what we *know*, but invariably barring a few exceptions such as Nizamani's work in Haider K. Nizamani, *The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan*

This leads us to ask a different set of questions such as: How is Pakistan produced, reproduced and articulated to form the body of knowledge in International Relations through which we have come to *know* it? How is Pakistan spoken of and how is it constructed? By exploring these questions we necessarily turn our gaze away from Pakistan and toward the discourse that produces Pakistan, and in doing so shift focus from the question of *being* to the question of *becoming*. This question is the focus of this study. What is not attempted here is to trace historically how Pakistan has been defined, explained or understood by various interpretive communities (such as International Relations scholars, Area Studies specialists and think-tank experts) and then to supplant these understandings with our version of what Pakistan is. Nor does this study attempt to counter arguments on Pakistan by sifting through arguments to determine which hold more veracity and usefulness and which are poorly equipped to understand Pakistan. Instead this study investigates another question. How is the meaning of Pakistan fixed or stabilized via practices of interpretive communities? In other words our fundamental research question is: How is the ‘truth’ on Pakistan produced, and how is this truth represented, fixed and stabilized through the writings on Pakistan? What are the conditions under which it is possible to make authoritative claims about Pakistan?

KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

The canonical emergence of positivism and causal epistemology in International Relations following Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*²³ invigorated a dialectical debate on the ontology of International Relations, both as a site for theory and practice.²⁴ The challenge to rationalism’s objective and deterministic foundations, which subsumed both realist and neoliberal approaches, came from proponents of the sociological approach.

(Praeger, 2000), most have looked inwardly at the production of knowledge. Almost all though have either analyzed discourse through an analysis of media content, and statements of policy-makers and experts in the media.

²³Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), https://books.google.com.pk/books/about/Theory_of_International_Politics.html?id=2tOuQwAACAAJ&redir_esc=y.

²⁴I use positivism and rationalism interchangeably.

They stressed the interactive role of social forces centered around cultural practices, norms, values and identity, emphasized the importance of intersubjective meanings in the interpretation of political practices, and lamented the limitations of scientific models in studying world politics. ‘Reflective/Interpretive’ scholars—as they were monikered²⁵—despite being acknowledged for their contribution in offering valuable insights into the importance of norms and institutions for international politics, were slighted for not adopting an epistemology that was sufficiently rigorous to engage with rationalism. In other words, while the ontological dissidence of the Reflectivist scholars was tolerated, and even welcomed, by the rationalists, complete membership of the ‘mainstream scientific community’ could not ensue until the former harnessed the epistemological capacity to “formulate causal hypotheses and subject them to more rigorous testing” to assess the applicability of their ontological vagaries.²⁶

As a result, two developments marked the progress of the Reflectivist camp. Firstly, the intellectual debate between the rationalists and the reflectivists gave way to a particular form of research modeled on the natural sciences and microeconomics which was favored over other forms of knowledge that “drew upon philosophical, historical, and humanistic traditions of understanding”.²⁷ Resultantly constructivists—as they later came to be known²⁸—sought to occupy a middle ground, to build a bridge so to speak,²⁹ between rationalism and postmodernism by ontologically aligning themselves with postmodernists while conforming to the positivist methodology that was the defining feature of rationalism’s epistemological alignment. In doing so, Social Constructivism in its dominant form strongly resembles the neoliberalist wing of the rationalist paradigm and tries to build on the “shared features of the liberalist

²⁵Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1988): 379–96, <https://www.jstor.org>.

²⁶Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*.

²⁷Hansen.

²⁸Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

²⁹Jeffrey Checkel, “Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–48, <https://doi.org/10.2307/25054040>; Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003>; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

wing of the rationalist tradition and the modern constructivist wing of the reflectivist tradition”.³⁰ This development of ‘positivist’ constructivism with its emphasis on causation and concrete empirical analysis gave rise to disagreement in the reflectivist camp as to the epistemological nature of inquiry and have provoked methodological concerns on the part of the ‘interpretive’/critical constructivists³¹ who share significant ontological and epistemological similarities with the partisans of post-structuralism.³²

Secondly, post-positivists strongly entrenched on the opposing side of the critical divide defend their theoretical positioning based on the negation of an a priori reality. First, they dismiss the positivists’ (who includes both rationalists and constructivists)³³ assertions of a prior material reality ‘out there’ and in turn argue that “reality cannot be known other than through representations [...] Therefore, claiming a reality to start from, be it one of states, norms or natural raw materials, already involves a political act”.³⁴ Secondly, they reason that “while emphasizing epistemology, [positivists] often have neglected epistemics - that is,

³⁰Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline,’” *International Studies Review* 4, no. 2 (2002): 74–75, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3186354>.

³¹Constructivists are often distinguished by their work in terms of their epistemological and methodological commitments. They have often been assigned various juxtaposed labels such as ‘conventional’ and ‘critical’ constructivism in Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (July 27, 1998): 171–200, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.171>, ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ constructivism in Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1996), ‘modernist’ and ‘postmodernists’ in Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (September 24, 1998): 259–94, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066198004003001>, and ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ constructivism in Ronen Palan, “A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 31 (2000): 575–98.

³²Marcus George, “Foreword,” in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis and London: Minnesota University Press, 1999), x.

³³According to Zehfuss the partial essentialization of portions of reality and a doctrinal adherence to an a priori, however limited, reality of some constructivists, a platform they share with rationalists, distinguishes them from the postmodernists.

³⁴Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 36, https://books.google.com.pk/books/about/Constructivism_in_International_Relation.html?id=4M1eKE5jzxcG&redir_esc=y.

how knowledge is produced and deployed in practical interaction by the actors themselves that constitute the international system".³⁵ In the spirit of these counterarguments one can, for example argue that any analysis of Pakistan as a country with a fixed geographical locality is meaningless. In order for the multi-various organs of the international system to meaningfully interact with Pakistan, discursively produced knowledge is required to form the basis of policy analyzes and decision-making processes. In other words the Pakistan that we know is a socially constructed Pakistan which has moved forward in history through various representations at different temporal intervals. In such an instance, if knowledge is always for someone, and for some purpose,³⁶ questions such as, how is Pakistan discursively constructed? How is knowledge on Pakistan produced and reproduced? What purpose does this knowledge serve and for whom?, gain considerable significance. This research is particularly in *this* politics of representation, "the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another".³⁷ Although different epistemological paradigms engage with discourse theorizing, it is predicated on a shared set of theoretical commitments, which this research employs.

Most of the work on Pakistan in the field of International Relations is concerned with the political relations that Pakistan as a state seems to maintain with other states and vice versa. Within the realm of theory and practice concerned with these interactions, Pakistan's relationship with the outside world has often been studied within the conceptual parameters of foreign aid, human rights, democracy, and strategic alliances, among others. The process of understanding these political interactions is largely either left to empiricists who crunch data to formulate policy prescriptions and predictions, or to the positivists who view the political

³⁵Javier Lezaun, "Limiting the Social: Constructivism and Social Knowledge in International Relations," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (January 1, 2002): 231, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.00272>.

³⁶Robert Cox argued that "Theory is always for someone and some purpose". I have taken intellectual license to reframe his connotation. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 23, 1981): 126–55, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501>.

³⁷Richard Jackson, "Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse," *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (March 28, 2007): 395, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x>.

relations among states in a particular way “through the demarcation of a theory/practice divide so that theory is outside of the world it purports to simply observe”.³⁸ This implies that there is a ‘Pakistan’ ‘out there’ that needs to be made sense of, in order to meaningfully engage with it. The context within which the discussions on Pakistan are situated, construct and reconstruct Pakistan’s identity by attaching to it a meaning that is hostage to interpretation. Campbell argues that “meaning and identity are, therefore, always the consequence of a relationship ... which emerges through the imposition of an interpretation”.³⁹ Even though the world, and by extension Pakistan, exists independent of language, it is impossible to ‘know’ that “because the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpretation”.⁴⁰ This means that the knowledge of what Pakistan is exists within our interpretations of it. In other words, Pakistan is what we say it is!

The political identity of Pakistan⁴¹ cannot be investigated independently of our theories, language and practice. In other words, to unravel how Pakistan is constructed in the international political imaginary requires an investigation of the discursive practices within which it is produced rather than studying Pakistan’s identity as a political reality. Moving from a question of being to a question of becoming, what needs to be explored then is not what Pakistan is, but how is it spoken of? Such an investigation of Pakistan does not tantamount to a denial of the existence of a material world within which Pakistan exists as a territorially bound geographical area but rather suggests that our knowledge of Pakistan does not entail any meaning or being before speech, literary expression and interpretation but comes into being through it. As Laclau and Mouffe argue:

³⁸David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 19.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 24.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 6.

⁴¹This study is not informed by a reductionist understanding of Pakistan’s political identity within the international community. It does not speak of the Islamic character of Pakistan but of how this character has been constructed. It does not speak of Pakistan’s ostensibly inadequate role in its alliance with the United States on the War on Terror as an ontological reality but of how this role has been constructed to leverage certain expectations. It does not speak of Pakistan’s state fragility as an ontological reality, but how this reality is discursively produced as a political assignment to Pakistan’s identity.

The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence.⁴²

As Malmvig elaborates, the contention here is not that 'the Holocaust' did not happen but that the knowledge of what it was only comes about through discourse.⁴³ Similarly, Doty observes that troops marching across a geographical area are in itself an insignificant phenomenon; it is only when the word 'American' is attached to troops and 'Grenada' to the geographical locality that meaning is created. Further whether the marching of American troops into Grenada is a 'training exercise' or an 'invasion' interprets the nature of such a political interaction.⁴⁴ One can argue that when the United States gives foreign assistance to Pakistan, this is certainly 'real'. It is when the 'United States' is attached to 'foreign assistance' and 'Pakistan' to the geographical space that meaning is created. But questions such as what is the nature of the foreign assistance, why is it being disbursed, generate certain meanings which lead to questions such as, is the United States providing foreign assistance to Pakistan as support because it's an 'ally', or is it providing foreign assistance because Pakistan is a 'failed/fragile state'. The identities fixed on Pakistan⁴⁵ give correlative meanings to US interaction with Pakistan. In that sense while a 'real' Pakistan exists in the material world, it is through language that we assign Pakistan an identity, and through discourse

⁴²Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001), 108, https://books.google.com.pk/books/about/Hegemony_and_Socialist_Strategy.html?id=-ZVoVtwCMz0C&redir_esc=y.

⁴³Malmvig, *State Sovereignty and Intervention: A Discourse Analysis of Interventionary and Non-interventionary Practices in Kosovo and Algeria*.

⁴⁴Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*.

⁴⁵Considering how identities are constructed through representational practices, Pakistan has often been represented as a 'greedy state', a 'failed state' and a 'garrison state' among other less conspicuous labels.

that Pakistan is represented. Consequently, the body of knowledge on Pakistan that is produced as ‘truth’ is essentially a construction of truth, embedded within the processes of knowledge production intrinsic to the discourse on Pakistan.

DISCOURSE AND REPRESENTATION

What is discourse then? It seems fair to claim that discourse is generally taken to denote a specific group of texts and the social practices to which those texts are inextricably linked. In a Foucauldian sense, “a discourse is a group of statements, which govern the production of objects, concepts and subjects”.⁴⁶ The discursive ‘structured totality’⁴⁷ includes the ways we think and talk about a subject and the manner in which this thinking influences and is reflected in the ways we act in relation to that subject.⁴⁸ The study of discourse within the discursive field of International Relations illustrates the intrinsic connection between textual and social processes, and entails the description of the implications of such a connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world.⁴⁹ More specifically, in International Relations, discourse implies the asymmetrical interaction between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’, that enabled the ‘West’

⁴⁶Malmvig, *State Sovereignty and Intervention: A Discourse Analysis of Interventionary and Non-interventionary Practices in Kosovo and Algeria*, 3.

⁴⁷See Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*; Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*.

⁴⁸Michael Karlberg, “The Power of Discourse and the Discourse of Power: Pursuing Peace Through Discourse Intervention,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10, no. 1 (2005): 1–25, <https://doi.org/10.2307/41852070>; Gearoid O. Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (1992): 190–204. For an even much detailed study of discursive constructions, see Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse”; Richard Jackson, “The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 3 (December 10, 2008): 377–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539150802515046>.

⁴⁹Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 225–54, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005002003>; Roger Maaka and Chris Andersen, *The Indigenous Experience: Global Perspectives* (Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2006), <https://www.canadianscholars.ca/books/the-indigenous-experience>.

to construct ‘realities’ that were taken seriously and acted upon, while simultaneously denying the ‘Rest’ an equal degree of agency.

According to Foucault, since knowledge is produced by competing discourses, the outcome of this struggle decides the ‘reality’ or the ‘truth’ of a particular situation around which the discourses compete. For instance, the category of ‘failed states’ is among the prominent representations of the postcolonial state in the contemporary world. A ‘failed state’ is purportedly characterized, domestically, by a complete or partial collapse of law and order whereby the institutions of the state are rendered inefficient and ineffective in monopolizing the legitimate use of force. Further, they are allegedly unable to provide for the security of their citizens or, alternatively, they become oppressive instruments and terrorize their citizens. Public institutions in these states are considered to be degenerative and largely unresponsive to their citizens’ needs and basic rights. Internationally, they suffer from a lack of credibility that makes them unrepresentative of their polity beyond their own borders.⁵⁰ The innocuous emergence of the discourse on ‘failed states’ in the aftermath of the Cold War became a vital component in the US strategy to combat terrorism once it declared its War on Terror. The convenient marriage between security and development then generated a negative stereotypical image of ‘failed states’ by strongly associating them with risks to global security. The competing discourse, on the other hand, questions the analytical utility of the concept of ‘failed states’ by pointing out the ambiguity inherent in its definitional conundrums and, by identifying the flaws in its operationalization, argues that these states are

⁵⁰See Derick W.D.W. Brinkerhoff, “Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes,” *Public Administration and Development* 25, no. 1 (February 2005): 3–14, <https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.352>; R.S. Williamson, “Nation-Building: The Dangers of Weak, Failing, and Failed States,” *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 8 (2007): 9–19; R. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton University Press, 2004); A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Morten Boås and Kathleen M. Jennings, “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats or Opportunities?” *Globalizations* 4, no. 4 (December 2007): 475–85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747730701695729>.

not a threat to global security.⁵¹ The knowledge of the ‘failed states-as-a-security-risk’ problem is produced by two discourses that have contested to promote their version of ‘truth’ and “each is linked to a contestation over power”.⁵² Both discourses marshal ‘facts’ to produce knowledge about the ‘truth’ of the situation; however, it is power that tilts the scales in battles for discursive domination. In that sense then power produces knowledge, and power and knowledge directly imply each other. Power to produce knowledge through discourse then allows a subject to make certain descriptions appear as truth even if they are false, allowing such truths to be channeled into action, i.e. if the discourse on the failed states as ‘incubators of terrorism’ dominates, then regardless of whether they are ‘incubators’ or not, policy actions will treat them as such. As Hall argues then, discourse has real effects on practice: “the description becomes ‘true’”.⁵³

While western representational practices have often sought to categorize entire nations under different categories such as ‘quasi states’, ‘failed states’, ‘fragile states’, ‘rogue states’ and so forth, these practices also exclusively target individual states. For instance, knowledge produced on Pakistan often represents it as an insecure state,⁵⁴ a garrison state⁵⁵ among other labels, but here too Pakistan’s membership in the ‘fragile state’ category has figured more prominently because of the

⁵¹See for instance, Hehir, “The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom”; Morten Boås and Kathleen M. Jennings, “Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the ‘Failed State,’” *The European Journal of Development Research* 17, no. 3 (September 1, 2005): 385–95, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09578810500209148>; Gordon, “Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion”; Sebastian Mallaby, “The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (2002): 2, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033079>; Logan and Preble, “Fixing Failed States: A Dissenting View”; J. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2008): 469–88.

⁵²Stuart Hall, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,” in *The Indigenous Experience: Global Perspectives* (Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2006), 167.

⁵³Stuart Hall.

⁵⁴Fair et al., *Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?* Gregory, *Pakistan’s Security: The Insecure State*.

⁵⁵Ahmed, *Pakistan the Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947–2011)*; Ziring, “Weak State, Failed State, Garrison State: The Pakistan Saga.”

state's ostensibly tenuous relationship with security. The system of classification originated in an annexation of the social sciences to the West's Cold War mentality, which in turn was influenced by a reciprocal relationship between the academic disciplines and the national security organs based on a mutual interest to define and explore 'national security' imperatives.⁵⁶ The system of classification performs an important function within representational strategies aimed at placing states in 'naturalized' categories consequently generating strong stereotypes which permit "a quick and easy image without the responsibility of specificity and accuracy".⁵⁷ The construction of the 'other' through discourse also involves creating contextual knowledge that is upheld as truth.

Doty argues that the process of naturalization in discourse, which happens through *presupposition*, works through "an implicit theorization of how the world works and also of the nature of its inhabitants".⁵⁸ This contextual knowledge of the 'Third World' allows discursive power to naturalize the representation of the 'Third World' by presenting the background knowledge as 'facts'. Foucault argues that the process of *surveillance* is vital to the ways in which the West gathers 'facts' about the 'Third World'. In effect, surveillance entails procedures of observation and examination as strategies through which the 'Third World' has come to be "known", classified and acted upon".⁵⁹ Since power is implicit in the knowledge that discourse produces, exercised over those who are 'known'—the *represented*, and power and knowledge operate in a cyclical relationship, i.e. power produces knowledge which reinforces power; the

⁵⁶For a detailed understanding of how systems of classification as a strategy of representation traces its legacy to the Cold War and the role of academic disciplines, see Bilgin and Morton, "Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences?"; Pinar Bilgin and Adam David Morton, "From 'Rogue' to 'Failed' States? The Fallacy of Short-Termism*," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2004): 169–80; Duncan Bell, "Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond," *International Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2009): 3–22, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00777.x>; David C. Engerman, "Bernath Lecture: American Knowledge and Global Power," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (2007): 599–622, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00655.x>.

⁵⁷Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, 10.

⁵⁸Doty.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 11.

sustenance of western power then also resides in the denial of equal and effective agency to the ‘Third World’ through the process of *negation*. As Doty argues: “Negation has constructed various regions making up the ‘Third World’ as blank spaces waiting to be filled in by Western writing [...] within these blank spaces the West may write such things as civilization, progress, modernization and democracy”.⁶⁰ Consequently, the West’s interaction with the ‘Third World’ takes the form of “missions of deliverance and salvation rather than conquest and exploitation”.⁶¹

However, this does not suggest the priority of the discursive over the nondiscursive. Neither does taking the knowledge/power nexus as the object of analysis imply a celebration of a “relativism in which any fixed point is dissolved”.⁶² What this does suggest is the dissolution of notions of any transcendental position which can be constituted outside of discourse. In effect, the discursive and the nondiscursive realms are mutually constitutive within the knowledge/power relations. In that sense then, discourse constitutes particular texts that are a part of a much broader ensemble of nondiscursive heterogeneous sets of practices. This means that the discourse on Pakistan not only needs to be understood within the texts that produce and reproduce it, but also the processes through which they emerge hegemonic. However, not all texts and practices are admitted as part of the discourse, if one were to study the discursive construction of Pakistan. It is within the discourse that the production of a number of subject positions grants individuals and groups the power to produce knowledge meaningfully and authoritatively.

The discourses on international relations typically organize the production of sovereign states, diplomats, heads of states or international organizations as willful and acting subjects who are allowed to act and speak about certain objects and concepts, such as war, peace and cooperation.⁶³ In the case of Pakistan, while knowledge production and its consequent discursive construction orders the production of a number of subjects including those mentioned above, three subject positions stand out among the rest in the way knowledge on Pakistan is produced,

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Doty.

⁶²Stewart R. Clegg, *Frameworks of Power* (London and New York, 1997), 152.

⁶³Malmvig, *State Sovereignty and Intervention: A Discourse Analysis of Interventionary and Non-interventionary Practices in Kosovo and Algeria*, 3.

namely, universities, area study centers and think tanks. The study of the discourse on Pakistan then not only involves an analysis of the texts through which ‘Pakistan’ is constructed, but also of these institutions, through which these texts breathe life into the representational practices which produce Pakistan.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AREA STUDIES AND THINK TANKS

Most scholars of international relations agree that the academic field is heavily dominated by the West, to the detriment of the rest.⁶⁴ For instance, Weaver and Tickner argue that the field of International Relations is skewed heavily in favor of the West. Quantitatively analyzing the data gathered from leading International Relations journals, they argue that “the numbers speak clearly about the invisibility of the ‘rest of the world’”.⁶⁵ Similarly Acharya and Buzan ask, “Why is there no non-western IR Theory?” implicitly questioning the uneven production of knowledge in International Relations.⁶⁶ Alatas considered these processes symptomatic of a western imperialism as he argues:

⁶⁴For instance, see Arlene B. Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 627–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494323>; Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* (New York and London: Routledge, 2009); Francesca Lo Castro, “Does International Relations Theory Privilege Western Ways of Thinking and Acting?” 2013; Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline’”; Ole Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American in and European Developments International Relations,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (2013): 687–727; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (Routledge, 2010); Syed Farid Alatas, “Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences,” *Current Sociology* 51, no. 6 (November 30, 2003): 599–613, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921030516003>; John M. Hobson, “Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian Towards a Post-Racist Critical IR,” *Review of International Studies* 33, no. S1 (July 11, 2007): 91, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210507007413>.

⁶⁵Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, 5.

⁶⁶Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” *International Relations of Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (2007): 287–312.

If in the colonial past, academic imperialism was maintained via colonial power, today academic neocolonialism is maintained via the condition of academic dependency. The West's monopolistic control of and influence over the social sciences in much of the Third World are not determined in the first instance by force via colonial power but rather by the dependence of Third World scholars and intellectuals on western social science in a variety of ways.⁶⁷

Despite various arguments that different researchers make on the effect of the hegemonic hold of the West on processes and structures of knowledge production, scholars of the post-structuralist and postcolonial traditions agree that the representations produced and reproduced in positivist terms within International Relations, as a truth that 'exists out there', are contentious.⁶⁸ Not least because Smith argues that the dominance of a specific view on how to create knowledge constructs a specific kind of International Relations which is essentially ethnocentric in character.⁶⁹ The dominance of western modes of thought in International Relations has thus spatially defined the West as the site of theoretical and ideational knowledge construction and the rest of the world as their empirical testing ground.⁷⁰ Through these 'empirical tests', identities are not only constructed, produced and reproduced but are naturalized as 'empirical facts', and therein lies the main problem arising from the dominance of positivist thought and method in IR.

Many scholars have questioned the eurocentricity and the Anglo-American bias of the International Relations discipline. A critical and growing body of literature continues to lay bare the processes, praxis and structures that sustain the western domination of discourses emerging

⁶⁷ Alatas, "Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences", 602.

⁶⁸ Even though most literature in International Relations is evolving to incorporate other theories that have laid outside mainstream concerns and is becoming increasingly non-paradigmatic, however the focus on positivism continues to dominate the literature. See Daniel Maliniak et al., "International Relations in the US Academy," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 437–64, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00653.x>.

⁶⁹ Smith, "The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: 'Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline'", 68.

⁷⁰ As is apparent for instance, most categories such as failed states, garrison state, client state, etc. that seek to codify state behavior in the Third World have their origins in the western academe. See Walter Mignolo, "The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 1 (2002): 57–95.

from within International Relations, and in doing so fix their inquiry on peer-reviewed academic journals in International Relations. However, this particular strand of the critical thread running through International Relations is mostly concerned with (i) how disciplinary imbalance produces a particular form of International Relations,⁷¹ (ii) how this imbalance affects International Relations scholarship in the Third World and lastly (iii) the reasons why Third World scholars maintain a marginal presence in their contribution to the field of International Relations.⁷² Few have explored how Third World identities are discursively produced in International Relations by analyzing journal articles and foreign policy documents.⁷³ However, if one were to explore how the representational identity of an area, a people or a society is discursively constructed within International Relations and effectively naturalized, the resultant analysis could only be complete if one were to step outside the rarefied atmosphere of International Relations academe. In doing this, peer-reviewed International Relations journals would become a part, rather than the whole, of a larger structure that fixes representational identities through productive and reproductive practices. This would mean that, for an understanding of how knowledge is produced on Pakistan, the narrow confines of International Relations would form an insufficient basis.

⁷¹Arlene B. Tickner, "Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 627–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494323>; Maliniak et al., "International Relations in the US Academy"; Smith, "The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: 'Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline'"; Castro, "Does International Relations Theory Privilege Western Ways of Thinking and Acting?"

⁷²See Arlene B. Tickner, "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World," *Millennium—Journal of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 295–324, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298030320020301>; Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*; N. Behera, "International Relations in South Asia: State of the Art," in *International Relations in South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradigm*, ed. N. Behera (New Delhi: Sage, 2008); A. Suresh Canagarajah, "'Nondiscursive' Requirements in Academic Publishing, Material Resources of Periphery Scholars, and the Politics of Knowledge Production," *Written Communication* 13, no. 4 (1996): 435–72, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0741088396013004001>.

⁷³For instance Doty's analysis of Robert Jackson's work on "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World" and Campbell's examination of the NSC 68 document are two important examples in this regard.

Along with the International Relations community that produces knowledge on particular areas depending on the corresponding interests of its experts, an equally significant production of knowledge happens in Area Studies centers across the universities in the West. As Mielke and Hornidge argue:

Area Studies expertise is again sought for and increasingly funded by governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to understand the other and how it can have such powerful effects on Northern societies... the economization of academia and the transnational regime of so-called “academic quality assessment,” which are also based on the amounts of third-party funding records, provide a major drive towards an increasing dependence of scientists on extra-epistemological forces. The effect is the nurturing of Eurocentric dominance in both ontological and epistemological scientific worldviews... [Area Studies] as a “world-making” activity risks becoming instrumentalized.⁷⁴

Rooted in a colonial legacy, Area Studies were initially a means to produce information and knowledge about different geographies and their people in order to enable western imperial nations to strengthen their colonial hold. Despite the processes of decolonization of the mid-twentieth century, the patterns of knowledge production in Area Studies have not changed substantially. In this regard, the position of the United States as one of the two superpowers in the aftermath of the Second World War played a vital role in keeping Area Studies thriving, not least because of the strategic interests that immediately presented themselves to the United States after the Second World War.⁷⁵ As Appadurai argues: “Area Studies are the largest institutional epistemology through which

⁷⁴Katja Mielke and Anna-Katharina Hornidge, eds., *Area Studies at the Crossroads: Knowledge Production After the Mobility Turn* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 4.

⁷⁵David L. Szanton, *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Discipline*, ed. David Szanton, vol. 3 (University of California Press, 2004), <https://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520245365>; Vicente L. Rafael, “Regionalism, Area Studies, and the Accidents of Agency,” *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (October 1999): 1208–20, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2649568>; Malini J. Schueller, “Area Studies and Multicultural Imperialism: The Project of Decolonizing Knowledge,” *Social Text* 25, no. 1 90 (March 1, 2007): 41–62, <https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2006-016>.

the academy in the US has apprehended much of the World in the last fifty years”.⁷⁶ Just as International Relations journals provide an intellectual platform for the scholars in the field to produce and disseminate knowledge, Area Studies journals perform a similar function for Area Studies specialists. However, the multi-disciplinarity of Area Studies journal allows many International Relations scholars to routinely publish their research in these journals. That is why an exploration of the discursive construction of Pakistan’s identity within the international scholarly community cannot be complete unless both International Relations and Asian/South Asian Area Studies journals are taken into consideration. While both International Relations Departments and affiliated centers along with Area Studies centers produce much of the knowledge through which we come to politically and socially *know* the world, this does not mean that knowledge production is restricted within the boundaries of the western universities.

When it comes to knowledge production on certain geographies, the role of think tanks cannot be ignored. While International Relations scholars collectively constitute a large resource pool for policy-makers, it is not until think-tank experts jump into the fray that some of their ideas are adopted for practice. In this way, think tanks occupy the semi-autonomous organizational space at the intersection of the fields of politics and academia.⁷⁷ But think-tank experts are not knowledge producers in the way that International Relations and Area Studies academics are. For one, unlike academics whose work may have implications for policy, but for whom influence on policy formulation is not a primary interest,⁷⁸ think-tank experts are constrained by certain parameters in their quest to

⁷⁶Arjun Appadurai, “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination,” *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 3, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pc/summary/v012/12.1appadurai.html>.

⁷⁷Jordan Soukias Tchilingirian, “Producing Knowledge, Producing Credibility: British Think-Tank Researchers and the Construction of Policy Reports,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 31, no. 2 (June 3, 2018): 161–78, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-018-9280-3>.

⁷⁸For a detailed discussion on Think-tanks and their relationship with the academia in International Relations, see David D. Newsom, “Foreign Policy and Academia,” *Foreign Policy* 101, no. 101 (1995): 52–67, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149406>; Howard Wiarda, “The New Powerhouses: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy,” *American Foreign Policy Interests* 30, no. 2 (2008): 96–117, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920802022704>.

produce knowledge. One of the constraints arises from their position as representatives of many social groups competing over governance, while operating in a complex environment where they have to manage relationships with their more economically and politically powerful sponsors.⁷⁹ Secondly, while academics are geared toward producing original research within their respective fields and within their self-imposed disciplinary interests, think-tank experts are largely motivated toward producing policy-relevant essays. For them, the value of academic knowledge is restricted to filling the gaps in the wider knowledge of their research on the target policy area.⁸⁰ For this reason, Freeman argues, think-tank experts approach knowledge differently from authoritative intellectuals. He further goes on to argue that unlike expert producers of knowledge such as the university academic, think-tank experts acquire knowledge products from a variety of sites and use them to their advantage by applying them at the appropriate moment.⁸¹ In that sense then, think tanks perform not so much as knowledge producers as knowledge reproducers.

Experts in think tanks have inadvertently become the arbitrators between power and knowledge. On the one hand, in order to help the state articulate the objective causes of international problems, identify the ‘real’ dangers or interests of states affected by those problems, and to suggest appropriate policy remedies, they have inadvertently become the “vehicle for the interpretation of international structures, the identification of the ‘imperatives’ facing the state, and the articulation of state interests in international politics”.⁸² On the other hand, their participation in the knowledge economy through ‘revolving doors’ allows them the opportunity to contribute toward knowledge production by becoming involved in disciplinary discussions through university teaching and journal publications. In the case of Pakistan, for instance, think-tank experts are often called upon to produce quick policy prescriptions

⁷⁹John Mclevey, “Think Tanks, Funding, and the Politics of Policy Knowledge in Canada,” *Canadian Review of Sociology* 51, no. 1 (2014): 54–75, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/cars.12033>.

⁸⁰Tchilingirian, “Producing Knowledge, Producing Credibility: British Think-Tank Researchers and the Construction of Policy Reports.”

⁸¹Richard Freeman, “Epistemological Bricolage: How Practitioners Make Sense of Learning,” *Administration & Society* 39, no. 4 (July 26, 2007): 476–96, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399707301857>.

⁸²Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 1 (2005): 108.

and analysis of the state of democracy in Pakistan, its role in countering global terrorism, or whether foreign aid to Pakistan should be withheld. At the same time, the ingress of their opinion into academic discourse allows them to circulate their ‘truth’ to a wider audience.

The need to inform policy-makers on how to vote on, let’s say, military aid to Pakistan, is simultaneously followed by an academic discussion on why military aid to Pakistan should be given or withheld. Implicit within a discussion of such issues is a construction of Pakistan’s identity. What this means is that within the context of these discussions Pakistan’s identity as a state has been constructed, and reconstructed practices of representation are brought into play which enables the production and reproduction of Pakistan’s identity. Through these “discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as truth”,⁸³ practices, policies and courses of action are made possible. This further means that the ‘truth’ about what the Pakistani state is, constitutes and informs the context of theoretical and empirical discussions around what action and policy it warrants. Doty argues that the productive practice of constructing identities and relationships “is perhaps most obvious in situations where the production of truth and knowledge coincides with the military and economic power that facilitates control and domination”.⁸⁴ In this instance then, the foreign policy think-tank experts who inform policy-making in the West cannot be absolved of the vital role they play in the production of ‘truth and knowledge’ about Pakistan’s representational identity by speaking to the economic and military power of the state on the one hand and, less conspicuously, by actively participating in discursive and representational practices through their membership of academe.⁸⁵

⁸³Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 5, https://books.google.com.pk/books/about/Imperial_Encounters.html?id=SUYudGRbIp0C&redir_esc=y.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, 146.

⁸⁵Stephen Walt laments that “the deans and faculty at many of these institutions are a who’s who of leading figures in the foreign-policy community, and most of them remain strongly committed to exercising U.S. power far and wide. Not surprisingly, the faculties at these institutions are mostly made up of policy-oriented academics and former government officials, people who are unlikely to question the central premises that have underpinned U.S. foreign policy for many years”. In Stephen Walt, “America’s IR Schools Are Broken,” *Foreign Policy*, 2018, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/20/americans-ir-schools-are-broken-international-relations-foreign-policy/>.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Considering that this study is aimed at exploring sites of knowledge construction and production, it visits IR as a discipline in addition to the sites where the knowledge it generates is transformed into power. Moreover, since the study has a significant identity dimension, it requires a theoretical understanding that bypasses essentialist positivist approaches. In that sense the constructivist variant that deals with the construction of reality through language and discourse, and explores the linkages between knowledge and power, provides us with a suitable alternative. According to Hall:

Discourses are ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice. A cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge, and conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society. These discursive formations as they are known, define what is and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and are practices in relations to, a particular subject or site of social activity; what knowledge is considered useful, relevant and 'true' in that context; and what sort of persons or 'subjects' embody its characteristics.⁸⁶

Since the question that this study seeks to ask is *how* Pakistan's identity is constructed, produced and reproduced rather than *why*, hence most positivist analytical frameworks and methodologies are inadequate. For this reason interpretive and qualitative in nature, discourse analysis emerges as a suitable analytical framework for this research. However, this research takes a *discursive* approach rather than a *semiotic* one to analyze the discursive formation of Pakistan's identity. While the semiotic approach to discourse analysis is merely concerned with the production of meaning through language, the discursive approach instead focuses on the effects and consequences of representational practices. This approach not only examines how language and representational practices are integral to the discursive formations of identity, but also seeks to explore how the knowledge produced by discourse "connects with power, regulates conduct, makes up or constructs identities and subjectivities, and

⁸⁶Stuart Hall, ed., *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (Sage in association with the Open University, 1997), 6.

defines the way certain things are represented, thought about, practiced and studied”.⁸⁷ But how do we examine representational constructions in discourse and how do we analyze the ways in which the representational identities constructed through discourse connect with power?

Milliken identifies three distinguishable analytical bundles of theoretical claims within discourse analysis.⁸⁸ The first theoretical commitment, according to Milliken, is to “a concept of discourse as structures of significations which construct social reality”.⁸⁹ Discourse can be studied as a system of signification by analyzing significative constructions, first by drawing on Saussure’s understanding of the relationship between the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’. The signifier is the “mark, word, sound or image that refers to something, and the ‘signified’ is the mental idea of the thing to be represented”.⁹⁰ Secondly, drawing on Derrida’s philosophical work, we can expect discourses to be arranged in terms of binary oppositions such as “Greek versus barbarian, Christian versus infidel, civilized versus primitive, modern versus traditional”,⁹¹ and more contemporaneously, First World versus Third World and empire versus failed states.⁹² These binary oppositions, far from being neutral language constructions, manifest relations of power by according privilege to one element in the binary. The second theoretical commitment, Milliken argues “is to discourses as being productive or reproductive of things defined by discourse”.⁹³ By discourse productivity Milliken refers to how discourse operationalizes certain ‘regimes of truth’ while excluding other modes of identity and action. More specifically, Milliken argues that discourse (i) defines the subjects authorized to speak and to act; (ii) defines knowledgeable practices of these subjects toward places and groups that

⁸⁷Hall.

⁸⁸Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods.”

⁸⁹Ibid., 229.

⁹⁰Anthony Burke, “Post-Structural Security Studies,” in *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 78.

⁹¹Richard Harvey Brown, “Cultural Representation and Ideological Domination,” *Social Forces* 71, no. 3 (March 1993): 657–76, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2579889>.

⁹²Mallaby, “The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire.”

⁹³Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”, 229.

are produced and defined as objects by discourse and finally (iii) works simultaneously to define and to enable and to silence and exclude by rendering other modes of interpretations impractical and meaningless, thus endorsing a certain common sense. The third theoretical commitment refers to a ‘play of practice’ which examines hegemonic discourses and “their structuring of meaning as connected to implementing practices and ways of making these intelligible and legitimate”.⁹⁴ Jackson further provides a succinct understanding of these commitments:

Discourse theorising is predicated on a number of theoretical commitments, including, among others: an understanding of language as constitutive or productive of meaning; an understanding of discourse as structures of signification which help to construct social realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification...; an understanding of discourse as being productive of subjects authorised to speak and act, legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices, and importantly, common sense within particular social groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, inter-textual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-articulation and therefore, open to destabilisation and counter-hegemonic struggle.⁹⁵

This study shares these theoretical commitments in its quest to examine the dominant discourse on the representational practices that construct Pakistan’s identity by analyzing the structures of signification in the texts produced by academia, which in this case are the highly cited academic journal articles on Pakistan in the fields of International Relations and Area Studies. Though texts such as books and policy papers are important sites of knowledge production, they do not represent the field of International Relations and Area Studies in the manner that academic journals do, since these journals are the most direct measure of the disciplines themselves.⁹⁶ Academic journals sanction what passes as

⁹⁴Ibid., 230.

⁹⁵Jackson, “The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies”, 378.

⁹⁶Ole Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 687–727, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550725>.

knowledge. In that sense, they assume the responsibilities of being gate-keepers of a community of knowledge producers. Their rigorous peer review and editorial processes ascertain what knowledge is worth circulating and who should be given membership of the club of knowledge producers. In doing so, academic journals set the parameters of what qualifies as knowledge in International Relations and Area Studies and who is qualified to produce it. In order to investigate the discursive construction of Pakistan's identity, this study examines journal articles on Pakistan published in top International Relations and Asian/South Asian Studies journals from 2006 to 2016.⁹⁷ Our research focuses on articles within these journals that are specifically written about Pakistan and South Asia. Since discourse produces this world and it selectively constitutes some and "not others as privileged storytellers...to whom narrative authority...is granted",⁹⁸ consequently an analysis of this data allows us not only to assess who is publishing on Pakistan, and the spatially located/geographical sites from where these articles are published, but a close examination of highly cited articles also enables us to unveil who these privileged storytellers are and analyze the 'circulation of truth' on Pakistan assimilated by academic audiences, both students and experts, as common sense.

To summarize, this research investigates knowledge production within the academic International Relations community within western universities, the South Asia centers at the top universities in the world and influential think tanks in the West through the lens of three questions.⁹⁹ Firstly, what knowledge is produced on Pakistan? Secondly, how much knowledge is produced on Pakistan? Thirdly, who is producing knowledge on Pakistan? An examination of the discursive production of knowledge within universities (International Relations and Asian/South Asian Centers) and outside the universities (think tanks) consequently reveals the intrinsically connected textual, institutional and social processes through which representational identities are discursively produced.

⁹⁷The journal rankings are taken from the data maintained by Scimago Labs and powered by Scopus. See <https://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php?category=3320>.

⁹⁸Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods", 236.

⁹⁹This examination will access the Times Higher Education ranking of universities in International Relations and will look at the corresponding South Asia Centers at these universities.

CHAPTER STRUCTURE

The introductory chapter explored the subject matter of this book by, first, identifying the theoretical basis of its claim and explaining the theoretical relevance of knowledge, power and discourse, as proposed by constructivists, to the emergence of Pakistan's representational identity through discursive practices. The chapter provided the theoretical basis for our subsequent examination. It begins with an exploration of the positivist and post-positivist positions on 'truth' by examining the relationship between knowledge and power and discourse and 'reality'. Secondly, this chapter introduced the key players in the knowledge economy (International Relations community, Area Studies centers and think tanks), who together form an interpretive community. Lastly, this chapter provided an analytical framework for the examination of the discursive practices through which Pakistan's representational identity is constructed.

Chapter 2 focuses on the knowledge-production processes emerging within the International Relations community in universities. It begins by broadly exploring the discursive practices within International Relations and their relationship with knowledge and power in the construction of representational identities. The second section explains the processes through which these texts construct Pakistan's identity which includes a detailed analysis of the articles published on Pakistan in International Relations. The chapter then moves on to explore the relationship between pedagogical arrangements and their relationship with the circulation of knowledge in International Relations and consequently how this discourse productive exercise connects to the wider International community through policy-proximate roles. The final section discursively analyzes the top most cited articles on Pakistan in International Relations to explore the knowledge being produced through which Pakistan's representational identity is constructed.

Chapter 3 examines the role of Asian/South Asian studies centers in the discursive production of Pakistan's identity. This examination follows a dual trajectory. First, it discursively analyzes key texts of articles published on Pakistan within the journals of Asian/South Asian studies. It further explores the processes through which knowledge of Pakistan is produced. Secondly, on a different trajectory, this chapter examines the constitutive elements of South Asia centers, analyzes the research on the region conducted in these centers and explores how Pakistan figures in

this research. Lastly the chapter analyzes the discourse on Pakistan in top cited articles of South Asian studies journals.

Chapter 4 aims to contribute toward an understanding of the role of think tanks and their place in the knowledge-production process. Think-tank experts routinely publish work in top International Relations and Area Study journals. This chapter discursively analyzes the texts of their publications on Pakistan. It also examines the discursive practices through which think-tank experts connect to the wider community of scholars and, as knowledge-producing subjects, have a wider audience through their links to the academic community in universities and the policy-making community. The final chapter of the book examines knowledge-production processes in Pakistan. The chapter explores the knowledge community in Pakistan and its contribution to and influence on, the dominant discourse on Pakistan. The chapter analyzes the knowledge–power nexus in Pakistan by examining the links between the International Relations academic community, Think-tank experts and policy-making.

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The ‘Truth’ About Pakistan: Knowledge Production and Circulation in International Relations

Knowledge-production processes have come under increased scrutiny in recent years. From the academic disciplines of Geography¹ to Development Studies,² scholars have been preoccupied by a concern with mapping the unevenness of knowledge production in their respective fields. International Relations, as an academic field of inquiry, is no exception. Since the initial exposition of International Relations as an American social science by Stanley Hoffman,³ researchers have been busy trying to explore the skewed nature of knowledge production in

¹Parvati Raghuram and Clare Madge, “Towards a Method for Postcolonial Development Geography? Possibilities and Challenges,” *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 27, no. 3 (November 1, 2006): 270–88, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9493.2006.00262.x>; Tariq Jazeel and Colin McFarlane, “The Limits of Responsibility: A Postcolonial Politics of Academic Knowledge Production,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 35, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 109–24, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2009.00367.x>.

²Paul Hoebink and Sarah Cummings, “Representation of Academics from Developing Countries as Authors and Editorial Board Members in Scientific Journals: Does This Matter to the Field of Development Studies?” *European Journal of Development Research* 29, no. 2 (2017): 369–83, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-016-0002-2>. Research Project on *The Geopolitics of Academic Knowledge Production: Political economy of academic knowledge production: constructs of inequality and issues of diversity and inclusion*, at the Center for Critical Development Studies, University of Toronto, Canada.

³Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” *Daedalus* 106, no. 3 (1977): 41–60, <https://www.amherst.edu/system/files/media/0084/Hoffman.pdf>.

International Relations. Most of this work scrutinizes the International Relations literature by analyzing various contributions to International Relations Theory. Having established the dominance of American thought in International Relations, the research agenda has recently moved on to analyzing the exclusionary nature of a discipline that prefers ontologically positivist and epistemologically rationalist knowledge to other forms of knowledge. To that extent, the scholarly resistance to traditional thought and methods in International Relations has followed two parallel developments. First, a disciplinary inquiry into the ideational foundations of International Relations has sought to question the ontological character of knowledge itself and historiographically investigated the discipline's self-narration.⁴ Secondly, another set of literature that analyzed the sociology of the discipline explored how the dominance of Anglo-American thought effected the marginalization of Third World scholarship by inhibiting the participation of Third World scholars in the knowledge-production process, for reasons endogenous or exogenous to the processes within the Third World states.⁵ This literature, which is predominantly positioned within postcolonialism in International Relations, examines core-periphery relations through the lens of which scholars study First and Third World interactions. It is largely preoccupied with questions of disciplinary exclusion (why is Third World scholarship marginalized in International Relations?) and disciplinary inclusion (how is International Relations practised in difference locations around

⁴For instance, see Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 251–87, <https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140577>; Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations* (Verso, 2009); Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, "The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You About 1648 and 1919," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (May 24, 2011): 735–58, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811401459>; Jack Donnelly, "The Discourse of Anarchy in IR," *International Theory* 7, no. 3 (November 21, 2015): 393–425, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000111>.

⁵For instance the volumes edited by Tickner and Weaver, and Acharya and Buzan not only explore the factors which arise in the West and which constrain Third World scholarship from participating but also the conditions and processes within the Third World which internally inhibit their contributions. See Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* (New York and London: Routledge, 2009); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (Routledge, 2010).

the world?). A basic premise of the postcolonial theory in International Relations is an explicit dismissal of the positivists' assertions of an a priori material reality 'out there'. To that extent under the overarching theoretical umbrella of post-positivism and what Smith terms constitutive theory,⁶ scholars of various schools of thought (social constructivism, postcolonialism and post-structuralism) instead argue that knowledge constructs 'reality', and that it is within the representational practices embedded within International Relations discourse that the Third World is constructed. This brings us to the case of Pakistan.

The chapter analyzes academic journal articles on Pakistan in the fields of International Relations.

Our analysis is consequently based on a data set compiled from the top 100 journals in the field of International Relations from 2006 to 2016. The top 100 journals were selected from the 2017 journal ranking published by Scopus.⁷ Forty-two journals did not publish an article on Pakistan, hence the data set is restricted to 134 articles on Pakistan in 58 journals, including articles on South Asia within which Pakistan is studied. These articles also include those entries which were printed outside the temporal interval set for this research but were published online between 2006 and 2016. The chapter initially explores the data and analyzes dominant trends in the study of Pakistan. It then moves on to explain how knowledge-production processes and their intrinsic connection to pedagogy become conduits for the circulation of 'truth' and in doing so implicitly construct the representational identity of Pakistan. Finally the chapter expounds how knowledge is circulated in policy thinking by academics pursuing policy-proximate roles.

⁶Steve Smith, "The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: 'Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline'," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 2 (2002): 67–85, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3186354>.

⁷The ranking can be accessed at <https://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php?category=3320&type=j&area=3300>.

THE ACADEMIA AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

The ‘University’ until very recently, has been heralded as the *key* institution most intimately associated with knowledge-production processes in the West.⁸ Increasingly, the monopoly of the ‘western’ universities on knowledge production and transmission has been unraveled by a burgeoning of alternate sources of knowledge producers.⁹ However, despite the ingress of these organizations into the intellectual activity that was once a university’s domain, the university in the western world continues to wield considerable power and resources in interpreting and sanctioning what passes on as knowledge. The emergence of many recent factors has now forced academia to participate and compete in a race for the power over knowledge.¹⁰ This competition has allowed academia to come out of its ‘ivory tower’ and partake in the politics of knowledge distribution. In this way, academia joins other knowledge producers such as think tanks, advocacy networks and research groups in the fight over whose interpretations qualify for operationalization through policy-making.¹¹

While this holds true for the range of disciplines categorized within social sciences, the discipline of International Relations is notable among the social sciences fields in the extent to which it has aligned itself with the needs of the policy-making machine. The apparent mutual exclusivity

⁸S. McNair, “Is There a Crisis? Does It Matter?” in *The End of Knowledge in Higher Education*, ed. Ronald Barnett and Anne Griffin (Cassell, 1997), 192; Ruth H. Finnegan, ed., *Participating in the Knowledge Society: Researchers Beyond the University Walls* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Steve Fuller, *The Governance of Science: Ideology and the Future of the Open Society* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), <https://search-works.stanford.edu/view/4321059>; Peter Scott, ed., *Higher Education Re-formed* (Falmer Press, 2000).

⁹These include and are not limited to Industrial firms, public and private research institutes, government, consultancies, charities, think tanks, Royal Commissions, survey organizations, newspapers, broadcasting organizations and activist bodies, etc.

¹⁰Benoit Godin and Yves Gingras, “The Place of Universities in the System of Knowledge Production,” *Research Policy* 29, no. 2 (2000): 273–78, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333\(99\)00065-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(99)00065-7).

¹¹The knowledge producers compete for greater power by using various means to influence policy and attract funding arrangements for research. This competition premises on the use of social, electronic and print media to draw attention to the significance of their expertise in their respective fields.

of the domain of the professor and the policy-maker is fast crumbling. Many professors have gone on to hold key governmental positions¹² and many governmental officials have turned to an academic career. However, this is more a staple of the US knowledge-production system than those of its transatlantic partners, who continue to keep the divide between policy-making and academia intact.¹³ For instance, notable experts on Pakistan such as Stephen P. Cohen, Daniel Markey, and Lawrence Ziring have held both academic positions and policy assignments. Being authoritative subjects in International Relations, the knowledge on Pakistan that they have produced contributes vitally to the discourse on Pakistan both within academia and policy-making circles. Thus, when Stephen Cohen argues that “the failure of Pakistan would be a multidimensional geostrategic calamity, generating enormous uncertainties in a world that craves order and predictability”,¹⁴ or when Daniel Markey announces that “Pakistan is a failing state in many ways [...] it could fail in ways that are far worse than at present”,¹⁵ or when Lawrence Ziring asserts that Pakistan is a weak state, a failed state and a garrison state,¹⁶ they contribute to the knowledge in a discourse that inevitably ends up constructing a certain ‘truth’ about Pakistan. Resultantly, this aspect of the discourse on Pakistan—one that sees Pakistan as a failing state and a threat to global security—has gained such power that even those who deem the ‘failed state’ categorization of states as inherently ambiguous and analytically useless, endorse Pakistan’s failed state status. For instance, Hehir argues that:

¹²David D. Newsom, “Foreign Policy and Academia,” *Foreign Policy* 101, no. 101 (1995): 52–67, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149406>.

¹³Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, “The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,” *Review of International Studies* 20, no. 1 (1994): 15–34, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500117760>.

¹⁴P. Stephen and S. Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 118.

¹⁵D. Markey, *No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Pakistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10.

¹⁶L. Ziring, “Weak State, Failed State, Garrison State: The Pakistan Saga,” in *South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament*, ed. T. Paul (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 170–95.

Fundamentally, determining whether the term “failed” can be applied to any state is subjective and often political. As a pejorative term “failed state” has proved to be malleable enough to be applied to a vast array of states and a powerful rhetorical device; as an objective definition of an observable condition, its utility is less evident. Yet leaving these concerns aside, much evidence suggests that owing to its obvious internal divisions, coercive incapacity and high level of terrorist activity Pakistan can plausibly be deemed a failed state, as the Failed State Index attests.¹⁷

The classification and the naturalization of Pakistan as a ‘failed/failing/fragile’ state¹⁸ is only one aspect of the process through which discourse fixes and stabilizes the meaning of Pakistan. It is when other discourses such as, for example, ‘terrorism’, ‘extremism’ and ‘governance’ combine with Pakistan’s status as ‘failing state’ that an interpretation of Pakistan is created that heralds doomsday scenarios. Considering how knowledge production has now become a multiple-site process, even governmental officials have not shied away from subscribing to a similar interpretation of Pakistan.¹⁹

Through such processes knowledge produced within academia is brought to actionable policy usage, and knowledge accrued by government officials permeates through the dense academic membrane. The effects of International Relations’ need for policy relevance²⁰ becomes all the more clear given that the percentage of non-paradigmatic research in leading International Relations journals amounted to 50% of the total

¹⁷A. Hehir, *Is Pakistan a Failed State?* (Brief Number 15, Bradford: Pakistan Security Research Unit [PSRU], 2007), 10.

¹⁸The terms are often used interchangeably denoting the weakness of states and the use of these terms are only a matter of semantics.

¹⁹See for instance The News International, “Pakistan a Failed State, Stated Planning Commission Chief,” *The News International*, December 19, 2012, <https://www.the-news.com.pk/archive/print/627238-pakistan-a-failed-state-stated-planning-commission-chief>; Dawn News, “Pakistan May Become a Failed State If Current Circumstances Persist: Shahbaz,” *Dawn*, February 21, 2013, <https://www.dawn.com/news/787642>; Attaur Rahman, “A Failing State,” *The Express Tribune*, February 22, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/510629/a-failing-state/>; Ahmed Waheed, *The Wrong Ally: Pakistan’s State Sovereignty Under US Dependence* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018).

²⁰Foreign Policy, “Does the Academy Matter?” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, March 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/15/does-the-academy-matter/>.

content of those journals in 2006.²¹ At the same time, 90% of the articles in these International Relations journals were ontologically positivist.²² Research conducted within the western academies is automatically explicit in its proclamation of universality, projecting itself as discovering a 'truth' which lies implicit within theoretical, conceptual and thematic frameworks boxed in by a positivist understanding.²³ As Raghuram and Madge argue: "The often unstated claim to universality is one of the key problems of how many northern academics currently theorize".²⁴ While research within western academia constructs knowledge for a local audience, the reverberations of this causally oriented knowledge make themselves felt in academia in the South, which unwittingly assimilates it. This is because academia in the non-West is a passive recipient of research agendas, methods and ideas emanating from western academia, and this passivity is due to a "shared sense of [...] intellectual inferiority against the West".²⁵

²¹Paradigmatic research is the research that fits neatly into the dominant International Relations paradigms such as Realism, Liberalism, Marxism and Constructivism. Non-paradigmatic research, Maliniak et al. argued was a research that advanced theoretic arguments grounded in for example, cognitive psychology, strategic choice, feminism, the English School, prospect theory instead of the main International Relations paradigms.

²²Daniel Maliniak et al., "International Relations in the US Academy," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 437–64, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00653.x>.

²³Jazeel and McFarlane, "The Limits of Responsibility: A Postcolonial Politics of Academic Knowledge Production." They are quick to remind us that "Theory is never a disinterested relay of the happenings of a world out there. Though we may search for better theoretical languages to bring aspects from our research into representation (as we may be coaxed into them by processes like peer review, best-practice and the onus on producing 'world class research'), we must remember that theory also writes the world in its image. Theory, then, thought as part of the academic practitioner's oeuvre, should never simply thought as a relay of a world existing 'out there'; it is sign-structure as well, participant and producer of its own system of semiotics. In terms of the space theory constructs around itself, the pretence that theory is untouched by representation's multiple mechanics participates in a violent effacement of difference within academic praxis, once again expansively imperialising modernity's own conceptual categorizations."

²⁴Parvati Raghuram and Clare Madge, "Towards a Method for Postcolonial Development Geography? Possibilities and Challenges," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 27, no. 3 (November 1, 2006): 280, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9493.2006.00262.x>.

²⁵Syed Farid Alatas, "Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences," *Current Sociology* 51, no. 6 (2003): 603, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921030516003>.

This ostensible inferiority of the non-West is cultivated through its participation in the processes of knowledge production,²⁶ and is further evident in the “West’s monopolistic control of and influence over the nature and flow of social scientific knowledge”.²⁷ Western academia generates a huge proportion of global social science research in the form of scientific papers in peer-reviewed journals, books and research papers. This has been demonstrated by Tickner and Wæver using a data set of journal articles in the top International Relations journals, collected from 1970 to 2005: More than 80% of articles were published by scholars positioned in the West. The figures serve to illustrate how the field of International Relations is heavily skewed.²⁸ Furthermore, the publication of most of the top journals in the field of International Relations in the West, allows western academia to ensure the global reach of its ideas and information. This global reach enables it to influence the discourse of International Relations in the non-West through ensuring the global academic consumption of its products. The skewed structure of the field of International Relations creates a split whereby western academia produces original theoretical/meta-theoretical analysis and “methodologically

²⁶Postcolonial literature on the dynamics of core–periphery relations has often looked at the inherent asymmetry in process of knowledge production in the social sciences in general and the International Relations specifically. See W. Keim, “Social Sciences Internationally: The Problem of Marginalisation and Its Consequences for the Discipline of Sociology,” *African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie* 12, no. 2 (2008): 22–48, <https://doi.org/10.2307/24487604>; Wiebke Keim, Ercüment Çelik, and Veronika Wöhrer, eds., *Global Knowledge Production in the Social Sciences: Made in Circulation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014); Syed Farid Alatas, “Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences,” *Current Sociology* 51, no. 6 (November 30, 2003): 599–613; Arlene B. Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 627–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494323>; Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship: Around World*; Ole Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American in and European Developments International Relations,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (2013): 687–727.

²⁷Ibid., 206.

²⁸Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 5.

sophisticated” studies,²⁹ while at the same time restricting non-western academia to producing copious amounts of empirical work on issues within their respective territories, which take its cues from most of the research conducted in the West. This certainly holds true in the case of Pakistan, since most of the work conducted in Pakistan on matters of International Relations is case study-based and takes for its premise the ontological assumptions of western ideas and concepts.³⁰ Knowledge production in academia, which allots significance to research published in journal articles as an implicit method to generate meaning, thus works on two dimensions. First, by ascribing a superior character to literature originating in the West, the non-West is relegated to the role of recipient of rather than contributor to the discourse. Secondly, this affects the ways in which western-produced knowledge is assimilated in the non-West. For instance, considering how the category of a ‘failed/failing/fragile state’ is discursively established through the knowledge produced by the West, most of the discussions in Pakistan on its place within the category seek to either endorse or debate this construction of Pakistan’s reality, but eschew any challenge to the ontological assumptions of the category.

THE ‘TRUTH’ ABOUT PAKISTAN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Between 2006 and 2016, 134 journal articles specifically on Pakistan and on the South Asian region, appeared in the top 100 journals in the field of International Relations.³¹ This data also includes articles that were published in non-peer-reviewed journals and magazines such

²⁹Tickner and Wæver.

³⁰For a discussion on the state of International Relations in Pakistan and its relationship with the ‘Realist’ paradigm, see Ahmed Waheed, “State Sovereignty and International Relations in Pakistan: Analysing the Realism Stranglehold,” *South Asia Research* 37, no. 3 (2017): 277–95, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728017725624>; N. Behera, “South Asia: A ‘Realist’ Past and Alternative Futures,” in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, ed. A. Tickner and O. Wæver (London: Routledge, 2009); N. Behera, “International Relations in South Asia: State of the Art,” in *International Relations in South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradigm*, ed. N. Behera (New Delhi: Sage, 2008).

³¹These do not include 60 journal articles which were published in print earlier but were published online during 2006–2016.

as *Washington Quarterly* and *Foreign Affairs*. The dominant themes in the literature on Pakistan were (1) militancy and militant Islam, (2) Pakistan's nuclear program and its global and regional implications, (3) Pakistan and its relationship with terrorism, (4) democracy and civil-military relations in Pakistan, (5) India-Pakistan relations and (6) Pakistan-US relations. Among the scholars who have authored and coauthored these publications, only 9 scholars published in these journals while being based in Pakistan, the rest of the Pakistani scholars visible in the dataset were affiliated with western knowledge-production hubs at the time of their publications. This endorses Tickner and Waver's observation that it makes a huge difference to a scholar's global visibility and prestige whether (s)he is based in western centers of knowledge production or working from the peripheries.³² The visibility of only 9 Pakistan-based scholars in the top 100 journals of International Relations over the ten years from 2006 to 2016 demonstrates quite vividly the limited participation of Pakistani scholars in the knowledge-production process and their restricted role in the academic polemical activity on Pakistan's identity. In effect then, the almost invisible contribution of Pakistan-based scholars in the discourse on Pakistan implicitly suppresses, excludes and delegitimizes what they *know* about Pakistan through the conventions and regulation of their publication practices.³³

The data also highlights the dominance of Anglo-American scholarship on Pakistan. Of the total scholars who contributed to the literature on Pakistan, 52.5% scholars were based in the United States, 16.01% in the UK, and 10.9% in Europe. Taken all together 82.42% of scholarship originated from western centers of knowledge production.³⁴ The dominance of a western mode of thought, which discursively travels through intertextuality, builds knowledge about Pakistan through academic hegemonic structures that act as 'norm enforcing institutions' in International Relations. The contention here is not that knowledge

³²Tickner and Waver, *International Relations Scholarsh: Around World*.

³³For a conceptual understanding of how nondiscursive processes inhibit Third World participation in mainstream academic debates, see A. Suresh. Canagarajah, "Nondiscursive Requirements in Academic Publishing, Material Resources of Periphery Scholars, and the Politics of Knowledge Production," *Written Communication* 13, no. 4 (1996): 435–72, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0741088396013004001>.

³⁴This also includes Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

from within Pakistan is being marginalized or being appropriated (this is quite obvious), but that “material power aids and shapes the knowledge construction”,³⁵ and in doing so International Relations journals sanction certain representations of Pakistan’s identity which have implicitly monopolized the ‘truth’ about Pakistan, and that the discursive production of Pakistan’s identity by the West has huge policy implications.

Within the data gathered on the knowledge produced in International Relation journals on Pakistan, 5 journals and magazines have contributed substantially to that knowledge. *The Washington Quarterly* published 18 articles, *Survival* published 13 articles, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* published 16 articles, *International Security* published 11 articles and *Foreign Affairs* published 8 articles. Taken together these journals have contributed 47.7% of the scholarship produced on Pakistan between 2006 and 2016. Out of these, 2 journals are housed in US academic centers (*The Washington Quarterly* is hosted by the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and *International Security* is edited by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University), while 2 are published by UK think tanks (*Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* is published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and *International Affairs* is published by Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs). All these journals boast of their policy-proximate positions. For instance *International Security* asserts that it “has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years”³⁶; *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* positions itself as a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs³⁷; *International Affairs* “has become renowned for its academically rigorous, practitioner-focused scholarship”³⁸; *The Washington Quarterly* argues that the “members of

³⁵Grazia M. Saracino, *Writing for Scholarly Publication in English: Issues for Nonnative Speakers* (Manni Publishers, 2004), 377.

³⁶Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, *International Security* (MIT Press), accessed October 11, 2018, <https://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/isec>.

³⁷*Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (The International Institute for Strategic Studies), accessed October 11, 2018, <https://www.iiss.org/>.

³⁸Royal Institute of International Affairs, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944), <https://academic.oup.com/ia/pages/About>.

the analytical, diplomatic, intelligence, media, and policymaking communities value TWQ as a source of incisive, independent thinking about global political and security challenges and policies”.³⁹ Considering the global reach of these journals and their location at the intersection of the academic and the policy-making communities, it comes as no surprise that the most cited articles, and indeed most of the scholarship on Pakistan, belong to these journals.

Given the nature and the scope of these journals, their gatekeeping knowledge-production process has reduced the understanding of Pakistan’s identity by enabling knowledge constructions fenced in by specific security-centric parameters. At the same time because publication in these journals allows scholars to harness policy-proximate positions, the circulation of certain knowledge about Pakistan’s representational identity is facilitated, the ‘scientific’ nature of which sanctions the ‘truth’ about Pakistan. Further, because the most produced (see Table 2.1) and the most cited work (see Table 2.2) on Pakistan originates in the United States, this programmatic circulation of knowledge provides the lens through which recipients of this knowledge assimilate the ‘truth’, which in dominant ways is only a US-specific understanding of Pakistan’s identity. To take interpretative license from Ido Oren, the question that the International Relations community needs to answer about Pakistan is: How can International Relations scholarship on Pakistan remain an objective and neutral exploration even as it seeks greater intimacy with policy-making processes?

That the International Relations scholar is central to the production of knowledge is widely accepted and has consistently been explored through detailed analysis of their knowledge contributions to academic journals. However, their centrality in constructing regimes of ‘truth’ through the circulation of International Relations knowledge claims has garnered scant attention. While International Relations professionals participate in the knowledge-production and knowledge-circulation processes through their contributions to academic journals, this is not the only professional activity through which they partake in the discursive practice of fixing ‘truths’. As mentioned earlier, the implicit construction

³⁹The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, *The Washington Quarterly* (Taylor & Francis), accessed October 11, 2018, <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/about-twq>.

Table 2.1 Most ‘produced’ work on Pakistan in International Relations journals—recurring contributors on Pakistan

S. No.	Author	Article(s)			Journal	
		Name	No. of Citations	Contributing author(s)	Name/country	Ranking
1.	C. Christine Fair	Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan	26	Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro	<i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i> /US	8
		Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan	105	Jacob N. Shapiro	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
		Measuring Political Violence in Pakistan: Insights from the BFRS Dataset	16	Erhan Bueno de Mesquita, Jenna Jordan, and Rasul Bakhsh Rais	<i>Conflict Management and Peace Science</i> /US	15
		Using Manpower Policies to Transform the Force and Society: The Case of the Pakistan Army	04	–	<i>Security Studies</i> /UK	27
		Why the Pakistan Army is Here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance	31	–	<i>International Affairs</i> /UK	32
		Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?	83	–	<i>Terrorism and Political Violence</i> /UK	50
		Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights From a National Sample	50	Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro	<i>Terrorism and Political Violence</i> /UK	50
		Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Pakistan	36	–	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

S. No.	Author	Article(s)		No. of Citations	Contributing author(s)	Journal	
		Name				Name/country	Ranking
	Sumit Ganguly	Five Dangerous Myths about Pakistan		0	Sumit Ganguly	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52
		Consenting to a Child's Decision to Join a Jihad: Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan		56	Victor Asal and Stephen Shellman	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK	64
		Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations		57	–	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK	64
		Can Knowledge of Islam Explain Lack of Support for Terrorism?		09	Jacob S. Goldstei and Ali Hamza	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK	64
		Evidence from Pakistan		22	–	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK	66
		Pakistan's Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?		22	Shuja Nawaz	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK	66
		The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps		08	Karl Kaltenthaler and William Miller	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK	66
		Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on US Drone Attacks		64	Seth G. Jones	<i>Survival</i> /UK	77
		Pakistan's War Within Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State		41	–	<i>Survival</i> /UK	77
		The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia		40	S. Paul Kapur	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
2.	Sumit Ganguly	Nuclear Stability in South Asia		92	–	<i>International Security</i> /US	9

S. No.	Author	Article(s)		Journal	
		Name	No. of Citations	Contributing author(s)	Name/country
3.	Jacob N. Shapiro	The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy	34	Michael R. Kraig	<i>Security Studies</i> /UK
		War, Nuclear Weapons, and Crisis Stability in South Asia	06	–	<i>Security Studies</i> /UK
		Five Dangerous Myths about Pakistan	0	C. Christine Fair	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK
		Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Issues and the Stability/Instability Paradox	16	–	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK
		India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War	24	R Harrison Wagner	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK
		Will Kashmir Stop India's Rise?	65	–	<i>Foreign Affairs</i> /US
		Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan	102	Will Bullock and Kosuke Imai	<i>Political Analysis</i> /UK
		Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan	26	C. Christine Fair and Neil Malhotra	<i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i> /US
		Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan	105	C. Christine Fair	<i>International Security</i> /US
		Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights From a National Sample	50	C. Christine Fair and Neil Malhotra	<i>Terrorism and Political Violence</i> /UK

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

S. No.	Author	Article(s)		No. of Citations	Contributing author(s)	Journal	
		Name				Name/country	Ranking
4.	Ashley J. Tellis	Pakistan's Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance		43	—	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52
		The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan		35	—	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52
		U.S. strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation		14	—	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52
5.	Stephen Taniel	Beyond FATA: Exploring the Punjabi Militant Threat to Pakistan		07	—	<i>Terrorism and Political Violence</i> /UK	50
		Confronting Pakistan's Support for Terrorism: Don't Designate, Calibrate		01	—	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52
		Beyond the Double Game: Lessons from Pakistan's Approach to Islamist Militancy		04	—	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK	66
6.	Stephen Philip Cohen	The Nation and the State of Pakistan		56	—	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52
		The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan		34	—	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52
		India, Pakistan and Kashmir		24	—	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK	66
7.	Karl Kaltenthaler	The Sources of Pakistani Attitudes toward Religiously Motivated Terrorism		24	William J. Miller, Stephen Ceccoli and Ron Gellensy	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK	64

S. No.	Author	Article(s)		No. of Citations	Contributing author(s)	Journal		Ranking
		Name				Name/country		
8.	William J. Miller	Ethnicity, Islam, and Pakistani Public Opinion toward the Pakistani Taliban		11	William Miller	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK		64
		Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on US Drone Attacks		08	C. Christine Fair and William Miller	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK		66
		The Sources of Pakistani Attitudes toward Religiously Motivated Terrorism		24	Karl Kaltenthaler, Stephen Ceccoli and Ron Gelleny	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK		64
9.	Seth G. Jones	Ethnicity, Islam, and Pakistani Public Opinion toward the Pakistani Taliban		11	Karl Kaltenthaler	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK		64
		Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on US Drone Attacks		08	C. Christine Fair and Karl Kaltenthaler	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK		66
		India and Pakistan at the Edge		15	Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara	<i>Survival</i> /UK		77
		Pakistan's War Within		64	C. Christine Fair	<i>Survival</i> /UK		77
		The Terrorist Threat from Pakistan		12	—	<i>Survival</i> /UK		77

Information/Key

1. Authors who have contributed three or more articles to Pakistan have been included
2. In case the article(s) had contributing authors, the table mentions them
3. The table uses Scimago Country and Journal Rank
4. The data regarding the journals has been limited to top hundred ranked journals
5. The table includes articles from 2006 to 2016, and
6. The articles in the table include Pakistan and South Asia as central topics

Table 2.2 Most cited work on Pakistan in International Relations journals

S. No.	Article			Journal	
	Name	Author(s)	No. of citations	Name/country	Ranking
1.	Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan	Will Bullock, Kosuke Imai and Jacob N. Shapiro	102	<i>Political Analysis</i> /UK	7
2.	India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe	S. Paul Kapur	129	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
3.	No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan Afghanistan Frontier	Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason	187	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
4.	Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan	Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair	105	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
5.	Posturing for Peace? Pakistan 'Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability	Vipin Narang	156	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
6.	Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices	Samina Ahmed	93	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
7.	Nuclear Stability in South Asia	Sumit Ganguly	92	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
8.	Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia	S. Paul Kapur	100	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
9.	Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia	Paul Staniland	119	<i>International Security</i> /US	9
10.	The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan	Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi	88	<i>International Studies Quarterly</i> /UK	14
11.	From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization	Aurel Croissant	111	<i>Democratization</i> /UK	28
12.	Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?	C. Christine Fair	83	<i>Terrorism and Political Violence</i> /UK	50

S. No.	Article	Journal			
	Name	Author(s)	No. of citations	Name/country	Ranking
13.	When \$10 Billion is not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan	Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet	80	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> /UK	52
14.	The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign	Brian Glyn Williams	119	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism</i> /UK	64
15.	From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid	146	<i>Foreign Affairs</i> /US	82
16.	Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan	Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann	85	<i>Foreign Affairs</i> /US	82

Information/Key

1. Articles cited more than *eighty* (and more) times have been included
2. The table uses Scimago Country and Journal Rank
3. The data regarding the journals has been limited to top hundred ranked journals
4. The table includes articles from 2006 to 2016
5. The articles in the table include Pakistan and South Asia as central topics

of representational identities within International Relations plays an important role in how policies about other identities and issues are formed. To that extent, the International Relations scholars' contribution to knowledge in journals constitutes one of many avenues through which their knowledge is inextricably linked to policy formations, the other being through pedagogy and assuming policy-making or policy-proximate roles.

KNOWLEDGE AND PEDAGOGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Hagmann and Biersteker's work on critical pedagogy in International Relations provides a thorough understanding of how pedagogical arrangements in the study of International Relations significantly influence civil servants and International Relations scholars, earlier in their

career, through the perspectives taught in International Relations courses.⁴⁰ For instance, they argue that:

In their specialized training, IR schools worldwide instruct great numbers of students to adopt particular modes of thinking and approaches concerning world politics. In doing so, IR teaching plays a central role in pre-structuring foreign policy practices, as students will likely reproduce the syllogisms acquired in their training when taking up professional positions. The selection of theories and concepts taught in seminars and lectures therefore has a political dimension that should not be underestimated.⁴¹

Analyzing the graduate level courses at top US and European universities, Hagmann and Biersteker conclude that the knowledge circulated through these courses is predominantly positivist and rationalist in character. The dominance of positivist and rationalist positions in the teaching of International Relations seeks to self-referentially serve as the site for ideational knowledge production and implicitly projects the rest of the world as its empirical testing ground.⁴² Through these ‘empirical tests’, identities are not only produced and reproduced but are naturalized as ‘empirical facts’. The circulation of knowledge in International Relations, which tacitly claims universality,⁴³ intellectually conditions a certain prejudicial disposition among early-career scholars toward identities which are constructed through this knowledge and assimilated as

⁴⁰Jonas Hagmann and Thomas J. Biersteker, “Beyond the Published Discipline: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of International Studies,” *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 2 (June 18, 2014): 291–315, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066112449879>.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 3.

⁴²As is apparent, for instance, in the fact that most categories such as failed state, garrison state, client state, etc. that seek to codify state behavior in the Third World have their origins in the western academe. See Walter Mignolo, “The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 1 (2002): 57–95; Pinar Bilgin and Adam D. Morton, “Historicising Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences?” *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2002): 55–80, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993576>; Pinar Bilgin and Adam David Morton, “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-Termism*,” *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2004): 169–80.

⁴³Parvati Raghuram and Clare Madge, “Towards a Method for Postcolonial Development Geography? Possibilities and Challenges,” *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 27, no. 3 (November 1, 2006): 280, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9493.2006.00262.x>.

objective truth. At the heart of such a pedagogical arrangement is the International Relations teacher, whose choice of what to teach informs the pedagogical arrangement in the classroom. As Hagmann and Biersteker contend, different teachers teach differently and “there is no guarantee that the instructed discipline as taught in classrooms should be congruent with the discipline as it is published in leading journals”.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, Hagmann and Biersteker demonstrate to the contrary that the texts preferred by International Relations teachers are closely aligned to their ontological, epistemological and methodological leanings.

Consequently, while the teacher has an enormous resource pool of knowledge from which to choose what International Relations should be taught, it is their discretionary privilege to valorize some perspectives to the detriment of others. However, when it comes to the identities that are automatically constructed within these texts as empirical referents, International Relations becomes more parochial in nature. The danger in assimilating fixed representational identities through the study of International Relations is that students project and reproduce their paradigmatically restricted and culturally closed understanding of international events and actors and carry with them generalizations of identities as ‘truths’. To that extent, since “IR courses speak more directly to larger, and eventually also more policy-proximate, audiences”,⁴⁵ the representational identities constructed within the International Relations knowledge and disseminated within the classroom serve as foundational ‘truths’ of representational identities, which then inform the worldview and ‘rational’ choices of students when they take on policy-proximate roles. For instance, one of the most cited journal articles on Pakistan between 2006 and 2016 was an article titled “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Security”, published in the highly reputable journal *International Security*.⁴⁶ The journal article

⁴⁴Hagmann and Biersteker, “Beyond the Published Discipline: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of International Studies,” 293.

⁴⁵Hagmann and Biersteker.

⁴⁶This article limits the discussion of the discourse on Pakistan by examining its circulation and production in International Relations. A comprehensive understanding of the representational identity of Pakistan constructed in IR texts will require a discourse analysis focusing on the semiotic nature of the texts. To that end, the representational identities mentioned here only serve as a snapshot of the discourse on Pakistan and a guiding reference to the nature of knowledge being circulated.

theoretically examines various regional-power nuclear postures and hypothesizes their different deterrence effects by analyzing the case of India and Pakistan. However, the article repeatedly invokes Pakistan's 'conventional aggression' and India's 'restraint' either on its own part or at the behest of the United States. Further, the author adds:

To many scholars and practitioners, the world's grimmest security concerns converge in Pakistan. Pakistan has supported the Taliban, against which the Pakistan Army is fighting a de facto civil war; it supports cross-border terrorism in India, provoking periodic crises in South Asia; and, of course, it has a growing nuclear arsenal. In addition to the risk of inadvertent nuclear use by the Pakistan Army, the arsenal could be vulnerable to malicious elements within the state, whose acquisition of nuclear material or weapons could be catastrophic for regional and international security.⁴⁷

This particular text is unreferenced and implicitly appeals to the 'common sense' of the reader.⁴⁸ Within the text Pakistan's representational identity is constructed as 'the grimmest security concern', supporter of terrorism in Afghanistan and India, an 'irresponsible' state and a potential threat to regional and international security. The particular article has been taught as part of degree courses ranging from courses on the politics of Nuclear weapons, to International Security, to courses on South Asia in various countries including the United States.⁴⁹ The circulation

⁴⁷Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 38–78.

⁴⁸The idea here is not to negate or endorse these subjective positions and consequently participate in the polemical debate of what is 'true' or 'untrue'. The point is to highlight a particular representation of Pakistan which has become a defining feature of its identity, among many other representations. These attributes have become central elements in the definition of Pakistan as opposed to the 'developed', western states and states that are closely aligned to them.

⁴⁹For instance, among many others, the article has informed: (1) the PhD Course in Nuclear Weapons: Science, Strategy, Culture and Law at the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, (2) the course on the Politics of Nuclear Weapons at the University of Minnesota, (3) the course on Politics and Strategy in the Nuclear Age at the University of Oslo, (4) the course on International Security: Nuclear Weapons and World Politics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, (5) International Security in the Twenty-First Century at Ohio State University, (6) Theoretical Approaches to International Security at the University of Toronto, (7) The Politics of South Asia at University at Albany-State University of New York and (8) South Asian Politics at the University of Rochester.

of the 'knowledge' on Pakistan then happens simultaneously at different locales, and the theoretically rationalist work in International Relations, which implicitly constructs Pakistan's representational identity, is then presented to reproduce a 'common sense' among the broader public. In addition, discussing the combination and recombination of extant cultural materials, along with the repetition of successful combinations of specific representation, Weldes argues that "the meaning they produce come to seem natural, to be an accurate description of reality".⁵⁰ This is evident from a similar trajectory that informs the empirical work of Shapiro and Fair in an article published in *International Security* titled "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan":

Pakistan has used Islamist militants to pursue its regional interests since its inception in 1947. In the last ten years, however, Islamist militancy in Pakistan has become a key international security concern. Concerns about Pakistan's stability are exacerbated by its nuclear status, dysfunctional civil-military relationship, a demonstrated propensity for risk-seeking behavior, and ever-expanding connections between local groups and transnational Islamist terrorist organizations.⁵¹

Again the article has featured in courses taught on terrorism, South Asia and the politics of Islam.⁵² Consequently, the wide circulation of knowledge, which happens through pedagogical arrangements, implicitly naturalizes and produces as common sense, a background knowledge that is taken to be true and occurs simply "through statements of 'facts', that is, ostensible descriptions of what simply 'is'".⁵³

⁵⁰Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 238, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005002003>.

⁵¹Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (January 2010): 79, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.79>.

⁵²For instance in the course on International Relations of South Asia at Boston University. https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2017/02/Syllabus_Spring-2017_IR372.Miller.pdf, the course on The Global Politics of Islam: Ideas, Actors, Sites and Practices compiled for the Higher Education Academy, UK. https://www.heacademy.ac.uk/system/files/sheikh_teaching_political_islam_syllabus.pdf.

⁵³Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, 10.

KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY-PROXIMITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Another dimension through which academics proliferate representational identities through knowledge production is by assuming policy-making or policy-proximate roles. These roles allow the knowledge produced within the International Relations academic community to be operationalized within foreign policy decision-making processes. Even still, within International Relations, various scholars have lamented the divide between the academic and the policy communities and have consequently called for International Relations scholarship to come out of its paradigmatically confined ivory tower and become more policy-relevant. For instance, Nye Jr. insists that “while important American scholars [...] took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street”.⁵⁴ Stephen Van Evera deplores that much of academia has morphed into a cult of irrelevance.⁵⁵ Similarly various others scholars have chastised International Relations academics for confining themselves within the groves of academe, thereby effecting estrangement from the policymaking community.⁵⁶ Their mutual concern is that the disciplinary study of International Relations is “guided primarily by internally-oriented research agendas and assessed by

⁵⁴Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Scholars on the Sideline,” *Washington Post*, April 13, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260.html?noredirect=on>.

⁵⁵Peter Campbell and Michael C. Desch, “Rank Irrelevance,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 15, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-09-15/rank-irrelevance>.

⁵⁶For instance, see Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In,” *International Security* 26, no. 4 (April 29, 2002): 169–83, <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228802753696816>; Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship Between Theory and Practice in International Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (June 15, 2005): 23–48, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104904>; Paul C. Avey and Michael C. Desch, “What Do Policymakers Want From Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers,” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 227–46, <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12111>; Lawrence M. Mead, “Scholasticism in Political Science,” *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 2 (June 17, 2010): 453–64, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592710001192>; Ian Shapiro, *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences* (Princeton University Press, 2005), <https://press.princeton.edu/titles/8083.html>; John J. Mearsheimer, “A Self-Enclosed World?” in *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics*, ed. Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 388–94, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492174>.

self-generated metrics of excellence".⁵⁷ As a result, the field of International Relations is less likely to stimulate and influence the members of the fraternity to produce more policy-relevant scholarship. However, Oren argues that this might not be the case. Though Oren demonstrates the considerable involvement of members of the International Relations academe in foreign policy processes,⁵⁸ he argues that the alleged gap between IR scholarship and "American foreign policy is grossly exaggerated".⁵⁹ Oren further argues that the role of intellectual elites and their influence in and for policy-making circles has allowed International Relations ideas to be used as weapons for US foreign policy.⁶⁰ This is because while theoretical abstractions and purely academic empirical exercises may or may not interest foreign policy-makers, International Relations scholars with a more area studies focus have always stayed relevant to the exercise of political power.

Considering their relevance to contemporary world events and their ability to project and promote their scholarship on the political dynamic of specific geographically bound 'people', their representations of distinct nonnational identities are more pronounced in the knowledge they produce. Consequently, the knowledge they produce under an ontologically fixed rationalist discourse allows certain 'truths' of distinct identities to circulate among policy-makers and policy processes as fixed realities. For instance, the data set of articles written on Pakistan between 2006 and 2016 reveals 9 International Relations scholars who have published 3 or more articles on Pakistan. These 9 scholars belong to the United States. Even though scholars from other locales, such as Australia, India, UK and Germany, have produced research on Pakistan, US universities

⁵⁷Michael Desch, "Technique Trumps Relevance: The Professionalization of Political Science and the Marginalization of Security Studies," *Perspectives on Politics* 13, no. 2 (June 18, 2015): 377–93, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714004022>.

⁵⁸Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Ido Oren, "The Enduring Relationship Between the American (National Security) State and the State of the Discipline," *Political Science and Politics* 37, no. 1 (2004): 51–55.

⁵⁹Ido Oren, "International Relations Ideas as Reflections and Weapons of US Foreign Policy," in *The Sage Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Andreas Gofas, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, and Nicholas Onuf (Sage, 2018), 399, <https://in.sagepub.com/en-in/sas/the-sage-handbook-of-the-history-philosophy-and-sociology-of-international-relations/book250865#contents>.

⁶⁰Oren.

seem to produce the majority. All 9 scholars have either held a government position or have enjoyed policy-proximate roles. In addition they are all positioned in universities or think tanks in the United States. For instance, Christine Fair, who has authored 17 peer-reviewed articles on Pakistan in International Relations journals (this list does not include area specialist journals or books), the most by any intellectual, has provided testimony to 13 congressional committees on Pakistan. Others have been more directly involved with policy-making. For instance, Stephen P. Cohen, who is a senior fellow in The India Project, a part of the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, is an emeritus Professor at the University of Illinois. In 2004, he was named by the World Affairs Councils of America as one of “America’s 500 Most Influential People” in the area of foreign policy. Notwithstanding his various consultations to the US government, he was also a member of the policy planning staff at the Department of State from 1985 to 1987.⁶¹ Similarly others such as Jacob N. Shapiro, Sumit Ganguly, Stephen Tankel, Karl Kaltenthaler, William J. Miller and Seth G. Jones, have all either been directly involved with the government in policy-making or have assumed policy-proximate roles by either consulting or through memberships in think tanks and advisory bodies.⁶²

The propensity of American scholars to impress the ‘truth’ about Pakistan by assuming policy-proximate and advisory roles is, of course, restricted to their own government. This does not, however, inhibit them from circulating their knowledge to policy-makers in foreign governments. For instance, as observed earlier, most of the articles produced on Pakistan have been published in 5 academic journals. What is most interesting to note here is that authors contributing to top publications in International Relations journals on Pakistan, housed in the United States were predominantly located at institutes and universities within the United States. However, the contributions to journals housed in the UK policy institutes do not demonstrate a similar demographic allegiance. The journal *Survival* published 13 articles between

⁶¹ Brookings Institution, “Profile of Stephen P. Cohen,” 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/experts/stephen-p-cohen/>.

⁶² I am not holding suspect the propriety of International Relations scholars who perform some role in governmental policy-making. Rather my focus here is on exploring the connection between the International Relations scholarship on Pakistan and how Pakistan’s identity is constructed therein, which consequently informs policy.

2006 and 2016.⁶³ Seven contributors were affiliated to UK institutes whereas 8 researchers who authored and coauthored these publications were positioned in the United States, and 2 were positioned in India. At the same time, a similar analysis of the data on *International Affairs* reveals 4 journal articles within our specified time period, of which 3 were authored and coauthored by American academics or Pakistan-origin American academics, while only 1 article was published by an academic in a UK university. The limited contributions of researchers from outside the United States to US-based journals, coupled with the dominance of US research in UK-based journals, demonstrates how a particular understanding of knowledge on Pakistan dominates International Relations.

This demonstrates the skewed nature of knowledge production on Pakistan. Most of the intellectual work on Pakistan, that is produced and circulated internationally revolves around four major themes; (1) Pakistan's nuclear program, (2) Pakistan's link to militancy and terrorism, (3) Pakistan's relations with foreign actors (mainly United States and India), and lastly, (4) the Pakistan Army and its role in democracy and relationship with democratic actors. Within these studies, the representational identities constructed not only derive from the empirical study that codifies behavioral patterns of and within the Pakistani state, but also 'knowledge' that is made to appear as common sense to the reader. In essence then, the knowledge produced by the scholarly community on Pakistan circulates through the foreign policy corridors embedded in the processes of advisement and consultancy by intellectuals taking up policy-proximate roles or by their direct involvement in policy-making process. For this reason alternative representations of Pakistan's identity are overshadowed by the massive intellectual work that focuses on certain specific 'truths' on Pakistan.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF MOST CITED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARTICLES ON PAKISTAN

One of the journal with the most cited articles on Pakistan is the journal *International Security*. The journal boasts of having "defined the debate on US national security policy".⁶⁴ In effect then, while the journal has promoted scholarship on Pakistan with the specific objective of

⁶³This includes articles originally published after 2000 and recirculated online between 2006 and 2016, and the remaining 9 were originally published before 2000.

⁶⁴Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, *International Security*.

informing US national security policy, its impact factor and the vast circulation of its research articles have allowed a specific set of representations of Pakistan to proliferate beyond its primary objective. Thus, what had initially been intended as fodder for policy prescriptions aimed at US policy-makers has become universalized beyond the United States. A similar case is that of the magazine *Foreign Affairs*, which “has been the leading forum for serious discussion of American foreign policy”.⁶⁵ Even though debates within these leading academic platforms tend to analyze events and ideas from different vantage points, they seamlessly construct a representational identity of Pakistan that is consistent throughout.

First and foremost, the discourse operates through the deployment of a series of labels and discursive formations on Islam within the writings on Pakistan, including, ‘Islamist Militancy’, ‘militants’, ‘muslim world’, ‘islamist terrorists’ and ‘islamist parties’ among others. The use of the term ‘Islamist militancy’, which is often vaguely defined, generalized and culturally loaded, discursively links the negative representational identity of the religion of Islam with Pakistan, thereby forming an unconscious and constant link between the two. Consequently, the discussions that proceed in these articles not only problematize Pakistan’s representational identity, but by grounding discussions in the context of ‘Islamism’, they also draw more attention to Pakistan as a ‘dangerous’ country. For instance, one article begins with: “Pakistan has used Islamist militants to pursue its regional interests since its inception in 1947”.⁶⁶ Another argues that “[m]ilitant violence in Pakistan stands at the top of the international security agenda, yet little is known about who supports militant organizations and why”.⁶⁷ Yet another believes that “[w]ith the collaboration of elements within one of Pakistan’s secret intelligence services, the ISI, the Pashtun borderlands have become a safe haven for the Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist elements”.⁶⁸ Thus Pakistan’s

⁶⁵“About Foreign Affairs,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/about-foreign-affairs>.

⁶⁶Shapiro and Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” 79.

⁶⁷Will Bullock, Kosuke Imai, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan,” *Political Analysis* 19, no. 4 (January 4, 2011): 363.

⁶⁸Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 (April 2008): 58.

association with 'militant', 'insurgent' Islam in itself has been used to summon 'danger', but equally negative is the representational identity of Pakistan disassociated from its link with 'Islam'. This discourse presents Pakistan as:

[the] world's grimmest security concern [...] [because it has] supported the Taliban, against which the Pakistan Army is fighting a *de facto* civil war; it supports cross-border terrorism in India, provoking periodic crises in South Asia; and, of course, it has a growing nuclear arsenal. In addition to the risk of inadvertent nuclear use by the Pakistan Army, the arsenal could be vulnerable to malicious elements within the state, whose acquisition of nuclear material or weapons could be catastrophic for regional and international security.⁶⁹

Another article argues that "concerns about Pakistan's stability are exacerbated by its nuclear status, dysfunctional civil-military relationship, a demonstrated propensity for risk-seeking behavior, and ever-expanding connections between local groups and transnational Islamist terrorist organizations".⁷⁰ Central to the discourse on Pakistan are three themes. First, that the Pakistani state and its people support militancy; second, that because this militancy is based on 'religiosity', the association of 'Islam', 'militancy' and 'Pakistan' becomes a dangerous combination which requires to be dealt with at the top of the international security agenda; and lastly, that Pakistan has 'lawless borders' and is an 'army-led dysfunctional democracy'. The combination of these three themes discursively form Pakistan's representational identity as a 'dangerous' state. Taken together as a broader discourse that has political and cultural currency, this discourse functions to construct and sustain a specific identity of 'Pakistan'. Consequently, the constructed truth on the tenable link between violence, and, by implication, terrorism and militancy, 'Islam' and Pakistan, creates three major themes in the study of US-Pakistan relations.

First, it is explicitly established that the Pakistani people (and not the Pakistani state, even though that assumption is also noticeable throughout the discourse) support 'Islamist Militancy', and that even though US aid and financial assistance programs have benevolently tried to address

⁶⁹Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability", 40.

⁷⁰Shapiro and Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan", 79.

the root cause, they have nonetheless failed. The implicit assertions made in the literature are that neoliberal developmental logics such as promoting education and democracy and alleviating poverty through financial assistance programs have proved unable to curb support in Pakistan of ‘Islamist militancy’. For instance, Shapiro and Fair argue that: “Beyond a substantial investment in security assistance, U.S. and Western policies toward Pakistan over the last ten years have been geared toward encouraging economic and social development as an explicit means of diminishing the terrorist threat and turning back Islamization”.⁷¹ Bullock, Imai and Shapiro contend that, “discussions about why Pakistan suffers so much political violence tend to turn to untested assertions that poverty, poor education, and resistance to Western values drive support for militant organizations[...] United States and Western policies toward Pakistan have devoted billions of dollars to encouraging economic and social development as an explicit means of diminishing the militant threat”.⁷² The discourse consequently implicitly generates binaries such as strong (western) state/weak (‘Islamist’) state, strong democracy/dysfunctional democracy, law-enforcing/lawless, etc. These binaries reduce the integrity of Pakistan and provide justifications for interference. Implicit in the texts considered here is the discourse of development. As Doty argues: “Modern man embodied in a benevolent international society has bestowed on traditional societies a modern institution that has not lived up to western ideals”.⁷³ Consequently, US aid to Pakistan as a function of its benevolence has a civilizing mission at its core. In discourse, Pakistan is constructed as an example of freeloaders “who demand and take handouts and contribute little or nothing in return”.⁷⁴ As Johnson and Mason argue: “The United States and Saudi Arabia poured \$7.2 billion of covert aid into the jihad against the Soviets, the vast majority of which was channeled by the ISI, with the acquiescence of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the most radical religious elements

⁷¹Shapiro and Fair, 80.

⁷²Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro, “Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan”, 365.

⁷³Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 155–56. https://books.google.com.pk/books/about/Imperial_Encounters.html?id=SUyudGRbIp0C&redir_esc=y.

⁷⁴Doty, 156.

[...]. Foreign militants flowed into Pakistan for training and then deployed into Afghanistan. Among them were several thousand funded and paid by Osama bin Laden. Relationships were forged that continue to plague the United States".⁷⁵ Discourse thus portrays the United States as a victim of its own benevolence, while Pakistan is represented as an exploitative state which continues to plague US's good intentions. The dominance of this discourse continues to define the 'truth' of US aid to Pakistan despite alternative studies which have demonstrated that US aid to Pakistan has always been strategic in nature, with little to no regard for its economic, social and developmental ailments.⁷⁶ Only recently, the Trump administration has canceled \$300 million and \$1.3 billion aid packages to Pakistan, citing as the reason that "Pakistan has taken no serious steps to address the core US concern - that Pakistan tolerates and often encourages groups which use violence against Pakistan's neighbours".⁷⁷ Though a direct correlation between the knowledge produced in International Relations and the policies that ensue cannot be made, it can be argued that the widespread circulation of this knowledge as an established 'truth' underlies the assumptions in policy prescriptions.

Considering how neoliberal interventions have failed to counter 'Islamist militancy', and by extension 'violence' and 'terrorism', the second theme dominating the discourse on Pakistan is the 'effective use of drone strikes'. Yet since such a blatant violation of international norms and laws requires sound justification, both articles construct a 'dangerous' identity of Pakistan on which they premise the use of drones. For instance, Williams opens thus:

For American intelligence agencies "the most dangerous region on earth" is the Pashtun tribal areas of north-western Pakistan. U.S. National Intelligence Estimates have repeatedly described the remote tribal region known as the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Agencies) or Pakhtunkhwa (the homeland of Pakistan's Pashtun tribes) as one of the

⁷⁵Johnson and Mason, "No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier", 71.

⁷⁶See for instance Waheed, *The Wrong Ally: Pakistan's State Sovereignty Under US Dependence*; A. Murad, "US Aid to Pakistan and Democracy," *Policy Perspectives* 6, no. 2 (2009): 1–40.

⁷⁷Press Trust of India, "In Signal of US Frustration with Pakistan, Donald Trump Cancels \$1.66 Billion Aid," NDTV, 2018.

greatest threats to American domestic security. In the inaccessible mountains of this lawless, autonomous region, thousands of Taliban militants give sanctuary to Al Qaeda agents who are actively plotting new 9/11s. The Taliban also use this border region to launch attacks on Coalition forces across the frontier in neighboring Afghanistan. Frustratingly, the Pakistanis seem to have little will to go after Taliban and Al Qaeda in this region that is only nominally under Pakistani control.⁷⁸

Johnston and Sarbahi ground their analysis in the following context:

Often described as Pakistan's "lawless frontier," the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is located in the northwestern corner of the country bordering Afghanistan [...] The British governed this territory indirectly through local maliks and political agents with minimal direct involvement—a system that the postindependence Pakistani state more or less retained [...] The British carried out several major military operations in the region, the last of which they conducted in 1937 and 1938, but the British were never able subjugate the population or gain its allegiance[...] All of these groups share an anti-Americanism and an adherence to radical Islam.⁷⁹

Both texts assert the 'inability' of the Pakistani state to pursue 'Islamist militants' and 'terrorists' in the 'lawless' territory inhabited by 'anti-American' and 'radical Islamic' groups. Considering that the British, and then subsequently the Pakistani state following similar policies were unable to bridle this 'lawless' frontier, the United States, being technologically superior and unrestrained by these historic options, is in a better position to 'punish' and 'leash' this territory which has not succumbed to western 'civilizing' missions. The analogy between the British and the American empire though might be unintentional but does remark to continuity of a 'western' empire on a mission to subjugate, dominate and civilize the periphery.

Even though drone strikes are central to the US's policy of combating 'Islamist militancy', discourse represents these strikes as benevolent

⁷⁸Brian Glyn Williams, "The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 10 (September 20, 2010): 871–72.

⁷⁹Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, "The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan," *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (June 2016): 2.

mission in aid of the Pakistani state and its people, implying these strikes are a favor bestowed rather than an act of aggression. This is because these drone strikes are not seen as violating the sovereignty of Pakistan but the “sovereignty of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda”, and because local Pashtuns (the indigenous population of the ‘lawless’ region of Pakistan) “feel powerless toward the militants and [...] see the drones as their liberator”.⁸⁰ Johnston and Sarbahi argue that “new technologies—specifically, remote means of surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting—prove capable of disrupting and degrading militant organizations. In doing so, such technologies limit both the frequency and the lethality of militant attacks. They thus compensate for an incumbent government’s lack of physical presence in these areas”.⁸¹ Lost within these narratives are the discussions on the violation of international norms, the interference in Pakistan’s state sovereignty and the collateral damage which ensues because of the death of civilians. Pakistan within these texts emerges as a state incapable of controlling violence and its spillover effects, either because of the absence of technologies or the ability and the will to do so. In such a case, the United States positions itself as a ‘moral’ and ‘responsible’ state with a mission to alleviate the sufferings of the Pakistani people caused through ‘Islamist militancy’.

A third theme that dominates the discourse on Pakistan is that of its nuclear status. Though the discourse on Pakistan’s nuclear status does not directly tie in with US interests, it is considered to be of “critical importance to South Asia and International Security”,⁸² which implies India and the western world, especially the United States. The dominant binary in this theme is of an ‘aggressive Pakistan’ and a ‘restrained India’. Pakistan’s identity within these texts is constructed through representations such as ‘Pakistani boldness’, ‘Pakistani adventurism’, ‘Pakistani aggression’, ‘emboldened Pakistan’, ‘Pakistani provocations’, whereas the Indian state is represented as ‘restrained’, cautioned’, ‘refrained’. For instance, Kapur argues that “recent violence has been characterized by aggressive Pakistani attempts to revise territorial boundaries in the region and by relatively

⁸⁰Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign”, 884.

⁸¹ Johnston and Sarbahi, “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan”, 14.

⁸²Narang, “Posturing for Peace: Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability”, 40.

restrained Indian efforts to preserve the status quo”.⁸³ For Narang, while “the world sat on edge as yet another crisis between South Asia’s two nuclear-armed states erupted with the looming risk of armed conflict [...] India’s response was restrained”.⁸⁴ Kapur remarks at another point that “nuclear weapons’ ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan’s dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior”,⁸⁵ as opposed to India who is ‘restrained’ “mainly out of concern for world opinion”.⁸⁶ Consequently, when this discourse on Pakistan merges with the discourse on Pakistan as ‘irresponsible’ state with an active ‘Islamist militancy’, it is bound to generate ominous results. However, India is represented in these texts as a ‘normal’ state as opposed to Pakistan. India is said to face “no existential conventional threat” and privileges “strong centralized civilian control over its nuclear assets”,⁸⁷ whereas Pakistan is represented as a state who has ‘nurtured’ the ‘Islamist forces’ who have taken on a “life of their own and do not always act at Islamabad’s behest”.⁸⁸ In addition, it is a state whose army has possible links “to more radical elements within Pakistan and potentially internationally”⁸⁹ and has “has always been a deeply insecure state, militarily outmatched by India, lacking strategic depth, and suffering from domestic instability”.⁹⁰

The discourse consequently aligns the United States and India on one side of the ‘responsible/irresponsible’ divide, while Pakistan is on the other, because India and the United States share similar objectives of curbing ‘Islamist militancy’, ‘Islamist forces’ and ‘Islamist organization’ not under Pakistan’s control. Throughout the discourse there are times veiled and at other times overt references to each state’s relationship with the United States. While India sought to avoid ‘antagonizing’ the United States, Pakistan was ‘forced’ to action to avoid the US’s ‘wrath’ and

⁸³S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe,” *International Security* 30, no. 2 (2013): 129.

⁸⁴Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability”, 46.

⁸⁵S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” *International Security* 33, no. 2 (October 2008): 72.

⁸⁶Kapur, 77.

⁸⁷Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability”, 38.

⁸⁸Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia”, 91.

⁸⁹Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability”, 72.

⁹⁰Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia”, 90.

'anger', because the United States is Pakistan's 'benefactor' and 'patron' whose 'financial largesse' Pakistan enjoys. Consequently, the discourse calls upon "the United States and the international community to take steps to help make Pakistan's operationalization of its asymmetric escalation posture-safer making the management of the arsenal more secure".⁹¹ At another point the analogy between Pakistan and Iran points toward another discourse, one which hinges on US-Iran relations:

According to the optimists' logic, because the Iranians are neither irrational nor bent on suicide, the international community should not be inordinately fearful of an Iranian nuclear capability [...] If the Iranians decided to use their nuclear capability in a manner similar to the Pakistanis [...] Such behavior would not be irrational if a state were committed to destabilizing its adversaries, extending its influence, and undermining the territorial status quo. But it would be extremely dangerous and detrimental to the interests of the international community.⁹²

Here again it can be observed that policy decisions on Pakistan's nuclear status, such as amendments and sanctions, and on the Indian nuclear program, such as the famed Indo-US nuclear deal, follow a similar logical deduction. Considering the wide circulation of journal articles on Pakistan whose authors have been advisors and witnesses for official bodies, and the focus of the journals themselves on US national security, many of the central assumptions and narratives of the dominant discourse in International Relations on Pakistan have made it into the policy process. Many of the policies which are consequently based on a constructed 'truth' about Pakistan's identity also function directly to extend and consolidate US control. Since alternative discourses are either restricted or marginalized, the construction of 'Pakistan' in the dominant discourse informs policy debate while simultaneously establishing the parameters of legitimate action, leading to the persistence of certain policies. Thus, the production and circulation of Pakistan's representational identity as a specific 'truth' in the dominant discourse plays a vital role in the policies of the West, and especially the United States, toward Pakistan.

⁹¹Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability", 78.

⁹²Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia", 93.

CONCLUSION

The political identity of Pakistan cannot be investigated independently of our theories, language and practice. In other words, to unravel how Pakistan is constructed in the international political imaginary requires an investigation of the practices of knowledge production in International Relations within which it is produced rather than studying Pakistan's identity as a political reality. Moving from a question of being to a question of becoming, what needs to be explored then is not what Pakistan is, but how is it spoken of? Such an investigation of Pakistan does not tantamount to a denial of the existence of a material world within which Pakistan exists as a territorially bound geographical area but rather suggests that our knowledge of Pakistan does not entail any meaning or being before speech, literary expression and interpretation but comes into being through it. Consequently in International Relations the dominance of western scholars in producing research on Pakistan and the marginality of Pakistani scholars in contributing to the discourse on Pakistan affixes a certain representational identity of Pakistan.

This chapter began with an examination of knowledge production and circulation of Pakistan's identity in International Relations. Most of the work on Pakistan that oscillates within the field of International Relations is largely concerned with the political relations that Pakistan as a state seems to maintain observe with other states and vice versa, or the ostensibly inherently problematic structure of the Pakistani polity. Within the realm of theory and practice concerned with these studies, Pakistan's relationship with the outside world has often been analyzed within the conceptual parameters of foreign aid, human rights, democracy and strategic alliances, among others. In other words, Pakistan is what we say it is. But how do we say *what* Pakistan is, in International Relations? The chapter explained the processes of knowledge production and circulation in International by analyzing top journals and journal articles in International Relations on Pakistan. The chapter argued that the knowledge on Pakistan is produced through studies that produce 'truth' on Pakistan. These studies are circulated to the wider International Relations community, through three processes. Firstly, pedagogical arrangements in the classroom act as conduits to the transference of 'truth' through course readings and teaching which 'scientifically' explore the 'truth' about Pakistan. Secondly, most of the work on Pakistan is produced in policy-oriented academic journals who aim

to make the discussion of Pakistan more relevant and understandable for policy-makers. Lastly, the policy-proximity of the researchers who produce knowledge on Pakistan enables their 'truth' about Pakistan to circulate in the policy-making community. The final section of the chapter discursively analyzed texts produced in journals which form the dominant discourse on Pakistan, laying bare the mechanics of how 'truth' on Pakistan is constructed in International Relations.

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CHAPTER 3

The ‘Truth’ About Pakistan: Knowledge Production and Circulation in Area Studies

While International Relations and Politics departments across western academe employ interdisciplinary studies using themes and concepts within which Pakistan becomes a focus of study, these departments are not the sole producers of knowledge on Pakistan within universities. Given how the study of Pakistan is organized within intra-academic institutions that cut across various themes and disciplines, other significant producers of knowledge on Pakistan are the spatial and geographically located hubs dedicated to the study of South Asia, which view Pakistan through a regional lens. Whereas International Relations and Politics departments within universities are mostly concerned with thematic and conceptual works within which case studies of states perform a perfunctory function, enabling researchers to ascertain the veracity of their discursive polemics, Area Study centers within universities have been the most notable producers of knowledge on different regions of the world. Such centers trace their discursive lineage to the then-growing project of European imperialism in the nineteenth century. This resulted in a proliferation of scholarly centers on Area Studies across Europe, closely linked to imperial administrations and aimed at generating information and knowledge about the ‘other’. This knowledge accumulation was implicit in *representing* the ‘other’, and the discourse on the identity of the ‘other’ it produced guided imperial policy in its colonies. The retreat of European imperialism in the middle of the twentieth century gave way to a more development-centered Area Studies, spearheaded by the

United States, who had taken a lead role in global affairs in the aftermath of the Second World War.¹ Conceptually oriented by modernization and development theories, post-war Area Studies was meant to smooth the implementation process of US development policies.² Nevertheless, studies critical of the developmental discourse observed that the developing enterprise of Area Studies in the United States, and by extension the rest of the European world, continued to display strong undertones of the colonial discourses in their representation of the 'Rest'.³ As Rafael points out:

What is significant about area studies, then, is not so much the unsurprising point that they are tied to Orientalist legacies; rather, it is that since the end of World War, area studies have been integrated into larger institutional networks, ranging from universities to foundations, that have made possible the reproduction of a North American style of knowing, one that is ordered toward the proliferation and containment of Orientalisms and their critiques.⁴

¹The reason for my over emphasis on US Area Study Centers is that which is clearly different from area studies in Europe, or elsewhere, but because of certain common Cold War developments, the American version of area studies development has garnered worldwide influence that needs to be analyzed as the leading social science project in the Western world.

²See Manuela Boatcă, "Catching Up with the (New) West: The German 'Excellence Initiative,' Area Studies, and the Re-production of Inequality," *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 10, no. 1 (2012): 17–30; Katja Mielke and Anna-Katharina Hornidge, eds., *Area Studies at the Crossroads: Knowledge Production After the Mobility Turn* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

³In this vein the work of Arturo Escobar stands out as a critique of knowledge production on the field of 'development' and the Third World. For reference, see Arturo Escobar, "Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World," *Cultural Anthropology* (Wiley American Anthropological Association, n.d.), <https://doi.org/10.2307/656487>; Arturo Escobar, "Anthropology and the Development Encounter: The Making and Marketing of Development Anthropology," *American Ethnologist* 18, no. 4 (1991): 658–82; Arturo Escobar, "Imagining a Post-development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social Movements," *Social Text*, no. 31/32 (1992): 20–56, <https://doi.org/10.2307/466217>; Arturo Escobar, "Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality and Anti-Globalisation Social Movements," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004): 207–30.

⁴Vicente L. Rafael, "The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States," *Social Text*, no. 41 (1994): 91, <https://doi.org/10.2307/466834>.

The study of geographically located areas was not a novel idea in the aftermath of the Second World War,⁵ but it was motivated, inspired and expediently taken up by major powers owing to Cold War imperatives that had begun to dominate world politics in the early 1950s. Area Studies was geared toward developing a coterie of elite scholars skilled in producing knowledge about other nations to the benefit of the western world. As Escobar argued, it became the preeminent intellectual arena promoting modernization [and] became a site where development discourse was, and still is, performed, embodied and naturalized.⁶ The multi-disciplinarity that came to characterize Area Studies encouraged many scholars to use different disciplinary frames, such as history, political science, anthropology, etc., in order to document the economic, social and cultural differences of different geographical areas in the interests of making research beneficial for the defense departments of the world powers.⁷ As Vincent has argued: "The institutionalization of area studies was propelled by the canonization of modernization theory in American social sciences and policy circles as an instrument for the spread of U.S. hegemony".⁸

The conformity to objective methodological standards of contemporary social sciences guided by an ontological fixity meant Area Studies developed as an epistemologically empiricist exercise, "grounded in the notion that 'knowledge' can be inferred only from observable

⁵France created the Mission Scientifique au Maroc (1904) which published the *Revue du Monde Musulman* (1906), and the Société d'Economie Politique in Cairo (1909) which published *L'Egypte Contemporaine*. The School of Oriental and African Studies in London, was established in 1916. The Royal Society of Asian Affairs was founded in 1901 and continues to publish a journal *Asian Affairs* since 1914.

⁶J.K. Gibson-Graham, "Area Studies After Poststructuralism," *Environment and Planning A* 36, no. 3 (March 1, 2004): 405–19, <https://doi.org/10.1068/a3652>.

⁷For a detailed understanding of how Area Studies became a Cold War project, see Rafael, "The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States"; Vicente L. Rafael, "Regionalism, Area Studies, and the Accidents of Agency," *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (October 1999): 1208–20, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2649568>; Malini J. Schueller, "Area Studies and Multicultural Imperialism: The Project of Decolonizing Knowledge," *Social Text* 25, no. 1 90 (March 1, 2007): 41–62, <https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2006-016>; David Ludden, "Area Studies in the Age of Globalization," *Frontiers: The Interdisciplinary Journal of Study Abroad* 6 (2000): 1–22; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Area and Regional Studies in the United States," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34, no. 4 (2001): 789–91, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1350268>.

⁸Rafael, "Regionalism, Area Studies, and the Accidents of Agency", 1209.

characteristics of reality; and [...] grounding causation in material variables, and relegating non-material factors to intermediary roles”.⁹ The objective knowability of the reality embedded within its ontology helped it defend the independence of ‘reality’ from impacts that acts of observation or description might have. Social Science’s reductionist materialism and its pursuit of producing ‘truth’, which have directed much of Area Studies research, have therefore invariably ended up producing representations of whole regions and marketing them as ‘reality’. This construction of ‘reality’ is a twofold process. While Area Studies provided the raw material collected as data about an ‘area’, the ‘disciplines’ employed this data to produce generalized universal ‘truths’. Consequently, sources of representational constructions of an ‘area’ emerge at two different intellectual sites: the Area Study Center, and the Discipline.¹⁰ To that extent, the emergence of Pakistan during the Cold War as an area of interest to global politics has meant that most of the data on Pakistan has been interpreted by International Relations and Political Science scholars. The knowledge produced within the western International Relations discipline through its representational practices has conferred upon Pakistan an identity that has been constructed as ‘real’ to make it operational for policy-makers and relevant for decision-making processes. For this reason, most of the scholarship on Pakistan is largely the purview of International Relations scholars rather than intellectuals associated with Area Study centers.

This is not to say that the contribution of Area Study centers in constructing a ‘Pakistan’ is marginal. After all, most South Asia study centers have established undergraduate and postgraduate programs in South Asian Studies regularly churning out ‘experts’ on South Asia. It is within pedagogical processes and institutional infrastructure that ‘Pakistan’ is constructed as a subregion of South Asia. Pedagogical arrangements dictate that the knowledge sources of those training for a South Asian Studies degree are vested in two sites: academic journals with a focus on South Asia and the experience of the South Asian experts who provide and produce knowledge. For instance, most South Asia study centers are heavily research focused on India with scant research on Pakistan and

⁹ Andrea Teti, “Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the Disciplinary Politics of the Area Studies Controversy,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (March 25, 2007): 120, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107074291>.

¹⁰Teti.

the other five states that constitute 'South Asia'. The scarcity of expertise on Pakistan coupled with the considerable focus of attention on the politics of India means that the knowledge on 'Pakistan' produced and reproduced within these institutes and centers, instead of being formed from within, is largely anchored in borrowed texts from research conducted elsewhere and published in leading International Relations, Political Science and South Asian Studies journals. Consequently, while the texts of these journals provide the discursive formations within which 'Pakistan' is produced and reproduced, the institutional structures whence this scholarship emerges and where it submerges form the body of the 'non-discursive, non-linguistic' matter. In this way, the discursive and the 'non-discursive' come together to produce a certain 'reality' of Pakistan.¹¹

THE 'TRUTH' ABOUT PAKISTAN IN AREA STUDIES JOURNALS

The data extracted from 17 journals on Asian and South Asian Studies revealed 267 journal articles on Pakistan out of which 147 journal articles had been published in print earlier than 2006 but were published online between 2006 and 2016, while 124 journal articles on Pakistan were published in print between 2006 and 2016 (see Appendix B). Out of 152 scholars who authored and coauthored these publications, only 27 had research articles published in these journals while based in Pakistan. Despite the noticeable increase in the visibility of Pakistan-based scholars in Area Studies journals as opposed to International Relations journals, as observed in the previous chapter, of the total of 152 scholars who contributed to the literature on Pakistan, 30.2% of scholars were based in the UK, 24.3% in the United States, and 13.7% in Europe, Canada and Australia. Taken all together 63.6% of scholarship originated from western centers of knowledge production. The pattern of western-centered dominance of knowledge production on Pakistan in Area Studies journals on Asia and South Asia is similar to the pattern of domination observed in the previous chapter. However, unlike the knowledge produced in International Relations on Pakistan, knowledge

¹¹ Here, 'non-discursive' is used in a qualified sense. Though nothing exists outside discourse, but the use of 'non-discursive' is only to make a distinction between the processes of knowledge production and the linguistic discourse which is produced as a consequence.

production on Pakistan within Area Studies journals is led by researchers based in the UK.

This may be because the multidisciplinary nature of contributions in Area Studies journals means a wide array of disciplines falls within their ambit, in addition to International Relations. For instance, *Contemporary South Asia* seeks “to address the issues of the region by presenting research and analysis which is both cross-regional and multi-disciplinary. The journal encourages the development of new perspectives on the study of South Asia from across the arts and social sciences disciplines”. *South Asian Studies*, which is the journal of the British Association of South Asian Studies, “publishes high-quality, original research in the arts and humanities of South Asia and from across the South Asian Diaspora...[and] the methodological remit of *South Asian Studies* encompasses historical, archaeological, art historical, literary, musicological, cinematic, heritage, and media studies”. Similarly, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, published under the authority of the South Asian Studies Association of Australia, “provides a forum for scholarly research, comment and discussion on the history, society, economy, culture and international relations of the South Asian region, drawing on a range of disciplines from the humanities and social sciences”. However, a closer look at the knowledge produced on Pakistan within Area Studies journals reveals a different story. Most of the published work in Area Studies journals on Pakistan displays four dominant themes on which the study of Pakistan is centered: (1) Political Islam and Pakistan, (2) Pakistan’s relations with the United States, India and Afghanistan, (3) democracy and civil–military relations and (4) academic explorations of the Pakistani state from different disciplinary vantage points. Much of the published work on Pakistan continues, therefore, to revolve around themes that are spatially housed in the discipline of International Relations.

The data gathered on the knowledge on Pakistan produced in Area Studies journals shows that 6 journals have contributed substantially to that knowledge by publishing articles between 2006 and 2016.¹² *Contemporary South Asia* published 32 articles, *Modern Asian Studies* published 13 articles, *South Asia Survey* published 11 articles, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* published 11 articles, *The Journal of the*

¹²This excludes the articles printed earlier but published within 2006 and 2016.

Royal Society of Asian Affairs and *Asian Affairs: An American Review* published 10 articles each. Altogether these journals have contributed 75.8% of the scholarship produced on Pakistan between 2006 and 2016. The journals *Contemporary South Asia*, *Modern Asian Studies* and *Asian Affairs* are published from the UK and have published more UK-based researchers within their pages than US-based ones. Similarly, the journal *Asian Affairs: An American Review* is housed in the United States and demonstrates a higher proportion of American-based scholarship (see Appendix B). The skew toward a higher number of UK-based researchers in the knowledge production on Pakistan within Area Studies journals may be because of the geographical unevenness in the processes of knowledge production and publishing on Pakistan within Area Studies. Even though most of the journals mentioned above belie a singular disciplinary focus, nonetheless an examination of the most cited papers within these journals exhibits a circulation of 'truth' revolving around four themes: (1) militancy in Pakistan, (2) urban and sectarian conflict, (3) Pakistan–Afghan relations, and (4) drones over Pakistan. Interestingly, almost all the researchers who have contributed to these themes are intellectually positioned within International Relations. Here too, as in International Relations, US-based scholars dominate the discourse on Pakistan, a fact even more apparent when one considers the number of scholars who have produced more work on Pakistan in Area Studies journals.

The top three research scholars who have repeatedly published on Pakistan not only belong to the disciplinary field of International Relations but are also closely knitted into policy circles (see Table 3.1). For instance, Robert E. Looney "has provided advice and assistance to the governments of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Mexico, Panama and Jamaica as well as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, International Labor Office, Inter-American Development Bank, Stanford Research Institute, and Rand Organization".¹³ Shaun Gregory has lectured in the UK to many organizations, including the UK Royal College of Defense Studies, the UK Defense Academy and "on a number of occasions has been invited to lecture to the House of Commons Defense Forum and to give evidence to the Foreign and Defense

¹³Taken from the website https://my.nps.edu/web/nsa/faculty/-/asset_publisher/GvC61nDH4qso/content/robert-looney-ph-d-.

Table 3.1 Most ‘produced’ work on Pakistan in Area Studies journals—recurring contributors on Pakistan

S. No	Author	Articles			Journal	
		Name	No. of citations	Contributing authors	Name/country	
1.	C. Christine Fair	Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy Madrasah Connection	48	–	Asia Policy/US	
		The Militant Challenge in Pakistan	74	–	Asia Policy/US	
		The Educated Militants of Pakistan: Implications for Pakistan’s Domestic Security	15	–	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		The Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan: An Introduction to the Special Issue	02	Shaun Gregory	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		The US–Pakistan Relations after a Decade of the War on Terror	14	–	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
5.	Robert E. Looney	A State in Flux: Pakistan in the Context of National and Regional Change	01	Shaun Gregory	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		Pakistan’s Progress Towards Economic Freedom	05	–	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		Pakistan’s Economic And Security Dilemma: Expanded Defence Expenditures and the Relative Governance Syndrome	08	Robert McNab	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		Economic Impacts of the Floods in Pakistan	19	–	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		Leading Sectors in Economic Development: The Role of Manufacturing in Pakistan’s Recent Expansion	0	–	South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies	

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

S. No	Author	Articles		No. of citations	Contributing authors	Journal	
		Name				Name/country	
6.	Shaun Gregory	The Role of the Military in the Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan		20	James Revill	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		The Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan: An Introduction to the Special Issue		02	C. Christine Fair	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		Under the Shadow of Islam: The Plight of the Christian Minority in Pakistan		09	—	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		A State in Flux: Pakistan in the Context of National and Regional Change		02	C. Christine Fair	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
7.	Victoria Schofield	Can Democracy Work In Pakistan?		02	—	Asian Affairs/UK	
		Kashmiri Separatism and Pakistan in the Current Global Environment		11	—	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
8.	Feisal Khan	Why Borrow Trouble for Yourself and Lend It to Neighbors? Understanding the Historical Roots of Pakistan's Afghan Policy		09	—	Asian Affairs/US	
		Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan		41	—	Asian Journal of Political Science/US	
9.	Tariq Rahman	Islamic Banking by Judiciary: The 'Backdoor' for Islamism in Pakistan?		07	—	South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies	
		The Pashtro Language and Identity-Formation in Pakistan		26	—	Contemporary South Asia/UK	
		Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Survey of Students And Teachers At Pakistan's Urdu and English Language-Medium Schools, and Madrassas		28	—	Contemporary South Asia/UK	

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

S. No	Author	Articles		No. of citations	Contributing authors	Journal	
		Name				Name	country
10.	Ilhan Niaz	The Urdu-English Controversy in Pakistan		25	-	Modern Asian Studies/UK	
		Identities and the State in Pakistan: A Study of Mentality		0	-	Asian Affairs/UK	
		Jinnah on Governance: The Unheeded Advice of Pakistan's Quaid-I-Azam		01	-	Asian Affairs/UK	
11.	Sarah Ansari	Provincial Administration in Pakistan and the Crisis of Order and Development		03	-	South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies	
		Polygamy, Purdah and Political Representation: Engendering Citizenship in 1950s Pakistan		12	-	Modern Asian Studies/UK	
		From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947-1970		10	Taylor C. Sherman and William Gould	Modern Asian Studies/UK	
		Pakistan's 1951 Census: State Building in Post-Partition Sindh		0	-	South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies	

Information/Key

- 1. Authors who have contributed three or more articles to Pakistan have been included
- 2. The table includes articles from 2006 to 2016

Select Committees".¹⁴ Christine Fair, as we established in the previous chapter, is tightly knitted into the policy community. At the same time, among the most cited researchers Christian Enemark has been a member of the Australian Government's National Consultative Committee on International Security Issues (appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs).¹⁵ Frederic Grare is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie's South Asia Program. Prior to joining Carnegie, Grare served as head of the Asia bureau at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defense and also served at the French embassy in Pakistan.¹⁶ Finally, Marvin Weinbaum served as analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003 and is currently director for Pakistan Studies at the Middle East Institute.¹⁷

The point here is not to chastise these scholars for their ingression into policy-proximate roles. On the contrary, it is to demonstrate how academic research can be influenced by assuming policy-proximate positions and vice versa. Further, considering how the production of knowledge is centered on certain themes originating from spatially distributed locales of International Relations, the obvious pilferage of this knowledge into Area Studies journals allows the circulation of 'truth' on Pakistan to traverse narrow thematic corridors within which the construction of Pakistan's identity is disseminated to wider audiences. Even though various Pakistani researchers have published considerable work in Area Studies journals, it is notable that their scholarship is more multidisciplinary in nature and is positioned outside International Relations and Politics. Feisal Khan's work on the Pakistani state remains within the disciplinary ambit of economics and finance; Tariq Rahman's major works revolve around language and power in Pakistan; Ilhan Niaz's research focuses on history and local governance. The existence of the multidisciplinary approaches employed by Pakistan-based scholars, on the fringes of the dominant scholarship spatially located in the disciplinary centers of western International Relations academe, resonates with a similar pattern unveiled in the previous chapter.

¹⁴Taken from the website <https://www.dur.ac.uk/sgia/staff/profile/?id=11423>.

¹⁵Taken from the website <https://www.southampton.ac.uk/politics/about/staff/cele16.page#teaching>.

¹⁶Taken from the website <https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/275>.

¹⁷Taken from the website <https://www.mei.edu/experts/marvin-g-weinbaum>.

Though Area Studies offers the means to overcome disciplinary isolation by providing a platform that encourages the cross-fertilization of social sciences, in the case of the knowledge produced on Pakistan the ideas that continue to dominate remain for the most part positioned within International Relations. This runs contrary to the normative scope of Area Studies as a ‘discipline’. For instance, it was initially hoped that Area Studies would evolve into a “total structure of scientific knowledge”,¹⁸ within which “the area studies region could provide a definable whole in which the integration of the disciplines would take place”.¹⁹ As Szanton explains further:

Area study was analogous to the study of medicine...the total human organism corresponding to the totality of human society. Just as the understanding of the practical problems of “the whole man” required collaboration among several sciences -- “anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, bacteriology, and even psychology and some of the social sciences” -- in the same way, the study of an area would provide “a concrete focus for the disciplines of the social sciences and related fields of the humanities and natural sciences.”²⁰

The evolution of Area Studies has, however, been marked with consistent tensions between those who advocate a ‘scientific’ form of *knowing* with its emphasis on rationalist empirical research and those who situate the locus of their *knowing* in cultural specificities, the humanities and postmodernism.²¹ Recent overtures in the scholarly community have increasingly looked toward complementarity between the two intellectual

¹⁸Talcott Parsons, quoted in Charles Wagley, “Area Research and Training: A Conference Report on the Study of World Areas” (New York, 1948).

¹⁹David Szanton, ed., *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Discipline*, vol. 3 (University of California Press, 2004): 8, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/59n2d2n1#page-1>.

²⁰Szanton.

²¹For an understanding of the debate, see Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States”; Rafael, “Regionalism, Area Studies, and the Accidents of Agency”; Robert H. Bates, “Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30, no. 2 (1997): 166–69; Robert H. Bates, “Letter from the President: Area Studies and the Discipline,” *Newsletter of the APSA Organised Section in Comparative Politics* 7, no. 1 (1996): 1–16; Chalmer Johnson, “Preconception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30, no. 2 (1997): 170–74.

positions by aiming “typically at generalizations that, going beyond a specific country or region, rely on a sophisticated use of the comparative method and build on a relatively deep level of contextual and historical knowledge”.²² However, in the case of research published on Pakistan in Area Studies journals, the list of most cited articles suggests that positivist-rationalist research continues to retain currency, as opposed to more humanistic culture-specific research. This also means that in contrast to the early aspirations and more recent call of International Relations scholars to deparochialize United States and Eurocentric understandings of the world,²³ the analysis of the knowledge produced on Pakistan continues to conform to Edward Said’s observation that:

...despite Area Studies scholars’ evident personal interest and specialized knowledge of the area of the world they are studying, the conceptualization of their projects, their research agendas, and what they have taken as appropriate units of analysis and relevant models of society and social change, have been fundamentally and consistently US- or Euro-centric.²⁴

Considering the remit of Area Studies then, it would be normal to expect that the intellectual currency awarded to ‘scientific’ knowledge would be evenly spread to incorporate research on various dimensions of scholarly concern in the study of Pakistan. However, the list of most cited research on Pakistan reveals that despite intellectuals from different disciplines publishing their studies on Pakistan in Area Studies journals, only research which builds on Pakistan’s ‘security’ externally and the ‘conflict’ internally gains traction and is recognized within the broader community interested in the study of Pakistan. Consequently, then, the knowledge circulated on Pakistan in Area Studies journals remains centered on issues of ‘security’ and ‘conflict’, among various other themes, and in effect constructs Pakistan’s ‘reality’ and resultantly the ‘truth’ about its identity. At the same time, research on other themes such as

²²Peter J. Katzenstein, “Area and Regional Studies in the United States,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34, no. 4 (2001): 789, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1350268>.

²³Arjun Appadurai, “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination,” *Public Culture* 12, no. 1 (2000): 1–19; Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds,” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 647–59, <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12171>; Szanton, *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Discipline*.

²⁴Szanton, *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Discipline*.

history, governance and development, etc. is marginalized not because it is not published, but because the discourse constructs Pakistan as an object specifically within the confines of ‘security’ and ‘conflict’ and its ‘tenuous’ relationship with Islam.

The evident dominance of rationalism and the importance of empirical methodologies in the study of Pakistan within Area Studies may largely be because of the development of Area Studies as a US enterprise in the aftermath of the Second World War. Even though Area Studies had been historically tied to European imperial expansion, it took a significant disciplinary turn “with the cutting of the world into national states that covered the map after 1945”.²⁵ Consequently, Rafael argues, it is since the end of World War II that “area studies have been integrated into larger institutional networks, ranging from universities to foundations, that have made possible the reproduction of a North American style of knowing”.²⁶ Thus what may hold true for International Relations, as Stanley Hoffman proclaims, may also hold true for Area Studies—namely that “because of the American predominance, the discipline has also taken some traditional traits which are essentially American”.²⁷ This leads us to the question: Despite a relatively larger number of contributions on Pakistan in Area Studies journals than in International Relations journals, why are American and European authors’ works most cited and, consequently, most circulated? And why are similar works of Pakistan-based authors not as widely received? Jackson argues that:

An intellectual’s geographical location as a scholar in the twenty-first century global order whether at a prestigious Western or a low ranked Asian university directly influences the status of his or her ideas. The cultural capital of the West, and of diasporic intellectuals in the West, remains central to the internationally recognized capacity to speak of, analyse and define the non-West.²⁸

²⁵David Ludden, “Area Studies in the Age of Globalization,” *Frontiers: The Interdisciplinary Journal of Study Abroad*, 2000, 1, <https://nyuscholars.nyu.edu/en/publications/area-studies-in-the-age-of-globalization>.

²⁶Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States”, 91.

²⁷Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” *Daedalus* 106, no. 3 (1977): 43, <https://www.amherst.edu/system/files/media/0084/Hoffman.pdf>.

²⁸Peter A. Jackson, “The Neoliberal University and Global Immobilities of Theory,” in *Area Studies at the Crossroads*, ed. Katja Mielke and Anna-Katharina Hornidge (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 34, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59834-9_1.

Despite the intellectual transcendence of Pakistani scholars from publishing in the periphery to publishing in spatially located and western-dominated knowledge-production centers, extra-epistemological forces govern what knowledge is seen as relevant and important. The positionality of intellectuals in western universities is considered to indicate the rigor and accrued validation of their scholarship. In addition, because this positionality is further based on 'academic quality', it results in a continuous circle of knowledge production whereby the western (including diasporic) academic produces work of 'quality' in top Area Studies journals and their work receives wider circulation because of their position in elite western centers of knowledge production. Consequently, the knowledge produced on Pakistan in South Asian Studies journals does not merely suffer from an acute marginalization of alternative discourse that seeks to critically challenge western-dominated thought but is also impeded by extra-epistemological forces which continue to strengthen western knowledge production by sustaining a hegemonic academic structure that is entrenching global inequalities in academic prestige value. The favorability which positionality accords western-based academics not only allows the production of knowledge in prestigious knowledge-production sites, but also enables the wider circulation of *that* knowledge which evolves to become 'truths' through which its audiences come to view areas and spaces.

Milliken argues that "discourses make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting toward, the world, and of operationalizing a particular 'regime of truth' while excluding other possible modes of identity and action. More specifically, discourses define subjects authorized to speak and act".²⁹ Within Area Studies then, discourse has produced an identity through the writings of *authoritative subjects* and in doing so has marginalized alternative loci of knowledge production. The 'scientific truth' through which the representations of Pakistan's identity are constructed is circulated to an audience comprising both governmental officials (as is evident from the policy-proximate roles of *authoritative* scholars) and a

²⁹Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 229, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005002003>.

broadier public which involves but is not limited to Area Studies specialists and students. This circulation of knowledge on Pakistan's identity helps reproduce common sense among a wider knowledge and is consequently vital in helping to "legitimize to elites and a broader public particular policies taken by states and international organizations."³⁰

THE 'TRUTH' ABOUT PAKISTAN IN SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES CENTERS

The debate on how Area Studies can best serve the global knowledge economy, has been an invidious one. Critiques of Area Studies often revolve around arguments which suggest that it is driven by Cold War concerns, is an irrelevant enterprise in an era of globalization, or is inimical to generalizable theory. On the other side, "defenders of area studies have insisted that political analysis should always be grounded in a thorough knowledge of regional context, without which, in their view, a deeper understanding of the dynamics of political order and political change is impossible".³¹ In simpler terms then, the debate has often been about what kind of knowledge needs to be produced such that it merits inclusion in the global knowledge economy. Despite the polemical activity of area studies critiques, Area Studies centers continue to thrive in universities across the world and remain involved in producing multidisciplinary knowledge on different regions. Yet inquiries into how knowledge on different regions is produced within these centers remains scant.³² It is quite as important to understand the processes through which knowledge is produced in these centers as it is to inquire as to what kind of knowledge should be produced.

Despite scholarly arguments about the nature of Area Studies, an analysis of the top South Asia study centers in western universities reveals a radically different image of the study of South Asia, and by extension Pakistan. Some institutes and centers studying South Asia, explicitly

³⁰Ibid., 237.

³¹Stephen E. Hanson, "The Contribution of Area Studies," in *The Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (Sage Publishers, 2009), 159.

³²Among the few works some important ones are A. Chun, "The Postcolonial Alien in Us All: Identity in the Global Division of Intellectual Labor," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 16, no. 3 (December 1, 2008): 689–710, <https://doi.org/10.1215/10679847-2008-018>; Jackson, "The Neoliberal University and Global Immobilities of Theory."

focus on one region: India. For instance, the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute housed within the Centre for India and South Asia Research at the University of British Columbia “was created in 1968 to deepen the knowledge of Indian and Canadian scholars about each others’ society and culture”.³³ Another example is the UCLA Center for India and South Asia, whose stated goal is to “transform UCLA into one of the leading poles of integrated research activity on India and South Asia in the country through research, collaboration and academic integration”.³⁴ Given the explicit nature of the India-centered research agenda of these centers and institutes, it would hardly be surprising to find that little of the research conducted in such centers strays beyond the Indian borders. However, even those centers and institutes which profess to include all the political territories that make up South Asia are considerably skewed toward producing India-centric research.

One example among the many is the South Asia Institute (SAI) at the University of Heidelberg. It is one of the most prolific Area Study centers focusing on South Asia in the western world. The center is divided into various disciplines taught under the ambit of South Asian Studies. According to their website: “The Department of Political Science at Heidelberg is one of its kind located within a SAI. This brings to the department the richness of South Asia studies, and proximity to neighborhood disciplines ranging from Indology, Modern Languages, History, and Anthropology to Development Economics and Geography”. However, the Institute is less ‘South Asian’ in character than it is ‘Indian’. A large concentration of researchers are ethnically Indian with expertise in Indian politics, which has meant that most of the research carried out at the Department of Political Science in the SAI is focused on India as an area of interest. This becomes all the clearer given the current ongoing research projects within the department. The research project “Kausalya’s Arthashastra and its Relevance for Contemporary South Asia... explores the latent and manifest influence of Kautilyan thought in modern India’s institutional practices and politico-strategic culture”. The research project entitled ‘Bureaucratic Culture and Governance: State, Society and Rules’ “conducts comparative research on distributive conflicts over the rules of governance in India,

³³ See website <https://cisar.iar.ubc.ca/shastri-indo-canadian-institute/>.

³⁴ See website <http://www.international.ucla.edu/cisa/about>.

China and Iran". The project on 'Global Governance—Rethinking Stakeholder Participation' uses Bangladesh as a comparative case study perspective of India. Furthermore, the record of publications of researchers since 2016 listed on the website showcases research on only one political territory out of the seven that make up 'South Asia': India.

Another instance of how South Asia study centers are implicitly India-centric in research is the Australia South Asia Research Centre (ASARC), established as an initiative of the National University of Australia's Division of Economics through the Strategic Development Fund of the Institute of Advanced Studies. The Centre "focuses on India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives. The Centre is dedicated to research on the economics and politics of development in the South Asia region".³⁵ But despite the tall claims of regional inclusivity in the study of South Asia, the list of research projects and other activities of the Centre promoted through their website reveals a different picture. Most of the research showcased by the Centre is dominated by India-related themes. Consider, for example, the list of research projects mentioned on their website: (1) The design and implementation of Social Safety Nets in India, (2) The behavior of calorie and protein intake in rural India—in particular a study of nutrition–poverty traps, (3) Fiscal Policy Design in Developing Countries, with special reference to India, (4) Vulnerability of Consumption Growth in Rural India, (5) Review of anti-poverty programs in India, (6) Review of the prospects for attainment of Millennium Development Goals in India, and (7) The effect of liberalization on economic inequality in India. In addition to the specifically Indian projects, other studies on various themes continue to be mentioned on their website, but none of them focus on a particular region in the same way as those listed above focus exclusively on India.

The Centre for South Asian Studies at the University of Edinburgh is yet another example of how other regions within South Asia, including Pakistan, remain excluded from research conducted in South Asia centers. The Centre professes to be the "central academic unit at the University of Edinburgh and indeed for much of Scotland dedicated to the study of South Asia". However, a look at the research projects that the Centre has fostered and the publications with which it has associated

³⁵ See website <http://www.asia-studies.com/asarc.html>.

itself, reveals a similar trend as in other centers of South Asian studies. For instance, the Centre lists 29 research projects on its website to showcase its research potential. Out of these, 22 specifically focused on India, while 2 projects explored Nepal and only 1 research project was focused around Sri Lanka and Maldives. The rest explored South Asia generally around various themes ranging from medicine to history. There was no research project on Pakistan. Similarly, the Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies lists 25 entries from 1995 till 2011, out of which only 1 paper was published on Pakistan.³⁶ On the other hand, the Routledge/Edinburgh *South Asian Studies* routinely publishes research on South Asia with the aim “to advance understanding of the key issues in the study of South Asia”, yet out of the 23 manuscripts published through these series only 1 manuscript focused on Pakistan³⁷ whereas the rest were heavily dominated by India-centric research.

One of the reasons research on South Asia is narrowly confined to the study of India is that scholars within these study centers are predominantly of Indian origin. As Chun observes about anthropology, a major field of study in Area Studies centers, “a vast majority of Third World anthropologists end up studying their own society [because]... once a local, always a local”.³⁸ Chun also argues that “the other may have been silent, but only in western discourse”.³⁹ Consequently, it is when ‘local’ scholars gain access to western academia through doctoral scholarships and postdoctoral fellowships that their ‘voices’ about their ‘locale’ are heard. The scholarships and fellowships in western universities are aimed at attracting and harnessing the area expertise of natives working in their own countries, which is considered likely to be deeper and richer than those working in the West. A glance at the top South Asia study centers in the western world again reveals that most postdoctoral fellowships at these centers are occupied by western and Indian academics studying India. The fascination of the West with Indology or Indian studies

³⁶Syed H.S. Soherwordi, “‘Punjabisation’ in the British Indian Army 1857–1947 and the Advent of Military Rule in Pakistan,” *Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies Number*, vol. 24, 2010, www.csas.ed.ac.uk.

³⁷Katharine Charsley, *Transnational Pakistani Connections Marrying ‘Back Home,’* 1st ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).

³⁸Chun, “The Postcolonial Alien in Us All: Identity in the Global Division of Intellectual Labor”, 699.

³⁹Chun, 692.

stems from both its origins in European imperialist orientalism and Cold War-era political agendas of American hegemony.⁴⁰ While for the Europeans, India was the legitimate inheritor of the pre-partition sub-continental identity, for the Americans, India was a natural democratically. Consequently, the embrace and celebration of the 'Indian' academic's entry into western academe has led to a manifold increase in the knowledge produced on India within academic institutional structures. This intellectual development has worked to the detriment of other areas within the South Asian region, including Pakistan. First, it has unveiled the endemic lack of interest on the part of western knowledge producers in *knowing* Pakistan and the other states that make up the South Asian region. Secondly, while true to their proposed research ambit, South Asian area study centers across the West have intellectually explored India across the depths and breadths of various disciplines, so that the study of India has become a truly multidisciplinary enterprise, in the case of Pakistan, most of the research, however marginal, remains centered on matters of its security and international affairs.⁴¹

The ingress of the 'Indian' academic into western knowledge-production centers has enabled him/her to speak of the local, yet in the case of Pakistan intellectual 'voices' have been marginalized as a result of being both geographically insulated and spatially isolated. To that extent, as in the discipline of International Relations, most of the scholarship originating spatially in area-centered academic journals, the research conducted within South Asia study centers and the pedagogical arrangements that are followed in these centers are spearheaded predominantly by Western and Indian intellectuals. For instance in one of the most prominent universities, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, not only is there no Pakistani 'local' expert mentioned within the expertise on Pakistan, even among the scholars across the disciplines who have cross-disciplinary expertise the presence of Pakistani

⁴⁰For a detailed overview of how the study of India became the study of 'South Asia', see Nicholas B. Dirks, "South Asian Studies: Futures Past," in *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, ed. David L. Szanton (University of California Press, 2003), 341–85.

⁴¹There are only three units dedicated to research on Pakistan: The Berkeley-Pakistan Initiative at the University of California, Berkeley; The Centre for the Study of Pakistan at the School of Oriental and African Studies and the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Durham University. The dominant work on Pakistan within these centers revolves around Pakistan's security and political issues.

academics is marginal. A similar trend can be observed in other elite South Asia study centers such as those at the University of Edinburgh and Heidelberg. This might also explain why these centers have produced minimum Pakistani Ph.D.s.⁴² The vast majority of South Asia study centers also routinely engage in postgraduate teaching through awards of postgraduate degrees in South Asia Studies. It seems reasonable to posit then, that in case of the content on Pakistan taught within these degree programs, a great majority of South Asia experts and intellectuals are considerably more directly influenced by scholarship generated elsewhere, which also means that the circulation of knowledge on Pakistan which is dominant in disciplines across the social sciences seeps into the content of area studies on Pakistan. Further, since classrooms are locations in which agency can significantly and clearly be engaged to promulgate certain approaches but not others, and since teachers have the ability to select and to valorize some perspectives but not others,⁴³ what becomes increasingly evident is the dominance of a discourse on Pakistan in South Asia studies borrowed from other disciplines and circulated through western and Indian-origin scholars.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF MOST CITED SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES ARTICLES ON PAKISTAN

The discourse on Pakistan in the eight most cited articles in South Asian studies journals reveals a fascination, similar to that found in International Relations journals, with Pakistan and its relationship with conflict (see Table 3.2). Pakistan's conflicts are either studied in the context of its relationship with Afghanistan, or in the context of international conflict as a consequence of the War on Terror. The discourse

⁴²Between the years 2002–2013, the South Asia Institute at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London has awarded 5 Ph.D.s to Pakistani candidates out of a total 158 successful Ph.D.s; The Center for South Asian Studies at the University of Edinburgh has awarded 2 Ph.D.s to Pakistani candidates out of a total of 38 between the years 2004–2015; and the Department of Political Science at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University, Germany has awarded 2 Ph.D.s to Pakistani candidates out of a total of 32 between the years 2001–2018.

⁴³Jonas Hagmann and Thomas J. Biersteker, "Beyond the Published Discipline: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of International Studies," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 2 (June 18, 2014): 291–315, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066112449879>.

Table 3.2 Most cited work on Pakistan in Area Studies journals

S. No	Article			Journal
	Name	Authors	No. of citations	Name/country
1.	The Militant Challenge in Pakistan	C. Christine Fair	74	<i>Asia Policy</i> /US
2.	The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border	Bijan Omrani	57	<i>Asian Affairs</i> /UK
3.	Guns, Slums, and “Yellow Devils”: A Genealogy of Urban Conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan	Laurent Gayer	57	<i>Modern Asian Studies</i> /UK
4.	Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection	C. Christine Fair	48	<i>Asia Policy</i> /US
5.	Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan	Feisal Khan	41	<i>Asian Journal of Political Science</i> /US
6.	Drones over Pakistan: Secrecy, Ethics, and Counterinsurgency	Christian Enemark	32	<i>Asian Security</i> /US
7.	The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence	Frédéric Grare	32	<i>South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies</i>
8.	Pakistan’s Afghan policies and their Consequences	Marvin G. Weinbaum and Jonathan B. Harder	29	<i>Contemporary South Asia</i> /UK

Information/Key

1. Articles cited more than *twenty-five* (and more) times have been included

2. The table includes articles from 2006 to 2016

within these writings continues to deploy familiar labels and discursive formations on Islam, such as 'Islamist militants', 'islamists', 'islamist legitimacy', 'salafist jihadists', 'radical islam', 'radical islamists', 'domestic extremists', 'militantly islamists', 'radical Islamic parties' and so on. Additions to the discourse on Pakistan in South Asia studies journals are the labels of 'failed state' and 'failing state' used to describe the poor governance record of the Pakistani state. The discourse on Pakistan consequently interacts not only with the discourse on 'Islam', 'militancy' and 'Jihad', but also with the discourse on 'failed state', to construct a representational identity of the Pakistani state where conflict is endemic and uncontrollable because of the weakness of the state. This discourse on Pakistan then constructs a broader representational identity by exposing this 'state ineptness' and its link to international conflict, painting a grim picture. For instance, one article begins thus:

After describing the complex contemporary landscape of Islamist militancy in Pakistan and the relationship between these groups and the state, as well as between religious and political organizations, this article contends that jihad is sustained by important segments of Pakistani society that endorse "militant jihad" in general and specific militant groups and operations in particular. Given Pakistan's enduring security concerns about India's ascent, Islamabad is unlikely to abandon militancy as a tool of policy....⁴⁴

Yet another exposes the Pakistani militant problem: "Between 1989 and 2003, 1468 Pakistanis were killed, and 3370 injured, in some separate 1813 incidents of (mainly) Shia–Sunni violence. This violence is fuelled and exacerbated by highly inflammatory speeches by extremist ulemas, who constantly incite their followers to eliminate members of the other sect, invariably categorised as enemies of Islam".⁴⁵ Elsewhere it is augured that "Pakistan's madaris are posited both to be incubators of militants in Pakistan and to be responsible for creating communities of support for militancy in Pakistan, South Asia and beyond".⁴⁶ However,

⁴⁴C. Christine Fair, "The Militant Challenge in Pakistan," *Asia Policy* 11 (2011): 106.

⁴⁵Frédéric Grare, "The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 30, no. 1 (April 30, 2007): 127, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400701264068>.

⁴⁶C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection," *Asia Policy* 4, no. 1 (2007): 109.

the discursive construction of Pakistan as anathema to regional and ‘international’ peace does not stop at ‘Islamist militants’. According to discourse it is not just the state and its ‘militants’ which is the problem, but a general support for violence across the entire country. For instance, another article argues that: “Limited evidence suggests that Madrasah students more strongly support jihad than those of public or private schools—but public school students, who comprise 70% of Pakistan’s enrolled students, also have high levels of support for violence”.⁴⁷ Consequently, the blame for such widespread support of conflict and violence rests with the ‘inability’ of the Pakistani state institutions to reform. Another article argues that:

Conventional wisdom holds that the most dangerous threat to the Pakistani state is the growing power of Islamic fundamentalists challenging its legitimacy. However, this is reversing the causation. It is not the rise of Islamic fundamentalism that is challenging the legitimacy and the power of the state but it is the ever-weakening governance capability of the Pakistani state that is allowing Islamic fundamentalism to challenge it. And it is the inability of the Pakistani state to provide any appreciable level of public goods and services to the Pakistani people that allows the Islamic fundamentalists to plausibly claim that the Pakistani state is illegitimate, and for some Western analysts to describe it as a ‘weak’ or ‘failing’ state.⁴⁸

The discursive construction of Pakistan’s representational identity in South Asian studies journals is woven around three central themes: First, that it is not just the Pakistani state but its people who support varying degrees of conflict and violence depending on their political, ideological and ethnic leaning; secondly that Pakistan’s ‘nefarious’ designs in Afghanistan and its policies dating back to the partition of the sub-continent have resulted in the region’s current ailment; and lastly that Pakistan’s state is both structurally weak internally and also suffers from a lack of will to pursue an ‘international agenda’ because of its national security policies. Most pervasive within these themes is the connection

⁴⁷C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection,” *Asia Policy* 4, no. 1 (2007): 106.

⁴⁸Feisal Khan, “Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan,” *Asian Journal of Political Science* 15, no. 2 (August 2007): 219–20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370701511644>.

of Pakistan's militancy with Madrassas and, consequently, within this discourse the representational identity of Pakistan is constructed in the context of Pakistan-US relations. For instance, Fair argues that: "While the United States was an important supplier of military equipment, Pakistan's military also undertook an important doctrinal shift under U.S. influence and tutelage [...] Pakistan began intensively studying guerilla warfare through its engagement with the U.S. military. Although the U.S. objective in providing this instruction was to suppress such conflict, Pakistan was keen to understand how to engage in guerilla warfare against India".⁴⁹ Thus the United States appears as a 'benefactor', a 'patron' whose 'tutelage' has been 'manipulated' by Pakistan to serve its own interests. It is argued that: "Years of U.S. policies toward Pakistan based on financial allurements and conventional weaponry have done little to induce change".⁵⁰ In another article: "US policies dedicated to defending the Kabul regime and resisting the re-emergence of radical Islam in Afghanistan, a serious falling out between Islamabad and Kabul could have an adverse effect on both [...] Whatever its differences with Washington, Pakistan has been unwilling to jeopardize military and economic assistance".⁵¹ In this way the discourse thus constructs the representational identity of the United States as a 'benevolent patron' whose patronage has been misconstrued and misused by a 'manipulative' Pakistan. Just as within the International Relations discourse, a series of binaries are constructed such as strong democracy/weak democracy, successful state/failed state, western education/Islamic education, etc. In the case of Pakistan, the United States is considered to be caught in a 'moral dilemma'. As Enemark observes:

The US government also has a strategic interest in countering in insurgency that threatens the political stability of Pakistan itself. A descent into disorder in this nuclear-armed state would likely generate consequences detrimental to other states in South and Central Asia, with flow-on negative outcomes for the United States in terms of power balance in the region. The US government also has a broader, long-term interest in

⁴⁹Fair, "The Militant Challenge in Pakistan", 109.

⁵⁰Fair, 106.

⁵¹Marvin G. Weinbaum and Jonathan B. Harder, "Pakistan's Afghan Policies and Their Consequences," *Contemporary South Asia* 16, no. 1 (March 6, 2008): 27.

upholding international norms governing war and its reputation as a champion thereof. From an ethical perspective, these norms are inherently good because they seek to make armed conflict less frequent and more humane, and they are also instrumentally good in promoting stability in the international system and restraint in states' use of force. The US government is more likely to advance its interests by using lethal force justly.⁵²

A similar tone follows Fair's assertion when she argues that:

While some madaris are notorious [...], U.S. ability to act against them is frustrated by several factors. First, the United States takes unilateral action in Pakistan very hesitantly and only with solid intelligence out of a concern for Pakistan's domestic stability [...] Second, despite its engagement with U.S. counterparts and despite massive infusion of funds and other resources, the Pakistan Army remains incapable of mounting effective counter-insurgency in FATA and elsewhere.⁵³

The United States is thus not only strategically motivated to counter 'terrorism' internationally. Given the chaos that instability may generate, its interests also lie in maintaining the political stability of Pakistan, which means that it has to 'champion' the cause by using force 'justly'. Absent from the discourse on Pakistan—whether the context is provided by a militant-madrasa connection, drone strikes or US-Afghanistan conundrum—is a discussion on Pakistan's state sovereignty, which is implicitly left to the reader to realize that for a country 'willfully' fostering such grave 'ills', state sovereignty is a matter of no consequence. Thus while here there is a subliminal hint toward the US's 'imperialist burden', elsewhere colonialism is presented as having done more good to Pakistan than harm. For instance, Gayer argues that "the colonisation of Karachi connected it even tighter to the world economy".⁵⁴ Even though his article examines the urban conflict in Karachi, a city in

⁵²Christian Enemark, "Drones Over Pakistan: Secrecy, Ethics, and Counterinsurgency," *Asian Security* 7, no. 3 (September 2011): 219, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2011.615082>.

⁵³Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection", 132.

⁵⁴Laurent Gayer, "Guns, Slums, and 'Yellow Devils': A Genealogy of Urban Conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan," *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no. 3 (May 11, 2007): 517, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X06002599>.

Pakistan, Gayer does not hesitate to connect it to the wider discourse on the Pakistani state and its link with 'militancy'. He argues that the "extreme fragmentation of the city has benefited local jihadis and foreign terrorists who have taken shelter here since the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan".⁵⁵ According to discourse then, not only is the Pakistani state a corrupt and failed one, but the Pakistani Army has also been complicit in providing extensive support to jihadi groups fighting against Indian forces in Kashmir. "However, the Islamist 'threat' to the state is not just simple 'blowback' but a direct result of the declining legitimacy and governance ability and increasing inability of the Pakistani state to provide any meaningful level of public goods or services to the Pakistani people".⁵⁶ Its people in the urban areas, its 'islamic education' in madrassas, its students in public and private schools are all 'active participants' in violence and conflict, either through being openly 'militant' or by supporting 'militancy' in its various forms. Even along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, it is not just a single category of 'militants' who are the problem, rather:

the frontier poses problems of many different types: legal, territorial, economic, ethnographic, military, geopolitical. Nor does it just involve Pakistan and Afghanistan as two titanic players. There are many parties involved: the various factions of the government in Pakistan, the secret services of Pakistan, the Pakistani army, the tribesmen, the local notables, the insurgents, whether Islamic or otherwise. There are smugglers and business interests to consider.

In such a situation, the United States is considered to be in a conundrum since its 'responsibility' as a state pursuing 'just wars' is impeded by the widespread 'problem' in Pakistan. Again absent from these accounts is the US's role in abetting this militancy through its support to Pakistan during the Cold War and even after it,⁵⁷ and its active involvement in

⁵⁵ Gayer, 515.

⁵⁶ Khan, "Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan", 241

⁵⁷ Ishaan Tharoor, "The Taliban Indoctrinates Kids with Jihadist Textbooks Paid for by the U.S.," *The Washington Post*, December 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/08/the-taliban-indoctrinates-kids-with-jihadist-text-books-paid-for-by-the-u-s/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fe1c2c219d73; Robert Dreyfuss, *Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam* (Metropolitan Books, 2005).

Pakistan's political affairs by propping up dictatorial regimes.⁵⁸ In the case of Afghanistan, there is no mention of the root of the problem in the hasty and uneven demarcation of borders by the British Raj. At no point in the discourse has any kind of responsibility for Pakistan's current ailments been attributed to the West. The discourse amputates the non-western dimensions of history and presents Pakistan as a state whose problems are 'indigenous' and 'home grown', while the West is presented as a 'champion' benevolently trying to ameliorate the key issues in Pakistan's 'instability'. Consequently, the discourse argues for the United States to leave its 'just' approach act more directly to achieve its desired results. Fair, for instance, argues that the United States "will have to work harder to align Pakistan's interests with those of the United States", by making "increasing use of negative inducements" rather than relying upon "positives ones". And if that fails, she argues, then "the United States may have to act alone and find ways of managing the fallout". Finally: "Yet the United States and its partners must make such attempts because the opportunity costs of inaction or failure are simply too high in this unstable, nuclear-armed country facing considerable internal security challenges".⁵⁹ The increase of negative inducements implies sanctions or the blocking of foreign aid to Pakistan, which has been a recurring phenomenon during the War on Terror, and the 'go-it-alone' strategy implies a blatant use of force in the face of Pakistan's inability to follow the US plan, as manifested by drone strikes. Lastly, the text draws on three discourses to construct a representational identity of Pakistan as a 'nuclear-armed', 'instable' and 'incapable' state. Even within the study of Pakistan-Afghanistan similar references to US 'benevolence' continue to prevail. For instance, Weinbaum argues:

the United States gave a strong stimulus to Pakistan's economy by rescheduling US\$3 billion in debt and supporting the International Monetary Fund's additional US\$9 billion in debt relief.¹⁸ A large part of the development portion of the 5-year programme has been in the form of budgetary support. A US\$750 million development aid programme was

⁵⁸A. Murad, "US Aid to Pakistan and Democracy," *Policy Perspectives* 6, no. 2 (2009): 1–40; Ahmed Waheed, *The Wrong Ally: Pakistan's State Sovereignty Under US Dependence* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018).

⁵⁹Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection", 132–33.

sought from the US Congress in 2007, designed to transform the FATA into a more governable region. Yet aid that is so heavily pitched to security and regime stability will do little to ameliorate the social and economic problems faced by Pakistan's citizens.⁶⁰

Within this theme too, the onus of responsibility rests squarely on Pakistan's shoulders with little to no explanation of how the international community and the United States have played a role in Pakistan-Afghanistan affairs. As Weinbaum concludes:

Pakistan's Afghan policies over the past 30 years, whether pursued for domestic political or strategic reasons or under US and international pressures, have come at the expense of the country's political stability and social cohesion. These policies carry heavy responsibility for intensifying Pakistan's ethnic fissures, weakening it economically, fuelling religious radicalism, and bringing about an attenuation of the state's legitimate authority... Islamabad has turned a blind eye to domestic radicalisation and the impact of this radicalisation on its ability to govern within its own borders.

The texts through which the discourse on Pakistan is constructed and circulated in Area Studies mostly use theoretical frameworks or empirical methodologies to produce resolute 'truths' about the Pakistani state. The pervasive de-contextualization and de-historicization through which the Pakistani state is produced obfuscates the motives behind its particular actions, and ignores the historical productivity through which the Pakistani state has come to view its place in this world. The dominance of western scholars in constructing 'Pakistan' allows them to interpret the meanings of Pakistani state actions and the Pakistani 'reality', not with reference to the social conditions within which Pakistan's actions originate, but with reference to abstract moral categories that these western interpreters use to structure their world. Consequently, through de-contextualization and de-historicization, the list of sociopolitical causes of problems in Pakistan is transformed into abstract, universalized moral categories that the West is familiar and comfortable with such as 'failed state', 'radical Islam' and 'militant jihadi'. Through this process of interpretation and reinterpretation of the policies of the Pakistani state, categories are constructed in binaries which seek to legitimize or

⁶⁰Weinbaum and Harder, "Pakistan's Afghan Policies and Their Consequences", 37.

delegitimize actions and policies by associating them with generalized moral concepts. The language of the discourse on Pakistan obfuscates the structural causes of the motives of the Pakistani state by de-contextualizing them from their historical-material settings. Instead, abstract and absolute moral notions are employed to describe Pakistan and its deeds. The Pakistani state is seen as inherently flawed because it persistently fails to measure up to western values and demands, and operates beyond the West's rationality.

CONCLUSION

Considering that Area Studies journals have a broad multidisciplinary pool from which to draw knowledge, it could at least be expected that they would be conduits of knowledge broad in scope rather than myopically focused on Pakistan's security and its internal and external affairs. However, the dominance of a particular kind of knowledge exclusively monopolized in US knowledge hubs has allowed the construction of a representational identity of Pakistan through the discourse it produces. More importantly, this discursive construction is the exclusive domain of International Relations scholars who have simultaneously positioned themselves as Area Studies scholars. Consequently, the representational identity of Pakistan constructed within Area Studies follows similar lines as that constructed through the discipline of International Relations. The absent of alternative discourses continue to allow a 'western' understanding of Pakistan to dominate and remain unchallenged. As in International Relations, those who continue to produce and circulate Pakistan's representational identity in the mainstream discourse of Pakistan demonstrate linkages to US policy networks. While it can be contested whether the academic discourse has a direct effect on US and western policy decisions regarding Pakistan, the representational identity of Pakistan can be claimed to be circulated untrammelled through International Relations and Area Study scholars and, via them, the western policy corridors.

This chapter initially began with a brief description of how Area Studies as spatial and geographically located knowledge-producing hubs as in Area Studies journals and Area Studies centers in the West, have evolved since the Cold War. The chapter then explored the eurocentricity of scholarship produced in Area Studies journals on Pakistan. Despite

being a disciplinary melting pot, Area Studies journals were shown to be dominated by conflict-centric research on Pakistan. Most of the research was conducted by scholars positioned in western centers. The data also made apparent the marginalization of Pakistan-based scholars to the discourse on Pakistan's conflicts, internal and external. This development bears a stark resemblance to similar trajectories observed in International Relations scholarship. At the same time Area Study Centers across the western world have remained focused on India as an object of research to the detriment of other states that comprise South Asia including Pakistan. This has resulted in fewer experts on Pakistan within these centers and consequently researches conducted within these centers continue to recycle knowledge produced on Pakistan elsewhere which again is dominated by security-centric issues.

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The ‘Truth About Pakistan’: Knowledge Production and Circulation in Think Tanks

Knowledge production, in recent years, has broken through the dominance of university-based research. While in the past university research centers and area study centers policed the parameters of knowledge production, think tanks have increasingly emerged as competitive centers of knowledge production. This shift in knowledge-production processes¹ is characterized by a transformation from ‘Mode 1’ to Mode 2’ knowledge production. ‘Mode 1’ knowledge production was “characterized by the hegemony of theoretical or, at any rate, experimental science; by an internally-driven taxonomy of disciplines; and by the autonomy of scientists and their host institutions, the universities”.² Universities were the locus of knowledge-producing activities and the production of knowledge was restricted to relatively autonomous and structured fields. Consequently, the intellectuals and scholars of distinct fields within the universities exercised monopolistic control over knowledge-production processes. Assuming ‘guru-like status’, the academic experts provided

¹Michael Gibbons et al., *The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies* (Sage, 1994); Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, and Micheal Gibbons, “Introduction to Special Issue: Reflections on the New Production of Knowledge: ‘Mode 2’ Revisited: The New Production of Knowledge,” *Minerva* 41, no. 3 (2018): 179–94.

²Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons, “Introduction to Special Issue: Reflections on the New Production of Knowledge: ‘Mode 2’ Revisited: The New Production of Knowledge”, 179.

empirically driven solutions for the wider society, especially the government. Their expertise was valued on the basis of their established research careers and professional credentials.³ However, the traditional structures of knowledge production were increasingly superseded by “a new paradigm of knowledge production (‘Mode 2’), which was socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities”.⁴ Thus knowledge production is no longer confined to university settings but is increasingly being produced at other loci, such as within epistemic communities, industries and think tanks. As Tchilingirian argues, “claims to socially and politically relevant expertise—such as security analysis and terrorism studies increasingly take place at the intersection of a number of professions and fields”.⁵

Given this context, the study of International Relations and Area Studies as spatial and geographical loci for the production of knowledge cannot be restricted to academic departments and research centers within universities. The operation of think tanks in the liminal spaces between the academic and policy-making communities as arbiters of knowledge means that the field of International Relations and Area Studies is also considerably influenced by knowledge produced within think tanks and vice versa. What this means is that the construction of ‘Pakistan’ does not solely happen within the knowledge produced by academics in university departments and centers, but is also shaped by

³Thomas Osborne, “On Mediators: Intellectuals and the Ideas Trade in the Knowledge Society,” *Economy and Society* 33, no. 4 (November 2004): 430–47, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0308514042000285224>; Lisa Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented ‘Terrorism’* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139208161>; Reiner Grundmann, “The Problem of Expertise in Knowledge Societies,” *Minerva* 55, no. 1 (March 27, 2017): 25–48, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-016-9308-7>.

⁴Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons, “Introduction to Special Issue: Reflections on the New Production of Knowledge: ‘Mode 2’ Revisited: The New Production of Knowledge”, 179.

⁵Jordan Soukias Tchilingirian, “Producing Knowledge, Producing Credibility: British Think-Tank Researchers and the Construction of Policy Reports,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 31, no. 2 (June 3, 2018): 162, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-018-9280-3>. For a detailed discussion on this aspect of knowledge production, see Gil Eyal, “Dangerous Liaisons Between Military Intelligence and Middle Eastern Studies in Israel,” *Theory and Society* 31, no. 5 (2002): 653–93, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3108544>; Gil Eyal and Pok Grace, “What Is Security Expertise?” in *Security Expertise: Practice, Power, Responsibility*, ed. Trine Villumsen Berling and Christian Bueger (Routledge, 2015), 37–59.

the knowledge-production processes in other loci such as think tanks.⁶ The study of think tanks as knowledge-producing agents becomes all the more important considering that there purportedly exists a considerable disconnect between academic departments and policy-makers. Considering that “the discourse ‘bridging’, ‘linking’ or ‘connecting’ the policy and research worlds” reverberates throughout the web sites, mission statements and publications of think tanks,⁷ any understanding of how knowledge is produced in International Relations, and how the discursive constructions embedded within the discourse are transmitted from the research world to the more applied world, cannot be complete without analyzing how knowledge is produced by think tanks.

Think tanks are not however, monolithic entities. Depending on their nature, structure and objectives, different think tanks operate differently within the interstitial zones at the crossroads of various academic and nonacademic professions. For instance, think tanks may act as bridges between the academic and policy-making communities; others might serve the public interest and in doing so behave as advocates for ideas and ideologies; there are yet others that are heavily invested in the exercise of writing and publishing original research.⁸ The concern of this chapter is not to explore how think tanks have influenced policy decisions on Pakistan, but how discourse on Pakistan circulates within these policy-expert communities and how it connects with the wider discourse.

⁶I wish to clarify that I do not believe that the discursive production of Pakistan is entirely restricted to academic knowledge and knowledge production processes in think-tanks. Rather, any discourse, because of its expansive nature, cannot be studied in its entirety. Even though knowledge production happens at other loci such as Research Councils, multilateral organizations, epistemic communities, I have chosen to restrict the ambit of this research to unravel a singular strand of the discourse that focuses on International Relations, Area Studies and Think-Tanks.

⁷Diane Stone, “Garbage Cans, Recycling Bins or Think Tanks? Three Myths About Policy Institutes,” *Public Administration* 85, no. 2 (2007): 260, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00649.x>.

⁸For a detailed understanding of the role of Think-tanks, policy experts and their influence on policy-making processes, see Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939–1945* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, *British Think-Tanks and the Climate of Opinion* (London: UCL Press, 1998); Andrew Rich, *Think-Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>.

For this reason, this chapter analyzes how experts within the top think tanks have contributed toward the discursive construction of Pakistan and how through their writings and professional engagements they have produced and reproduced knowledge on Pakistan.

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND THINK TANKS: AN OVERVIEW

Despite the emergence of a handful of institutes in Great Britain and the United States during the 1800s designed to help “policy-makers navigate their way through complex policy problems”,⁹ it was not until the initial decades of the twentieth century that think tanks began to garner prominence as intellectual participants in policy debates. Prominent among these were the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Russell Sage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, the Council of Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Following the events of decolonization in the aftermath of the Second World War and the subsequent rapid process of globalization, there was a proliferation of think tanks across the world, to the extent that there are today 7815 think tanks sprawled across the globe, of which 90.5% were created since 1951¹⁰ “and over half have been established since 1980”.¹¹ The process of globalization, which blurred the boundaries between the national and the international, has as a result led to a world that is both increasingly complex and interdependent. Adding to this, the technology boom that immediately followed globalization enabled the unlocking of a vast reservoir of information and knowledge, covering both historical and contemporary events, across the globe. At the same time, states are not only dealing with other states alone, but are in a state of continuous interaction with a diverse set of transnational actors. Consequently, the foreign policies of these states are not just calibrated on realpolitik measurements, but several other factors—economics, environment, culture, etc.—constantly contribute toward foreign policy decision-making

⁹Donald E. Abelson, “Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign Affairs Think Tanks,” *International Affairs* 90, no. 1 (2014): 125–42.

¹⁰James McGann, *2017 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report* (The Lauder Institute University of Pennsylvania, 2018).

¹¹Mahmood Ahmad, “US Think Tanks and the Politics of Expertise: Role, Value and Impact,” *Political Quarterly* 79, no. 4 (2008): 530, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923x.2008.00964.x>.

processes. This puts pressure on foreign policy-makers in three ways. First, because political developments that present themselves for resolution and mitigation often require immediate responses, they do not have "the time...necessary to think about, do the research, and fashion the recommendations" on major policy issues. Secondly, although foreign policy-makers might possess considerable knowledge on a vast array of issues, they do not know everything about everything. Even though they have an avalanche of information at their disposal, this information is often "unsystematic, unreliable, and/or tainted by the interests of those who are disseminating it".¹² The intricacies of foreign policy-making in the contemporary world have necessitated the outsourcing of political expertise and knowledge production to agents who can provide them with timely, understandable, reliable and useful information. This role has been taken up by think tanks to the extent that they have consolidated their position as an integral part of the policy-making process and have now become a permanent component of the political landscape. Since policy-makers have increasingly come to depend on the information and knowledge provided by think tanks, this dependence has enabled the think tanks to at least seemingly exert influence on the policy process.

The profusion of think tanks has been followed by equally rigorous inquiries on various discursive trajectories that seek to explore questions about the constituent nature of think tanks and the value of their participation in policy-making processes. These studies have firstly sought to resolve the definitional conundrum of identifying what constitutes a think tank. This has led to much scholarly activity concerned with how to conceptualize the think tank.¹³ Since the evolution of the think tank has depended on various factors such as "the type of constitutional architecture, the historical circumstances of war or stability, the political culture and legal traditions, alongside the character of the

¹²James G. McGann, "Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy," *The Quarterly Journal* 2, no. 1 (2003): 85.

¹³Diane Stone, "Old Guard Versus New Partisans: Think Tanks in Transition," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 2 (1991): 197–215, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00323269108402146>; McGann, "Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy"; Thomas Medvetz, "Hybrid Intellectuals: Toward a Social Praxeology of U.S. Think Tank Experts," 2006; Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 22, no. 3 (1989): 563–79.

regime in power”, the term ‘think tank’ has been able to defy any exact definition.¹⁴ The variations in how competing think tanks evolved have individually imbued these think tanks with different characters that differentiate them from each other depending on their “size, legal form, policy ambit, longevity, organizational structure, standard of inquiry and political significance”.¹⁵ In that sense it has become all the more difficult to allocate a precise meaning to the word think tank. Nonetheless, the quest to define think tanks has given impetus to a growing body of research which has been busy trying to segregate and organize think tanks according to various typological features. For instance, Weaver arranges the world of think tanks into three neat categories, namely “universities without students”, the “contract research organization” and “advocacy tanks”.¹⁶ Some other types recently introduced are “party think tanks”, “policy clubs” and “policy enterprises”.¹⁷ The propensity of scholars to base their understanding of think tanks on their organizational form¹⁸ “often degenerates into futile semantics”¹⁹ and contributes to the still unresolved “dilemma of definition”.²⁰ Despite exhibiting

¹⁴Diane Stone, “Garbage Cans, Recycling Bins or Think Tanks? Three Myths About Policy Institutes,” *Public Administration* 85, no. 2 (2007): 261, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00649.x>.

¹⁵Stone.

¹⁶Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks.”

¹⁷James McGann and Robert Kent Weaver, eds., *Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action* (Transaction Publishers, 2002); Donald E. Abelson, “Do Think Tanks Matter? Opportunities, Constraints and Incentives for Think Tanks in Canada and the United States,” *Global Society* 14, no. 2 (2000): 213–36, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820050008458>.

¹⁸For instance, McGann and Weaver define think tanks as “non-governmental, not-for-profit research organisations with substantial organisational autonomy from government and from societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties”. A critique of this definition is presented by Pautz in, “Revisiting the Think-Tank Phenomenon,” *Public Policy and Administration* 26, no. 4 (October 5, 2011): 419–35, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076710378328>.

¹⁹Simon James, “Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Political Process,” *Public Administration* 76, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): 409–10, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00108>.

²⁰Thomas Matthew Medvetz, *Think Tanks as an Emergent Field* (New York: Social Sciences Research Council, 2008).

distinctiveness in the manner in which they are organized, think tanks share one common goal: they are established to inform and influence policy.²¹

Moving away from exploring the typological distinctions between think tanks, scholarly inquiries have begun to question the role and the extent of the influence that think tanks wield in policy-making.²² These inquiries become all the more important when studying foreign-policy think tanks because of the wider implications of their role in foreign policy decision-making and their intermediary position between the policy machinery and academia. Higgott and Stone argue that “foreign policy think tanks and institutes of international affairs are of interest to the wider debates in international relations for two reasons. On the one hand, they aspire to be participants [...] in the foreign policy making process. On the other hand [...] some contribute directly to international relations as a field of study”.²³ The position of think tanks as idea-generating agents provides them with a unique opportunity to influence both research and policy by serving as a “transmission belt, a broker”²⁴ between the two different and mutually exclusive worlds of academia and policy-making.

There is a general normative consensus among observers and analysts that think tanks do indeed use their position as a bridge between academia and policy machinery to wield influence over policy-making

²¹Pautz, “Revisiting the Think-Tank Phenomenon”; Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, “The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,” *Review of International Studies* 20, no. 1 (1994): 15–34, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500117760>.

²²McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy”; Núria Almiron and Universitat Pompeu Fabra, “Favoring the Elites: Think Tanks and Discourse Coalitions,” *International Journal of Communication* 11, July 2016 (2017): 4350–69; Ahmad, “US Think Tanks and the Politics of Expertise: Role, Value and Impact”; Abelson, “Do Think Tanks Matter? Opportunities, Constraints and Incentives for Think Tanks in Canada and the United States”; Abelson, “Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign Affairs Think Tanks”; Murray Weidenbaum, “Measuring the Influence of Think Tanks,” *Society* 47, no. 2 (2010): 134–37, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-009-9292-8>; Higgott and Stone, “The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA.”

²³Ibid., 15.

²⁴Howard Wiarda, “The New Powerhouses: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy,” *American Foreign Policy Interests* 30, no. 2 (2008): 100, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920802022704>.

processes. To what extent they influence policy,²⁵ on what policy matters they are able to and on what matters not,²⁶ and who are able to and who are not,²⁷ are sources of current debate. The processes through which these influences are operationalized have been chronicled in much detail. One aspect of their influence stems from the considerable access and contact that foreign-policy think tanks have to policy-makers in their respective governmental structures. This access becomes all the easier, and the boundary all the more permeable, as a result of the presence of the experts, both bureaucrats and academics that populate the think tanks. These experts skirt the boundaries between “philanthropy, government, the media and education”.²⁸ Owing to the permeable and very flexible nature of their position, these experts help think tanks cultivate closer relations with policy-makers in the government.²⁹ For instance, Edwin J. Feulner the founder and former president of the prestigious Heritage Foundation, commenting on think-tank experts, confirmed that policy think tanks in the United States serve as a “revolving door for

²⁵See Michael Krepon, “The Limits of Influence,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 18, no. 1 (March 19, 2011): 85–101, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2011.549175>; Abelson, “Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign Affairs Think Tanks”; Wiarda, “The New Powerhouses: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy.”

²⁶See Stone, “Garbage Cans, Recycling Bins or Think Tanks? Three Myths about Policy Institutes”; Ahmad, “US Think Tanks and the Politics of Expertise: Role, Value and Impact”; Abelson, “Do Think Tanks Matter? Opportunities, Constraints and Incentives for Think Tanks in Canada and the United States.”

²⁷See McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy”; Abelson, “Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign Affairs Think Tanks”; Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939–1945*; Benoit F. Monange, “Social Science Expertise and Policymaking: Comparing U.S., French, and EU Think Tanks: Similar Model Different Paths,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41, no. 4 (2008): 909, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096508321271>; Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen and Olivier Schmitt, “The Impact of Institutions on Foreign Policy Think Tanks in France and Denmark,” *The International Spectator* 52, no. 1 (2017): 100–15, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1268443>; Stone, “Old Guard Versus New Partisans: Think Tanks in Transition.”

²⁸Higgott and Stone, “The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA”, 33.

²⁹A detailed understanding of the relationships that have been cultivated between a handful of think tanks and several recent US presidential administrations is evidenced in Donald E. Abelson, *A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).

individuals to come and go from administrative agency to think tank to agency, to media, back for a sabbatical [at the think tank] and finally into a high level policy-making position in a sympathetic administration".³⁰ While the case of the "revolving doors" may be exclusive to the United States,³¹ nonetheless think tanks in other states are often found to rely on former bureaucrats and academic experts who do possess considerable influence within government circles, given the nature of their service history.³² Think tanks employ various methods to showcase their ideas or new research in their pursuit of influence, both direct and indirect, over foreign policy decisions.

Essentially ideational repositories, think tanks are involved in knowledge production. As Wiarda argues: "Think tanks have come essentially to do the government's thinking [...] Their scholars either come up with new ideas based on their own research or they rationalize and put into articulate public policy form the ideas and conclusions that other academics, politicians, and government officials had already arrived at but for various reasons were unable to put in writing or into a framework that policymakers can use".³³ The cross-pollination of ideas happens through various means including organizing events such as lunches,

³⁰Edwin J. Feulner, "Ideas, Think-Tanks and Governments," *Quadrant* 29, no. 11 (1985): 24, <https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=353401175088031;res=IELLCC;subject=Sciences>.

³¹This distinction between the US and UK think tanks is chronicled in Abelson, "Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign Affairs Think Tanks"; Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939–1945*; Higgott and Stone, "The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA." For a comparative analysis of US and French Think Tanks, see Monange, "Social Science Expertise and Policymaking. Comparing U.S., French, and EU Think Tanks: Similar Model Different Paths." For a comparison between US and Canadian think tanks, see Abelson, "Do Think Tanks Matter? Opportunities, Constraints and Incentives for Think Tanks in Canada and the United States."

³²For instance in Pakistan most think tanks are heavily staffed by former bureaucrats and military officers which provide these think tanks ample opportunities to influence the state's decision-making processes due to their ingress in governmental circles. For an analysis on Pakistan's think tanks and their relation with the state, see Ahmed Waheed, "State Sovereignty and International Relations in Pakistan: Analysing the Realism Stranglehold," *South Asia Research* 37, no. 3 (2017): 277–95, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728017725624>.

³³Wiarda, "The New Powerhouses: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy", 97.

seminars, networking dinners, making television, media and public appearances, through personal contacts and issuing reports. However, one of the most important ways in which knowledge is produced and disseminated is through presenting and showcasing research through institutional publications targeting various audiences, including opinion magazines for policy-makers and the general public,³⁴ and scholarly journals which are intended to be read by faculty members and university students.³⁵ Rescuing information from the theoretical abstractions that pervade academic writing, scholars who contribute to the intellectual life of the think tanks produce knowledge based on new ideas or recycle existing academic ideas by making them more succinct, contemporary, policy-relevant and assimilative.

The vicious cycle of knowledge production and reproduction which constrains experts from producing alternative discourse also enables a constant circulation of 'truth' on representational identities. Considering that both the *Washington Quarterly* and *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* are among International Relations journals which have produced the most work on Pakistan, the discursive construction and reproduction of Pakistan's representational identity, because of the lack of alternative discourse, not only continues to demonstrate similar patterns as those in academic journals but also because of their wider reach, the 'truths' presented as common sense are transmitted beyond universities and policy-makers to the general global audience and in that sense these journals play a vital role in naturalizing representational identities. Consequently, these journals become important cogs in the knowledge-production machinery through which 'Pakistan' is marketed not only to local audiences, which include policy-makers, academics and policy experts but to the general International Affairs reader across the globe.

³⁴For instance, the French Institute of International Relations publishes *Ramsey*; Chatham House produces *The World Today*; Carnegie Endowment for Peace publishes *SADA* online; the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars publishes the *Wilson Quarterly* and the Council of Foreign Relations publishes *Foreign Affairs*.

³⁵The Brookings Institution publishes three journals; the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, *Economia*, and *Behavioral Science & Policy*. Chatham House produces the journal of *International Affairs* and *Journal of Cyber Policy* and the Cato Institute and the Royal United Services Institute publishes the *Cato Journal* and the *RUSI Journal* respectively.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF MOST CITED THINK-TANKS JOURNAL ARTICLES ON PAKISTAN

The discourse on Pakistan in the ten most cited articles in think-tank-based journals, five from the *Washington Quarterly*, which was published by the Center for International and Strategic Studies,³⁶ US, and five from *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, which is published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, demonstrate a peculiar pattern. Considering that these journals are based at think tanks, it would generally be assumed that their content would target their respective governments, but all ten most cited articles in both journals had American-based authorship. This clearly evidences a pattern of circulation of US *knowledge* about Pakistan that moves beyond territorial borders. Since the discourse is primarily dominated by US-based scholars and policy experts, it continues to produce similar knowledge about themes that have been of significance to the US discourse, as produced in Area Studies and International Relations journals. The articles were singularly focused on Pakistan–US relations, US assistance to Pakistan during the War on Terror and the ‘militancy’ architecture within Pakistan. Similar familial labels to those deployed in Area Studies and International Relations journals, for example ‘Islamist militants’, ‘trans-national jihad’ ‘radical Islam’, ‘extremism’, ‘radical Islamic parties’ and so on, continued to punctuate the discourse on Pakistan in the think-tank discourse on Pakistan. However, while these labels were organized to reflect the ‘dangers’ within Pakistan, additional labels were employed to project a ‘dangerous’ Pakistani state. For instance, discursive formations such as ‘Pakistani weakness’, ‘insecure Pakistan’, ‘distrustful Pakistan’, ‘revisionist and weaker state’, ‘shambolic’, and ‘risk-averse’, ‘devious’, and ‘failing state’, ‘unreliable ally’. A similar representation of the Pakistani people pervades the discourse. For instance Schmidt argues that a “palpably Islamic identity has penetrated into the psyche of even secular Pakistanis”.³⁷ Fair contends that “wide swaths of Pakistanis embrace negotiating with the raft of militant groups savaging

³⁶It is now hosted by the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

³⁷John R. Schmidt, “The Unravelling of Pakistan,” *Survival* 51, no. 3 (July 2009): 44, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330903011453>.

their country and oppose military action to eliminate them”.³⁸ Siddiqua believes that “the bulk of the Pakistani middle class, which is seen by authors such as Vali Nasr as a driver of change in Muslim societies due to its progressive nature is actually conservative with traces of latent radicalism”.³⁹ Consequently, the pejorative labeling of the actions of the Pakistani state, coupled with the discourse of the ‘dangers’ within, continues to shape the discussions on Pakistan’s ‘dangerous’ identity. For instance, one article begins:

Armed with nuclear weapons, home to al-Qaeda, and **heavily infested** with a growing mass of domestic radical Islamists, Pakistan has been famously called the ‘most dangerous place on earth’. At the **root** of the country’s problems is a feudal political establishment **primarily** interested in promoting and preserving its own narrow class interests and **unable or unwilling** to seriously address the myriad threats the country faces... Unfortunately, **there is nothing** in the nature of Pakistani political culture, nor in the performance of the Pakistani political class since the founding of the state, that provides **any** grounds for optimism.⁴⁰

Another argues that “Pakistan has a weak institutional architecture, an underdeveloped economy, simmering internal tensions, and nuclear weapons”.⁴¹ But while the above texts pointed at Pakistan’s notoriety for different reasons, elsewhere Pakistan’s ‘dangerousness’ was heralded for different reasons. As one author mentions: “Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) is the most lethal terrorist group operating from South Asia. Founded in 1989 in Afghanistan with help from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), it began operations in India in 1990”.⁴² Consequently, through

³⁸C. Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S Relations with Pakistan,” *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2009): 149–50, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600902775680>.

³⁹Ayesha Siddiqua, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies,” *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2010): 158, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2011.538362>.

⁴⁰John R. Schmidt, “The Unravelling of Pakistan,” *Survival* 51, no. 3 (July 2009): 29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330903011453>. Emphasis added.

⁴¹Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game” 49, no. 1 (2007): 29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330701254495>.

⁴²C. Christine Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State,” *Survival* 53, no. 4 (September 2011): 29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.603561>.

discourse, Pakistan appears not only as a 'danger' to the 'international community' but threatens regional peace as well. To that end, the United States emerges as a power 'generously' trying to help Pakistan. For instance, Fair argues that: "Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has sought to help Pakistan transform itself into a stable, prosperous, and democratic state that supports U.S. interests in the region, is capable of undermining Islamist militancy inside and outside its borders, commits to a secure Afghanistan, and actively works to mitigate prospects for further nuclear proliferation".⁴³ Tellis argued that: "the rejuvenation of al Qaeda and the Taliban [which] is due in large part to their ability to secure a sanctuary in Pakistan has incensed Americans across the political spectrum, because Washington has provided Islamabad 2002 with almost \$10 billion in overt security and economic assistance since and continues to compensate the Pakistani military for its counterterrorism efforts with roughly \$1 billion in annual reimbursements".⁴⁴ Many authors of this dominant discourse eventually point to the quid pro quo status of this foreign aid and the problems with looking at it as US 'benevolence'. For instance, Cohen and Chollet point out that very little US aid reaches "the vast majority of Pakistanis", because "U.S. assistance does not so much reflect a coherent strategy as it does a legacy of the initial, transactional quid pro quo established in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks".⁴⁵ They also agree that "the reality is that the US assistance since September 11 attacks is not money intended to transform the nature of the Pakistani state or society",⁴⁶ yet find themselves bewildered that "despite such generosity, most Pakistanis do not believe the United States is on their side".⁴⁷ Within discourse, then, there is a propensity to fluctuate from 'benevolence' to 'leverage' and to treat the two attributes as mutually inclusive.

⁴³C. Fair, "Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S Relations with Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2009): 149, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600902775680>.

⁴⁴Ashley J. Tellis, "Pakistan's Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance," *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (April 2008): 8, <https://doi.org/10.1162/wash.2008.31.2.7>.

⁴⁵C. Cohen and D. Chollet, "When \$ 10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking US Strategy Toward Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (2007): 9.

⁴⁶Cohen and Chollet, 11.

⁴⁷Cohen and Chollet, 16.

The apparent frustration of the United States with Pakistan has been as a result of its limited influence in cajoling, persuading or compelling “Pakistan to cease and desist from engaging in policies, such as supporting some forms of militancy, that are inimical to U.S. interests”.⁴⁸ This particular frustration has been at the basis of the entire discourse in the most cited articles published in think-tank journals. Pakistan is seen as a state which has selectively targeted ‘militants’, in that it has been ‘effective’ against foreign elements such as Al-Qaeda yet continue to be recalcitrant in confronting ‘homegrown’ or ‘Afghan’ ‘militants’, especially those it has ‘nurtured’ over the years “as a response to its enduring rivalry with India, rooted in the conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir specifically and in deep-seated fears about Indian intentions towards Pakistan”.⁴⁹ This conflict is considered to form the basis of Pakistan’s reluctance to act against the Afghan Taliban and the ‘homegrown jihadist network’. Even though discourse provides no contextual account of this ‘historical conflict’, there is a recognition of how the United States alienated Pakistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack. For instance Fair argues:

The December 2001 Bonn conference was, in many ways, a conference of Pakistan’s defeat. With U.S. military assistance, the Northern Alliance, which had long enjoyed the support and assistance of India, Iran, Russia, and other countries, wrested Kabul from the Taliban. The United States had promised Pakistan that this would not happen. The U.S. decisions to rely on the Northern Alliance in the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom and to retain a light footprint discomfited Pakistan, which feared the emergence of pro-India Afghanistan. Renowned journalist Ahmed Rashid has argued that these early actions conditioned Pakistan’s decision to retain its contacts with the Taliban to thwart the emergence of a hostile Afghanistan aligned with India [...] Pakistan’s fears are not completely ill founded. India seeks to establish its influence in Afghanistan because it seeks to isolate Pakistan politically, diplomatically, and militarily...India has seized numerous opportunities in Taliban Afghanistan to exert its influence. India has reestablished historical consulates from which it oversees its popular aid programs, supports its expatriate business community working in Afghanistan, and engages in consular and other activities.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S Relations with Pakistan”, 150.

⁴⁹Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State”, 30.

⁵⁰Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S Relations with Pakistan”, 160.

As Jones further elaborates:

Pakistan and India have long been involved in a balance-of-power struggle in South Asia. Both lay claim to the Kashmir region, and have fought three wars over Kashmir since 1947. Since 11 September, India has provided several hundred million dollars in financial assistance to Afghanistan, and provided assistance to Afghan political candidates during the 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections. It helped fund construction of the new Afghan parliament building, and provided financial assistance to elected legislators. A significant point of contention was India's road construction near the Pakistan border. These projects were run by the Indian state-owned Border Roads Organisation, whose publicly acknowledged mission is to 'support the [Indian] armed forces [and] meet their strategic needs by committed dedicated and cost-effective development and sustenance of the infrastructure'. Finally, India established several consulates in such Afghan cities as Jalalabad, Kandahar and Herat. Pakistan accused India of using these consulates for 'terrorist activities' inside Pakistan, such as fomenting unrest in the province of Baluchistan.⁵¹

In its reluctance to target 'militants' the Pakistani state is said to preserve its 'national interest' as opposed to follow 'US interest'. Having identified the 'insecurities' of the Pakistani state, it would be expected that the amelioration of these concerns would constitute the logical end, considering that "costs of crisis in Pakistan are too great to live without workable options".⁵² However, it is argued that while "The United States should **encourage** India to tone down financial and other assistance to Afghanistan [...] [it should] also consider **pushing** the Afghan government to terminate Border Roads Organisation work [...] **Pushing** Musharraf to conduct a sustained campaign against insurgents will also require finding pressure points that raise the costs of failure".⁵³ Discourse thus propounds a conciliatory tone when discussing US-India relations and a coercive tone when discussing Pakistan. It is to be expected, then, that discourse would explore avenues to ameliorate Pakistan's 'insecurities', consequently 'helping' "Pakistan rid itself

⁵¹ Jones, "Pakistan's Dangerous Game", 11.

⁵² Cohen and Chollet, "When \$ 10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking US Strategy Toward Pakistan", 18.

⁵³ Jones, "Pakistan's Dangerous Game", 27. Emphasis Added.

of its long addiction to terrorism”.⁵⁴ Yet this exploration is abandoned because, “even if Washington was somehow able to midwife a closer relationship between Islamabad and Kabul and persuade India to dramatically lower its profile in Afghanistan, it is doubtful Pakistan would reciprocate by taking the fight to the Afghan Taliban”.⁵⁵ As Fair argues, “Pakistan is unlikely to abandon its reliance upon [militants], regardless of what happens vis-à-vis India”.⁵⁶ Within the discourse, the Pakistani state comes across as failing, with its military and the Inter-Services Intelligence ‘manipulative’, its justice system ‘shambolic’, its people supporters of ‘militancy’ and its media ‘Anti-American’. Since Pakistan blames the United States for “having driven the Taliban onto their soil... [this] reflects an unfortunate Pakistani tendency to **blame** others for the nation’s problems, whether the agent be the United States, India”.⁵⁷ Thus, Fair concludes that “[t]he biggest hindrances to ‘saving Pakistan’ are the intentions, interests, and strategic calculations of the Pakistani state itself”.⁵⁸ In the face of such a ‘dangerous’ situation, the civilizing mission is then the ‘responsibility’ of the United States. Throughout the discourse, Pakistan is constructed as a state that needs US ‘help’ either by positive inducements (carrot) or by negative inducement (stick). In the face of this civilizing mission, Pakistan’s sovereignty becomes a hurdle for US interests in the region. Schmidt argues that “the powerful, overtly emotional Pakistani resistance to the idea of US forces crossing into Pakistani territory also demonstrates how sensitive they are to perceived slights to their sovereignty, an attitude stemming from their paranoia over what they perceive as chronic Indian unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of their state”.⁵⁹ An important detail to note in this text is how Pakistan’s paranoia is mentioned in a matter-of-fact manner, whereas Indian unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of Pakistan is presented as a perception on the part of the Pakistani state. The panacea to the Pakistan ‘problem’ spans over a range of substantial measures. Discourse is replete with various policy advice, such as: focusing on

⁵⁴Tellis, “Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance”, 22.

⁵⁵Schmidt, “The Unravelling of Pakistan”, 40.

⁵⁶Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State”, 15.

⁵⁷Schmidt, “The Unravelling of Pakistan”, 39.

⁵⁸Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S Relations with Pakistan”, 154.

⁵⁹Schmidt, “The Unravelling of Pakistan”, 44.

'genuine' democracy promotion because "Pakistan's parliament can learn much from other parliamentary democracies"⁶⁰; negative inducements such as severe sanctions and declaring Pakistan a terrorism-sponsoring state because "[a]lthough using sticks is highly undesirable, the past seven years demonstrate that carrots alone do not precipitate positive change"⁶¹; and, among others, "in the **absence of cooperation** against Afghan insurgent groups and their support network in Pakistan, they should increase pressure on Pakistan to pursue democratic reforms".⁶² However, within these texts the root cause of Pakistan's insecurities has either been marginalized or overlooked completely, its historically contextual conflict with India has been silenced, and so has any hint of apportioning some responsibility of the 'dangerous' situation concerning Pakistan to the United States. Consequently, the discourse fails to mention the pivotal role that the United States played during the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It also does not dwell on the immediate and sudden withdrawal of the United States from the region once the Cold War was won, leaving Pakistan to deal with the fighters in Afghanistan, the United States had carefully and diligently fostered. When the discourse does point out the US 'betrayal' of Pakistan, which is considered another reason for its 'insecurities', it is not more than a sentence. For instance, Fair argues that "the United States largely did abandon the region once the Soviets formally withdrew from Afghanistan".⁶³ Schmitt agrees that "Many Pakistanis also deeply resent the fact that the United States has been a fair-weather friend, closely allying with Pakistan when it served US interests, then abandoning and even sanctioning Pakistan when the political winds changed".⁶⁴ Yet beyond these observations, there is no justification provided for US actions, nor any explanation aimed at resolving this Pakistani 'paranoia' of US abandonment.

While the prevalence of anti-American sentiment is widely acknowledged in discourse, it is myopically reduced to a cause of Pakistan's 'islamist' leanings. For instance, Huma Yusuf argues that "radical clerics are known to lash out against US policy; the print publications of extremist organisations [...] are consistently anti-American; political religious

⁶⁰Fair, "Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S Relations with Pakistan", 166.

⁶¹Fair, 167.

⁶²Jones, "Pakistan's Dangerous Game", 27. Emphasis Added.

⁶³Fair, "Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S Relations with Pakistan", 156.

⁶⁴Schmidt, "The Unravelling of Pakistan", 44.

parties develop campaigns against the United States' regional activities; even military officers being trained at the prestigious National Defence University are provided biased information about the United States".⁶⁵ Consequently, the anti-Americanism is reduced to de-contextualized religious biases and military indoctrinations. This text ignores the widespread prevalence of anti-Americanism in the world of which Pakistan is a part. Secondly, it does not recognize that anti-Americanism is historically rooted in Pakistan for various social, political and economic reasons and not a novel development.⁶⁶ Indeed, anti-Americanism in Pakistan exists in various shades in the context of regional and global changes.⁶⁷ However, by focusing narrowly on religious-inspired anti-Americanism, discourse systematically disenfranchises the voices of those who harbor anti-American sentiments for nationalistic reasons, such as opposition to drone strikes,⁶⁸ US aid policies toward Pakistan, and antagonism toward the United States for allying with India.⁶⁹

CONCLUSION

The dominance of US-based think-tank experts in top think-tank publications allow a myopically constructed, target-specific narrative on Pakistan to proliferate not only within US policy and academic circles but also dominates publications originating elsewhere. Considering this

⁶⁵Huma Yusuf, "Conspiracy Fever: The US, Pakistan and Its Media," *Survival* 53, no. 4 (September 2011): 97, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.603564>.

⁶⁶Shafqat Hussain Naghmi, "Pakistan's Public Attitude toward the United States," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 3 (1982): 507–23; Hamid H. Kazilbash, "Anti-Americanism in Pakistan," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497, no. 58–67 (1988).

⁶⁷Mohammad Waseem, "Anti-Americanism in Pakistan," in *With Us or Against Us*, ed. Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 173–88, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403980854_10; Mohammad Waseem, "Perceptions About America in Pakistan," *Aziya Kenkyu* 50, no. 2 (2004): 34–44.

⁶⁸Brian Glyn Williams, "The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 10 (September 20, 2010): 871–92.

⁶⁹Waseem, "Perceptions About America in Pakistan."

dominance, it seems prudent to imply that a discourse which is specifically aimed to cater to US interests continue to dominate the processes through which Pakistan is constructed internationally. The discourse on Pakistan in think-tank publications thus constructs a 'dangerous' Pakistan which is inimical to US interests and values, a destabilizing force in the region, and a threat to international and regional peace because of the support provided by the Pakistani people and the Pakistani state to 'islamist militants'. It is not that these texts, taken as the basis for a discourse analysis, demonstrate a consistent narrative. It is rather, that "taken together as a broader discourse that has political and cultural currency",⁷⁰ the narratives function to construct and maintain a specific understanding of, and approach to, 'Pakistan'. Considering the plethora of literature which forms the discourse on 'Pakistan', the discourse analysis of articles in think-tank-based journals merely unveils the primary assumptions, labels, narratives and discursive constructions of the overall discourse. The Islamist Pakistan association encapsulated in the discursive formations constructs the widely accepted 'knowledge' that Pakistan is by nature violent, duplicitous and inimical to international and regional peace.

This chapter began with an overview of the changing processes of knowledge production from 'Mode 1' to 'Mode 2', i.e. Mode 1 being the knowledge produced centrally in universities and institutions which were more experimental and theoretical in nature to Mode 2 knowledge production which was more application- and policy-oriented and was increasingly hosted in nonacademic centers of production. It then moved on to elaborate on the structure and processes within think tanks which distinguish it from academic centers and the aims and objectives through which they operate and struggle for relevance in a fast-evolving world. Finally the chapter discursively analyzed main texts produced by think-tank experts to explore how knowledge produced by these experts is informed and consequently, also informs the construction of 'Pakistan'.

⁷⁰Richard Jackson, "Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse," *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (March 28, 2007): 403, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x>.

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Knowledge Production and Circulation in Pakistani International Relations

The marginal participation of the academics and scholars of the South in international knowledge production is not news. Various studies have sought to disentangle the specifics of the processes through which scholars from the South are inhibited from contributing toward international knowledge production, thereby reducing the visibility of alternative discourses.¹ According to Alatas, “[a]lternative discourses are works that attempt to debunk ideas that have become entrenched in the social sciences”, and as such they “could also be referred to collectively as counter-Eurocentric social science”.² The construction of

¹For instance, see David L. Blaney and Arlene B. Tickner, “Worlding, Ontological Politics and the Possibility of a Decolonial IR,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 45, no. 3 (June 12, 2017): 293–311, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829817702446>; Arlene B. Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 627–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494323>; Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* (New York and London: Routledge, 2009); Robbie Shilliam, ed., *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism, and Investigations of Global Modernity* (Routledge, 2011); John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139096829>; Pinar Bilgin, “Looking for ‘the International’ Beyond the West,” *Third World Quarterly* 31, no. 5 (July 2010): 817–28, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2010.502696>.

²Syed Farid Alatas, “Alternative Discourses in Southeast Asia,” *Sari* 19 (2001): 49–50, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2650589.

identities through international knowledge-production processes follows similar entrenchments. The lack of alternative discourses enables mainstream interpretations to dominate and, in effect, to naturalize certain representations of identities. This is not to say that alternative discourses are not smuggled into the knowledge produced internationally, but considering how representations of ‘areas’ and their ‘people’ naturalize identities through wide circulation of the dominant discourse, it is at least to be expected that the primary loci of any challenge to dominant discourse will come from indigenous locales. The accumulation of an extensive array of data in the previous chapters has highlighted how the dominant discourse on Pakistan’s identity originates in western intellectual centers, at the same time providing little space to alternative discourses from within Pakistan that might seek to challenge the naturalized representations. The feeble and marginal participation of Pakistani scholars and academics in the processes of international knowledge production cannot be left alone to publishing processes which are tacitly exclusionary and grant more credibility to knowledge produced in the western ‘intellectual’ centers. In this regard, a study of how International Relations scholarship is produced from Pakistan requires more insight into the exogenous and endogenous processes through which scholars and academics produce knowledge about Pakistan. The marginalization of alternative discourses exhibited through the patterns of inequality in publishing gains tremendous significance considering how the advantages of western scholars and academic journals in the West connect to “the material, cultural and political sources of power” and consequently, “the asymmetrical relationship between the center and periphery frame the salient features of contemporary geopolitical realities”.³ Considering the pernicious consequences that arise from the marginalization of alternative discourses, it becomes increasingly important to understand why and how indigenous scholars and intellectuals are systematically disenfranchised from the ‘international’ world of publishing.

Scholars who have sought to interrogate the unevenness in the production and dissemination of knowledge in the social sciences in general,⁴

³A. Suresh Canagarajah, *A Geopolitics of Academic Writing* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), 37.

⁴Syed Farid Alatas, “Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences,” *Current Sociology* 51, no. 6 (November 30, 2003): 599–613, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921030516003>; Syed Farid Alatas, “Academic Dependency in the

and International Relations⁵ and Area Studies⁶ in specific, have often done so within the conceptual ambit of core–periphery relations.⁷ Within this context, international knowledge production is taken as a function of academic imperialism and is said to be entrenched in neoliberal capitalist modes of production.⁸ For instance, Jackson argues that the “neoliberal policies of academic management are further entrenching the global division of intellectual labour that emerged as an epistemological result of European imperialism and American neoimperialism [...] [and] the worldwide imposition of neoliberal managerial policies in universities based on these measures has become a hegemonic framework”.⁹ The

Social Sciences: Reflections on India and Malaysia,” *American Studies International* (Mid-America American Studies Association, 2000); Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, “Redressing the Geographical Bias in Social Science Knowledge,” *Environment and Planning A* 33, no. 1 (2001): 1–9, <https://doi.org/10.1068/a33181>.

⁵Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews, “Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations,” 2000, 289–303; Blaney and Tickner, “Worlding, Ontological Politics and the Possibility of a Decolonial IR”; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” *International Relations of Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (2007): 287–312; Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*.

⁶Katja Mielke and Anna-Katharina Hornidge, eds., *Area Studies at the Crossroads: Knowledge Production After the Mobility Turn* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Peter A. Jackson, “Space, Theory, and Hegemony: The Dual Crises of Asian Area Studies and Cultural Studies,” *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 18, no. 1 (2003): 1–41; Malini J. Schueller, “Area Studies and Multicultural Imperialism: The Project of Decolonizing Knowledge,” *Social Text* 25, no. 1 90 (March 1, 2007): 41–62, <https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2006-016>.

⁷Branwen Gruffydd Jones, ed., *Decolonizing International Relations* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Shilliam, *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism, and Investigations of Global Modernity*; Syed Hussein Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems,” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 28, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 23–45.

⁸Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, “Redressing the Geographical Bias in Social Science Knowledge”; Peter A. Jackson, “The Neoliberal University and Global Immobilities of Theory,” in *Area Studies at the Crossroads: Knowledge Production After the Mobility Turn*, ed. Katja Mielke and Anna-Katharina Hornidge (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 27–44, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59834-9_1.

⁹Peter A. Jackson, “The Neoliberal University and Global Immobilities of Theory,” in *Area Studies at the Crossroads: Knowledge Production After the Mobility Turn*, ed. Katja Mielke and Anna-Katharina Hornidge (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 34, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59834-9_1.

quantification of ‘academic quality’ that has followed neoliberal policies impedes non-West scholars from contributing in many various ways. However, non-West scholars are not impeded and marginalized only by the presence of external factors. Structures within the non-West educational apparatus have also contributed toward this development. The following sections will discuss the external and internal factors that have contributed to the silencing of alternative discourses from Pakistan, and consequently played their part in the hegemony of a western-dominated discourse on Pakistan.

EXTERNAL FACTORS IN THE MARGINALIZATION OF PERIPHERY SCHOLARSHIP

International knowledge production has increasingly become corporatized as a result of a worldwide imposition of neoliberal managerial policies across universities, in both the West and the non-West.¹⁰ The academic capitalism that now dictates the directions of the international knowledge economy has increasingly standardized and globalized the traditional intellectual prestige of scholars within universities by measuring and quantifying their academic outputs. Scholars and academics across the globe, as part of their professional obligations, are now pressured into producing work of ‘academic quality’. Since publication in academic journals is the central tool for the communication of research work across spatial and territorial divides, the standard for the ‘quality’ of a publication now resides in the ‘quality’ of the journal it is published in. As Jackson argues:

Neoliberal assessment based on ranking of research publications according to whether they are published in so-called quality journals and monograph series is a regime of power that determines the renewal of academic contracts, whether or not tenure or promotion is awarded, and whether or not a scholar is regarded as being sufficiently “competitive” to be awarded research grants[...] the quality of research is not determined by any epistemological criterion but rather by the journal or monograph series in which it is published.¹¹

¹⁰For an interesting discussion on the commodification of education, see Neil Smith, “Afterword: Who Rules This Sausage Factory?” *Antipode* 32, no. 3 (2000): 330, 339.

¹¹Jackson, 35.

The database primarily responsible for this standardization of ‘quality’ has been the Institute for Scientific Information or the Thomson & Reuters, Web of Science, as it is now known. The citation data collated by the ISI and the impact factor demonstrating the influence of the journals in their respective fields, has become a universal standard of measurement of ‘quality’.¹² As Beigel argues: “ISI perpetuated the notion of ‘core journals’ and the impact factor became a yardstick for ‘excellence’ in a publishing system”.¹³ He further adds that:

This publishing circuit has been reinforced in the last decades, along with the increasing mercantilization of higher education and the application of scientometrics for external evaluation of institutions or individual competition for tenure and promotion. Global university rankings are built giving increasing importance to research performance, by measuring the volume of articles published and observing ‘research influence’. National rankings are also marked by these ‘international’ tendencies along with the creation of public or private agencies for external evaluation that have a strong influence in investment decisions.¹⁴

The “mercantilization of higher education”, to quote Beigel, now regulates scholarly activities by enforcing standards that academics and researchers must measure up to for their professional and career development. The ‘core journals’ of Social Sciences in the ISI index, prominent because of their higher impact factors, are published by academic corporations in the West, and most contributions to these journals are by academics from the West. The dominance of the West and its control of the knowledge-production process has allowed its agents (publishers, scholars, universities) to police what passes as knowledge. Consequently, Third World scholarship is, for the most part, validated and allowed ingress into this elite community of knowledge producers only if it conforms to the ideational, structural and linguistic standards of this

¹²For a short history of the ISI index and its subsequent rise to ‘power’ see Kwang-Yeong Shin, “Globalization and the National Social Science in the Discourse on the SSCI in South Korea,” *Korean Social Science Journal*, XXXIV 34, no. 1 (2007): 93–116.

¹³Fernanda Beigel, “Introduction: Current Tensions and Trends in the World Scientific System,” *Current Sociology* 62, no. 5 (September 27, 2014): 617.

¹⁴Fernanda Beigel, “Publishing from the Periphery: Structural Heterogeneity and Segmented Circuits: The Evaluation of Scientific Publications for Tenure in Argentina’s CONICET,” *Current Sociology* 62, no. 5 (September 3, 2014): 745.

intellectual gatekeeping community.¹⁵ This is highly problematic. Unlike the Natural Sciences, knowledge in the Social Sciences is pluralistic, idiosyncratic and laden with ideology and nationalism. The dominance of eurocentric knowledge and its ideational, methodological and empirical frameworks, and the vast circulation of this system of knowledge, mean that alternative Social Sciences discourses from the non-West, with their inherent non-West specific constituents of ideology and nationalism, are systematically disenfranchised. As Jackson points out:

In the neoliberal academy, the label of academic quality is almost always reserved for older, well-established journals and publishers, and is an intellectual status symbol that is only ever achieved after several decades of publication. New and exploratory forms of inquiry that challenge established ideas often face resistance, and scholars working in these fields may confront difficulties having their work accepted for publication in older journals and with publishers whose editorial boards are committed to the intellectual and methodological status quo.¹⁶

But the problem of the exclusion of non-western discourse from mainstream academic journals is not limited to issues of conformity to editorial preferences. Rather, the failure of academic inputs from the non-West to contribute to mainstream knowledge production is often attributed to lack of originality, inadequately structured presentation of written material, issues with writing styles and subjective and sometimes ill-informed¹⁷

¹⁵Beigel, "Introduction: Current Tensions and Trends in the World Scientific System"; Beigel, "Publishing from the Periphery: Structural Heterogeneity and Segmented Circuits—The Evaluation of Scientific Publications for Tenure in Argentina's CONICET"; Sari Hanafi, "University Systems in the Arab East: Publish Globally and Perish Locally vs Publish Locally and Perish Globally," *Current Sociology* 59, no. 3 (May 28, 2011): 291–309; Frederick H. Gareau, "Another Type of Third World Dependency: The Social Sciences," *International Sociology* 3, no. 2 (June 29, 1988): 171–78.

¹⁶Jackson, "The Neoliberal University and Global Immobilities of Theory", 39.

¹⁷A research article, on feudalism and its impact on Pakistan's democratic experience, which I had submitted to a journal of international repute, was rejected on the basis of a peer review which argued that "historians, economists and political scientists, among others, find it extremely difficult to trace feudalism in South Asian history, let alone modern Pakistan." This, despite the fact that there have been numerous studies on the link between feudalism and Pakistan's democratic experience.

and biased peer review.¹⁸ Thus, the problems facing scholarship from the non-West can largely be summarized under three sets of variables dominating the international knowledge-production process: creativity, communicability and acceptability. It is generally accepted that the non-West follows theoretical and ideational precepts of knowledge produced in the West.¹⁹ Within International Relations, scholars have been concerned about knowledge production in the non-West and have arrived at similar conclusions.²⁰ For instance, Tickner argues that “[m]any peripheral scholars have also largely embraced theories and concepts developed in the United States and Europe instead of revolting against them”.²¹ Yet if the peripheral scholars produce knowledge by borrowing ideas from the West and using them for their empirical research, their adherence to knowledge produced in the West should be rewarded by an increased number of publications in the ‘core’ journals of International Relations. However, that is contrary to the observed phenomenon.

¹⁸For a detailed understanding of the impediments faced by non-western scholars in their efforts to contribute in mainstream knowledge production processes, see A. Suresh. Canagarajah, “‘Nondiscursive’ Requirements in Academic Publishing, Material Resources of Periphery Scholars, and the Politics of Knowledge Production,” *Written Communication* 13, no. 4 (1996): 435–72, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0741088396013004001>; Syed Farid Alatas, “An Introduction to the Idea of Alternative Discourses,” *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 28 (2000): 1–12, <https://doi.org/10.2307/24492996>; Syed Farid Alatas, “Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences,” *Current Sociology* 51, no. 6 (November 30, 2003): 599–613; Daisy Jacobs, Pit. Pichappan, and S. Sarasvady, “What Do Third World Researchers Lack? Documenting the Peer Review Data,” *Current Science* 91, no. 12 (2006): 1605–7; Hanafi, “University Systems in the Arab East: Publish Globally and Perish Locally vs Publish Locally and Perish Globally”; Eugene Garfield, “Peer Review, Refereeing, Fraud, and Other Essays,” *Essays of an Information Scientist* 10 (1987).

¹⁹Alatas categorizes this form of Knowledge production from the non-West as a function of academic imperialism. See Syed Hussein Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems”; Alatas, “Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences,” November 30, 2003.

²⁰For case studies of knowledge production in the non-West, see Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (Routledge, 2010); In the case of Pakistan, an analysis of the academia’s conformity to western International Relations theories, see Ahmed Waqas Waheed, “State Sovereignty and International Relations in Pakistan: Analysing the Realism Stranglehold,” *South Asia Research* 37, no. 3 (2017): 277–95, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728017725624>.

²¹Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations”, 636.

One of the reasons for this paradox is that scholars in the non-West, and particularly Pakistan, are engaged in producing scholarship which is focused on policy relevance and is congruent to national needs and interests. Considering that in such scenarios theory is considered irrelevant and is merely a “toolbox that derives from the realities that states must address in their international dealings”,²² most scholars in the non-West resort to minimal use of theories in pursuing their objective to gain greater relevance nationally by achieving “proximity to power”.²³ Since International Relations journals are largely oriented toward producing theoretically and methodologically rigorous knowledge, the non-western scholar’s inadequate concern for theoretical and methodological research prevents them from contributing to internationally reputable journals. In the case of Pakistan, for example, International Relations scholars are quite narrowly confined within realism and neorealism²⁴ to the extent that they reinforce state preferences.²⁵ Consequently, while the theoretical basis remains the same as for their ‘core’ counterparts, albeit situated on different levels of sophistication, the representational identity within the discourse on Pakistan originating from Pakistan is different from the representational identity originating elsewhere. Theories traveling from the West go through processes of sociocultural adoption and adaptation and within these processes alternative representational identities are constructed. Since the alternative representational identity of Pakistan constructed through the abovementioned processes is produced and circulated locally with marginal dialogical interaction with western discourse on Pakistan, it fails to contest the dominant discourse on Pakistan. As a consequence, the representational identity of Pakistan widely produced and circulated in western discourse emerges as the constructed ‘truth’.

²²Ibid., 638.

²³For a detailed discussion on South Asian intellectuals and their quest for proximity to power, see Navnita Chadha Behera, ed., *International Relations in South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradigm* (Sage, 2008).

²⁴N. Behera, “South Asia: A ‘Realist’ Past and Alternative Futures,” in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, ed. A. Tickner and O. Wæver (London: Routledge, 2009).

²⁵Waheed, “State Sovereignty and International Relations in Pakistan: Analysing the Realism Stranglehold.”

Another reason for the marginal contribution of scholarship from Pakistan lies in what Canagarajah terms ‘non-discursive’ requirements of academic publishing.²⁶ For instance, misappropriate use of the specialized language of IR, with its discipline-specific jargon and forms of scholarly writing, significantly impedes participation in publishing activities.²⁷ However, the most potent of these barriers is the imposition of English as a *Lingua Franca* for publishing in internationally reputable journals. The hyper-centrality of the English language as a medium of communication for the global exchange of knowledge and participation in knowledge-building processes is evident from the list of ISI-indexed social sciences and International Relations journals, which are predominantly published in the English language. The hegemony of the English language as a hierarchy-enforcing agent has not gone unnoticed. Scholars and intellectuals have cogently been arguing that its imperialist potential advertently and inadvertently creates cultural hierarchies. Perpetuated and consolidated through the ISI index, the English language becomes a tool of western force in maintaining the structures of colonialism.²⁸ Some argue that the prevalence of English as a global medium of communication is crucial to ensure a dialogue between diverse geographical traditions, “because conversation without a common language between academicians from different nationalities,

²⁶Canagarajah uses the term ‘non-discursive’ in a qualified sense. While much has changed since globalization and technological advancements brought about by computers and internet, changed the way these nondiscursive requirements were imposed upon the non-West scholars, however much of it still remains the same. See Canagarajah, “‘Nondiscursive’ Requirements in Academic Publishing, Material Resources of Periphery Scholars, and the Politics of Knowledge Production”; Canagarajah, *A Geopolitics of Academic Writing*.

²⁷One of my earlier pieces of research got rejected by multiple reputable international journals. A peer reviewer of one journal was “quite disappointed with the overall arguments and style of the author” and a peer reviewer of another quipped that “The language used is also not academic enough: it reads more like a journalistic piece.”

²⁸See, for instance, Alastair Pennycook, *The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language* (Routledge, 1994); Robert Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism* (Oxford University Press, 1992); Robert Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism Continued* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Po King Choi, “Weep for Chinese University”: A Case Study of English Hegemony and Academic Capitalism in Higher Education in Hong Kong,” *Journal of Education Policy* 25, no. 2 (March 2010): 233–52; Canagarajah, *A Geopolitics of Academic Writing*.

both in the virtual and real world, would prove impossible”.²⁹ Though this might be true for the dominance of English in other areas of communication, such as tourism, diplomacy and to an extent journalism, in the realm of the exchange of scholarly ideas, English poses a major impediment in the peripheral scholar’s quest to contribute to international knowledge production. Choi consequently argues that the Euro-American practices of marketization, and the procedural implementation of ‘metrics’ as forms of surveillance, using indexing systems for academic journals such as the Science Citation Index (SCI) and the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) as a tool for the evaluation of research and publication capability, ultimately creates a disciplinary mechanism for academics. Further, “since such systems do not take into account journal publications in languages other than English, English soon becomes the measure of academic capability”.³⁰ The standards of English required by internationally reputable academic journals pose major impediments to periphery scholars because, despite the prevalence of English as a second language and a medium of instruction in the postcolonial world, those training and teaching in Social Sciences can seldom measure up to the language ability of native English speakers. Thus, the training of peripheral scholars in English as a second language gives way to stylistic, grammatical and structural errors in the written presentation of their research submitted to indexed journals. This consequently reflects on their ‘ability’ as academics; a development which does not impede native Anglophone scholars. Another consequence of the dominance of the English language in the global research culture arises from its status as a tool of social construction. As Inayatullah argues:

Language, then, does not merely neutrally describe the world; rather, it participates in creating the world. This differs from modern social science which presents language as a neutral category, like a lifeless tool helping to get the job done. The validity issue between theory and data is left unexamined since language is considered transparent in its delivery of

²⁹Bilal Genc and Erdogan Bada, “English as a World Language in Academic Writing,” *The Reading Matrix* 10, no. 2 (2010): 142; Also see Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, “On English as a Vehicle to Preserve Geographical Diversity,” *Progress in Human Geography* 28, no. 1 (February 1, 2004): 1–4.

³⁰Choi, “Weep for Chinese University’: A Case Study of English Hegemony and Academic Capitalism in Higher Education in Hong Kong”, 238.

information. But, as we know, each culture ‘languages’ the world differently; each sentence privileges a particular world and word at the expense of other words and worlds.³¹

Further, considering that a journal article in a peer-reviewed international journal is a shaped and negotiated product rather than some fixed inscription of reality, Canagarajah avers that “it is a real cause of concern that the majority of the journals publishing research articles are located in narrowly circumscribed regions of the developed world and that the policies are set by scholars of even narrower cultural/linguistic groups”.³² Resulting in the marginal contribution of peripheral scholars to international knowledge production and mainstream discourse, the dominance of English as the *scholarly* language provides intellectual room to western scholars to produce knowledge and construct representations that become ‘truths’ uncontested by alternative discourses from the periphery. At the same time, the predominantly theoretical nature of knowledge that knowledge producers from the West generate, inhibits the participation of peripheral scholars in the international knowledge-production processes. Consequently, while the West continues to publish copious amounts of research on the non-West, the absence of the non-West in challenging dominant discourse yields ominous results. For one, as Pierre and Wacquant argue: “The neutralization of the historical context resulting from the international circulation of texts and the correlative forgetting of their originating historical conditions produces an apparent universalization further abetted by the work of ‘theorization’”.³³ As a result, the production of ‘truth’ that we see prevalent globally is a product of the oligopolistic position of the ‘western scholar’ and this ‘truth’ is arrived upon with only marginal input from the non-West scholars.³⁴

³¹Sohail Inayatullah, “Imagining an Alternative Politics of Knowledge: Subverting the Hegemony of International Relations Theory in Pakistan,” *Contemporary South Asia* 7, no. 1 (March 11, 1998): 30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09584939808719828>.

³²Canagarajah, “‘Nondiscursive’ Requirements in Academic Publishing, Material Resources of Periphery Scholars, and the Politics of Knowledge Production”, 440.

³³Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, “On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 16, no. 1 (February 1999): 42.

³⁴Gareau, “Another Type of Third World Dependency: The Social Sciences.”

DOMESTIC FACTORS IN THE MARGINALIZATION OF PERIPHERY SCHOLARSHIP

The mercantilization of higher education advanced by academic capitalism promoted through neoliberal agendas in the education sector is not a phenomenon restricted to the West, but has proliferated into the peripheral states as well.³⁵ The non-West has increasingly been caught up in the rush to raise the standards of its universities by evaluating academic staff through publications that meet western standards of ‘quality’. Pakistan is no exception. Since the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC) took on the mantle of monitoring, evaluating and regulating higher education in Pakistan, there has been a concerted effort to raise the profile of universities through participation in national and international ranking systems.³⁶ The ranking exercises conducted by the Higher Education Commission were taken up in a bid to “promote a culture of participating in the world university rankings for the purpose of getting reasonable reflection of higher education (HEIs) development in the country”.³⁷ A key emphasis, in this regard, has been to motivate the academic faculty to publish research in ISI-indexed high impact factor journals. To that end, Pakistan recorded the highest rise in the production of scientific research papers in 2018. The publishing services company Clarivate Analytics found Pakistan’s contribution to the global production of scientific papers in the Web of Science database rise

³⁵For instance, see Hikyoung Lee and Kathy Lee, “Publish (in International Indexed Journals) or Perish: Neoliberal Ideology in a Korean University,” *Language Policy* 12, no. 3 (August 16, 2013): 215–30; Kwang-Yeong Shin, “Globalization and the National Social Science in the Discourse on the SSCI in South Korea,” *Korean Social Science Journal*, XXXIV 34, no. 1 (2007): 93–116; Chuing Prudence Chou, “The SSCI Syndrome in Taiwan’s Academia,” *Education Policy Analysis Archives* 22, no. 29 (2014): 1–18; Alatas, “Academic Dependency in the Social Sciences: Reflections on India and Malaysia”; Leandro Rodriguez Medina, *Centers and Peripheries in Knowledge Production* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Choi, “Weep for Chinese University”: A Case Study of English Hegemony and Academic Capitalism in Higher Education in Hong Kong.”

³⁶BR Research, “HEC Aims at Seeing 15 Pak Varsities Among World’s Top-500,” *Business Recorder*, September 3, 2018, <https://www.brecorder.com/2018/09/03/436715/hec-aims-at-seeing-15-pak-varsities-among-worlds-top-500/>.

³⁷Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, “Quality and Research Based Ranking of Pakistani HEIs,” Ranking of Pakistani HEIs, 2015, <http://www.hec.gov.pk/english/services/universities/Ranking/Pages/Ranking-of-Pakistani-HEIs.aspx>.

by 21% from 2017 to 2018.³⁸ However, a corresponding development in the Social Sciences within Pakistan's academic centers remains consistently absent.³⁹

Many commentators have attributed the poor conditions of Pakistan's Social Sciences to the controversial faculty-hiring processes of the Higher Education Commission, which "hooked the promotion, pay, and perks of university teachers to the number of research papers they published".⁴⁰ In 2006, the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan introduced the Tenure-Track System to run alongside an already existing Basic Pay-Scale System.⁴¹ The Tenure Track was implemented as a performance-based system to encourage scholars toward research by incentivizing their research outputs in the form of publications. The 'gold' standard for publishing was to have their research outputs displayed in impact factor journals. As part of the requirement to maintain tenure-track status, scholars in the initial years following their doctoral degrees are expected to publish a minimum of 10 journal articles within 6 years. The Higher Education Commission has also established the standards of the journals within which a scholar's publications will be considered toward their progress. There were three broad categories

³⁸Anita Makri, "Pakistan and Egypt Had Highest Rises in Research Output in 2018," *Nature: International Journal of Science* (December 21, 2018), <http://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07841-9>.

³⁹For the poor conditions dominating the trajectory of development in the social sciences in Pakistan, see Inayatullah, "Development of the Discipline of Political Science in Pakistan," in *Social Sciences in Pakistan: A Profile*, ed. Inayatullah, R. Saigol, and P. Tahir (Islamabad: Pisces Enterprises, 2005); Inayatullah, R. Saigol, and P. Tahir, eds., *Social Sciences in Pakistan: A Profile* (Islamabad: Pisces Enterprises, 2005); S. Akbar Zaidi, "Dismal State of Social Sciences in Pakistan," *Economic and Political Weekly* 37, no. 35 (2002): 3644–61; Tahir Kamran, "The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan," *The News on Sunday*, 2017, <http://tns.thenews.com.pk/state-social-sciences-pakistan/#.XMvtVWJMTIU>.

⁴⁰P. Hoodbhoy, "Pakistan's Professor Mafia," *Dawn*, July 1, 2017, www.dawn.com/news/1342483.

⁴¹Tenure-Track is a career path which incentivizes teaching and research. While in the North American context, it provides economic security to professors and allows them to pursue unpopular and controversial research without retribution of the education managers in Pakistan the system exists only as a means to incentivize research. The Pakistani Tenure-Track system however does not guarantee economic security and neither does it promote academic freedom.

introduced in this regard, which included, ‘W’, ‘X’ and ‘Y’ category national journals. Whereas the ‘W’ category consisted of journals having an Impact Factor and which were included in the Journal Citation Report (JCR) of the ISI Web of Knowledge, the ‘X’ and ‘Y’ category included journals verified by HEC that met all HEC journal criteria with one exception: The ‘X’ category journals had papers reviewed by at least one expert from an ‘academically advanced country’, whereas the ‘Y’ category journals were not bound by this rule.⁴² While earlier, journals listed in the ‘W’, ‘X’ and ‘Y’ category were considered for those on the Tenure-Track System, this policy has now been revised to now incorporate only ‘W’ and ‘X’ category journals.⁴³ In the field of Social Sciences, and more specifically International Relations and Political Science, three national journals which were part of the ‘Y’ category were upgraded to an ‘X’ category. More interestingly, the International Relations and Political Science journals in Pakistan within the ‘X’ category are geared toward producing policy-relevant knowledge and this knowledge has often been found to be complicit with state preferences.⁴⁴ For instance, the journal *Pakistan Horizon*, published by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, “seeks to encourage and facilitate the understanding of international affairs and to promote the scientific study of international politics, economics and jurisprudence”.⁴⁵ The *IPRI Journal* published by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute boasts of its policy relevance, as exemplified by “two decades of rigorous and timely analysis of crucial strategic agendas and intergovernmental processes that

⁴²This policy has been revised and been implemented with effect from 1 July 2018.

⁴³M. Tahir Ali Shah, “Policy Revision in Compliance of the Decision Taken in the 31st Meeting for Development of Social Sciences and Humanities in Pakistan,” 2017, <http://hec.gov.pk/english/services/faculty/SSAH/Documents/Journals/NOTIFICATION-RevisionOfPolicyCriteriaforSocialSciencesResearchJournals.pdf>.

⁴⁴I have mentioned elsewhere how the divisions between think-tanks and academia blur in matters of publishing. While the Higher Education Commission requires scholar to be published in some select national journals for them to be considered for Tenure-Track, however most of these journals in International Relations are housed in Think-Tanks, thus reducing the prospects of theory-driven research and increasing the focus on policy-relevant research articles. See Waheed Ahmed, “Why Are There No International Relations Theories in Pakistan,” *South Asia Research* 37, no. 3 (2017).

⁴⁵“Pakistan Institute of International Affairs,” *Pakistan Horizon*, accessed May 6, 2019, <https://www.piia.org.pk/about-us>.

influence national and regional policy corridors”.⁴⁶ The *Margalla Papers*, an annual publication of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis, “primarily deals with the national security issues of Pakistan”.⁴⁷ While the Chairman of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs is a former bureaucrat, in the case of Islamabad Policy Research Institute, not only is the organization headed by a former Vice Admiral who took ambassadorial assignments, the Director of Research and the Director of Administration are both former Brigadiers. Lastly, the Institute of Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis is housed in the National Defense University and is spearheaded by someone appointed at Major General level. The presence of ex-state officials in the top hierarchy of these research institutes is problematic, because they have been indoctrinated into following state preferences by the very nature of their work. Consequently, these institutes pursue policy-relevant research which is complicit in state preferences. Proximity to power not only becomes the goal, it is also the means of research. It remains the only viable incentive for a resource-starved academic community. Research institutes do not compete over the quality of knowledge they produce. Rather, in their pursuit of closer proximity to power, it becomes more important to be recognized within foreign-policy corridors rather than in the broader, more international academic community. As a consequence, the narrow options available to academic scholars to publish their research in these journals limit their participation to matters of policy and national interest, and as a result theory becomes a casualty in the academic’s desire to publish, and innovation and indigenous scholarship are structurally marginalized.⁴⁸

The processes of knowledge production designed by the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan steer the development of International Relations and Political Science in a direction which inhibits the international circulation of knowledge from Pakistan. First, the ‘X’ category journals include both the international journals included in the ISI Master List and the nationally produced journals which meet the guidelines set by the Higher Education Commission. The problem here is

⁴⁶ “Islamabad Policy Research Institute,” *IPRI Journal*, accessed May 6, 2019, <https://www.ipripak.org/introduction/>.

⁴⁷ “National Defence University, Islamabad,” *Margalla Papers*, accessed May 6, 2019, https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_ndu_issra_papers_intro.php.

⁴⁸ Ahmed, “Why Are There No International Relations Theories in Pakistan.”

that while it is generally relatively easy to publish papers in these journals for scholars of other sciences, it is quite difficult to publish an article in an impact factor International Relations journal, especially in the quantity required to meet the Higher Education Commission's standards. This is because firstly, while International Relations impact factor journals hold their contributing scholars accountable to rigorous levels of theoretical awareness, methodological clarity and proficiency in the English language, the national International Relations journals are more policy-oriented rather than theory-driven, are less methodological in their approach and do not require similar standards of English-language proficiency. This makes publishing in International Relations journals within Pakistan relatively easy as compared to publishing in international journals. Secondly, publication in international journals⁴⁹ is highly competitive and quite time-consuming, with a high chance of rejection. Publication in national International Relations journals, on the other hand, offers relative ease with regard to time, content and acceptability.⁵⁰ Considering, then, the tough criteria for the recognition of international journals and the relative ease offered by national journals, scholars and researchers are pushed into publishing in national journals to keep up with the standards specified by the Higher Education Commission for the Tenure-Track System. A similar dichotomy can be seen in the Higher Education Commission's policy on book publishing. According to their Standard Operating Procedures, books published after peer review by international publishers of repute from the 'academically advanced world' and books published by national publishers of international repute, recognized by HEC, can be considered equivalent to a maximum of two research publications.⁵¹

What follows, therefore, is a scramble. Considering the rate of unemployment dominating Pakistan's academia,⁵² and the uncertain economic

⁴⁹I don't mean all international journals. For the purpose of this discussion international journals are only mentioned in specific reference to journals listed in the Journal Citation Report and the ISI master list.

⁵⁰For a similar critique, see Niamat Ullah Khan, "HEC Recognised Journals," *Daily Times*, September 1, 2018, dailytimes.com.pk/290996/hec-recognised-journals/.

⁵¹Higher Education Commission, "Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Recognition, Upgradation & Funding of Journals and Equivalency of Book with Research Article," 2017, <http://hec.gov.pk/site/ssjournals>.

⁵²Associated Press of Pakistan, "Unemployed PhDs Demand Jobs," *Pakistan Today*, March 12, 2019, www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/03/25/unemployed-phds-demand-jobs/.

and social conditions facing scholars working in Pakistan, the will to produce quality is replaced by the need to produce quantity. In the skirmish to secure job positions and maintain academic employment these structural impediments inhibit the development of International Relations in Pakistan and the consequences reverberate along multiple trajectories. First, the emulation and enforcement of a western style of knowledge, in style and structure, proves to be detrimental to any effort to develop indigenous ideas and theories within Pakistan, ideas that could challenge the stranglehold of foreign concepts. Secondly, the doctrinal adherence of higher education managers to the dominant neoliberal capitalist structures pervasive in western universities, implicitly categorizes indigenous scholars as ‘second-class’ academics by compelling them to publish in national journals which do not compete with the international journals in terms of theory, methodology, English proficiency and writing styles. Thirdly, and most importantly, these structural impediments significantly reduce the flow of an alternative discourse on Pakistan’s identity into the international knowledge-production stream. Consequently, discursive representations of Pakistan’s identity are constructed, naturalized and awarded the status of ontological ‘truths’ without any challenge to this dominant discourse by indigenous Pakistani scholars.

CONCLUSION

The negligible contribution of Pakistani scholars to mainstream discourse and their complacency in continuing to publish locally suggests that International Relations academics have almost given up on the idea of publishing in western-centered international journals of ‘quality’. The overbearing requirements of ‘quality’ publishing have given space to national structures that accommodate the complacency of scholars. As Hanafi points out, the dilemma is whether to publish globally and perish locally or publish locally and perish globally.⁵³ Of the two choices it seems the Pakistan International Relations academic has made the

⁵³Even though Hanafi’s work highlights the distinction by emphasizing the use of language in different publishing circuits, however I believe a similar distinction can be made regardless of whether Pakistani scholars publish locally in Urdu or not. See Hanafi, “University Systems in the Arab East: Publish Globally and Perish Locally vs Publish Locally and Perish Globally.”

latter. However, the structure of international knowledge production, the power of the English language in the production process and the combined influence of both in constructing representational identities through mainstreaming discourses, is too serious an affair to be ignored. Alternative discourses circulated nationally do not have the power to influence or challenge mainstream ideas because they are inherently isolationist. Consequently, despite the implicit and voluntary retreat of Pakistani academics, the answer lies in more participation and less isolation in the processes of international knowledge production as Chung and Hanafi eventually suggest.⁵⁴

This chapter largely explored the external and domestic processes through which alternative discourse on Pakistan is marginalized. It exposed the dominance of indexes, taken as scholarly yardsticks, as hegemonic and hierarchy-inducing agents. Coupled with publishing requirements in English language, scholars in the non-West are impeded in their participation to the knowledge-production processes at the outset. In the case of Pakistani scholars, while these impediments do pose a serious obstacle to their contribution to the mainstream discourses on Pakistan, domestic structural factors are equally responsible for such an inimical situation. The structure of higher education in Pakistan, which implicitly drives scholars to produce ‘quantity’ rather than ‘quality’, continues to work against the production of alternative discourses and original ideas.

⁵⁴ Like Hanafi, Chung’s argument also calls upon the ‘South’s’ scholars to move beyond local vernacular barriers. However here again, I believe that the assertion can be made to scholars participating in national knowledge production irrespective of their vernacular leaning. Chung argues that social science scholars outside the dominant structure of international knowledge production process dominated by a Euro-American system:

“must also attempt to speak to their counterparts from the ‘North’ by relating their research work and findings to ongoing debates in the ‘mainstream’, even though this may show major contradictions and lead to conflicts with existing ‘paradigms’. In fact, this challenge from the ‘outside’ in both empirical and theoretical terms may prevent the social sciences from gravitating towards a dogmatic worldview in which only one voice dominates”. See Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, “Redressing the Geographical Bias in Social Science Knowledge”, 7.

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Conclusion

This book began by problematizing the notion of Pakistan's widely circulated identity, especially among policy-makers. For various different reasons, discussions of Pakistan are intertwined with its domestic security and its impact on 'international' security. The 'problematic' nature of Pakistan has led to much research and many studies which have sought to understand, explain and analyze why Pakistan is the way it is. For instance, Shapiro and Fair ask "why the Pakistanis support militancy", and immediately furnish a response: because 'obviously' "[t]he geopolitical reasons for the Pakistani state to tolerate militant groups such as the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba are well known".¹ In a similar vein, Vipin Narang tries to understand whether Pakistan is "Posturing for peace?" considering "that just the acquisition of nuclear weapons [...] has enabled Pakistan to more aggressively pursue longstanding, limited revisionist objectives against India with little fear of significant retaliation".² Thus, questions of *why* turn to rationalist, positivist theoretical accounts to make sense of state behavior. However, this ontological trajectory is not without its caveats. Doty argues that, "[e]xplanations for why-questions are

¹Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (January 2010): 79, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.79>.

²Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 39, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Narang.pdf>.

incomplete in an important sense. They generally take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen. They presuppose a particular subjectivity (i.e. a mode of being), a background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves”.³ What this means is that a decision on foreign aid to Pakistan, for example, has an implicit presupposition of Pakistan’s identity as a ‘failed/fragile/failing’ state, or a ‘client’ state or a ‘rentier’ state. Consequently, within the discursive practices that enable and provide support to certain actions and policies, Pakistan’s representational identity is constructed. The focus of this book is thus not on Pakistan’s domestic politics; instead of an inward approach, the book rather follows an outward approach in that it seeks to understand how the ‘international’ comes to *know* Pakistan and how this particular *knowledge* directs decision-making processes.

Even though foreign policy-makers are vital elements in the production and reproduction of representational identities, this book is concerned not with evaluating their actions, but instead revolves around the sources from which they draw knowledge, which are again based on representations articulated by a larger number of individuals and institutions. This book consequently turns toward the field of International Relations to explore how representational identities are constructed and produced within the field and made cogent for policy-makers. Diverging from more conventional approaches, which seek to analyze Pakistan and its relation with the ‘international’, this book has approached the study of Pakistan through a *how* question. In posing such a question, it examined how subjective meanings are produced through the ‘objective’ discourse in International Relations and attached through social subjects and objects. Through this process, these meanings constitute particular interpretations and constructions which create certain possibilities and preclude others.⁴ Discourses are too broad and wide to be considered in their entirety. Hence this research has focused on the production

³Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (September 1993): 298, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600810>.

⁴For a detailed understanding of the link between power and knowledge, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (University of

of knowledge within the International Relations community, for two reasons. First, because unlike other discursive outlets like electronic, print and social media or statements of foreign policy-makers, academic literature distinguishes itself through monopolizing ‘true’ knowledge production by grounding its ontological premise in an exploration of a ‘truth’ out there. The rationalist, positivist literature thus propounds empirically verifiable and theoretically sound ‘truths’ backed by the intellectual authority conferred on them by dominant knowledge hubs. Secondly, because of the nature of the discipline itself, its link with the ‘international’ allows its *authoritative* subjects ingress into matters concerning the ‘international’ through various modes of participation, such as testimonies to their governments, writing for foreign policy magazines, advocacy of issues through think-tank linkages and, at times, as part of the decision-making processes. Norms and institutions are not ‘things’ existing objectively out there, but are created in and by particular communities that exist in particular contexts. And these institutions again shape those communities. There are no objective measures of good or bad, right or wrong. Rather what is considered to be good or bad, right or wrong, depends on what viewpoint one takes.⁵

Minnesota Press, 1992); Stuart Hall, ed., *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (Sage in association with the Open University, 1997); Stuart Hall, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,” in *The Indigenous Experience: Global Perspectives* (Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2006), 165–73; Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse,” *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (March 28, 2007): 394–426, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x>; Richard Jackson, “The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 3 (December 10, 2008): 377–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539150802515046>.

⁵For a more comprehensive view of the debate between the various ontological and epistemological factions, see Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Routledge, 2006); Jeffrey Checkel, “Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–48, <https://doi.org/10.2307/25054040>; Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline,’” *International Studies Review* 4, no. 2 (2002): 67–85, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3186354>; Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (July 27, 1998): 171–200, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.171>; Ronen Palan, “A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 31 (2000): 575–98; Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Pakistan has often been the center of western-based inquiries for geostrategic reasons and these inquiries have often given rise to questions about the status and the nature of the Pakistani state, with scholars indulging in extensive inquiries seeking to answer questions such as 'what is Pakistan?' and 'why is it the way it is?'. The representational practices produced within these positivist academic inquiries have, through naturalization and categorization, imbued Pakistan with an identity created through an imposition of interpretation rather than being. An ontologically variant understanding has led us to explore a different set of questions throughout this book, such as: how is Pakistan produced, reproduced and articulated to form the body of knowledge in International Relations through which we have come to *know* it? How is Pakistan spoken of and how is it constructed? In posing these questions, the study shifted its focus from the question of *being* to that of *becoming*. What was not attempted in this book was to trace historically how Pakistan has been defined, explained or understood by various interpretive communities (such as International Relations scholars, Area Studies specialists and think-tank experts), and then to supplant those understandings with our version of what Pakistan is. Nor did this study attempt to counter arguments on Pakistan by sifting through them to determine which hold more veracity and usefulness than others, and which are poorly equipped to understand Pakistan. Instead, this study investigated another question: How is the 'truth' on Pakistan produced, and how is this truth represented, fixed and stabilized through the writings on Pakistan? What are the conditions under which it is possible to make authoritative claims about Pakistan?

The study of the discourse on Pakistan in International Relations cannot be left to textual analysis alone; rather it entails a detailed examination of the social processes through which these texts come to define Pakistan's 'reality' and of how the discursive totality impacts the way we think and act in the contemporary world. Since knowledge is produced by competing discourses, the outcome of this struggle decides the 'reality' or the 'truth' of a particular situation around which the discourses compete. In that sense, knowledge maintains an intrinsic connection with power. The power to produce knowledge allows knowledge to reinforce power. Further, the power to produce knowledge through discourse then allows a subject to make certain descriptions appear as 'truth'. As Nimmer argues:

Our perception of reality depends on the community one identifies oneself with. Norms and institutions change with time, taking multiple forms in different contexts. What might seem right in one community might be wrong in another; what is considered normal for one community might be abnormal to another. In sum, different communities have different sets of norms, goals and aspirations. Language has an important role in creating worlds that communities identify themselves with. Language functions as an instrument for creating, normalizing and reinforcing particular worldviews, affixing certain knowledge and institutions in society; at the same time alternative worldviews and knowledge are excluded and de-legitimized. Through language identities are created and maintained, and as such, language is never neutral. Groups struggling for power and trying to reaffirm their identities use language to create and maintain a hegemonic regime of truth.⁶

More specifically, in International Relations, discourse implies the asymmetrical interaction between the 'West' and the 'Rest' that has enabled the 'West' to construct 'realities' that are taken seriously and acted upon, while simultaneously denying the 'Rest' an equal degree of agency. Scholars undertaking sociological examinations of the production of knowledge in International Relations have often analyzed theoretical contributions to International Relations and proclaimed the dominance of western-based actors and their produced knowledge to the detriment of those in the periphery. This research distinguishes itself from these scholarly endeavors by analyzing how 'area' studies⁷ in International Relations construct, produce and circulate the 'reality' of Pakistan.

However, not all texts and practices are admitted as part of the discourse, if one were to study the discursive construction of Pakistan within International Relations. It is within the discourse that the production of a number of subject positions grants individuals and groups the power to produce knowledge meaningfully and authoritatively. The discourses on International Relations typically organize the production of sovereign states, diplomats, heads of states or international

⁶Livio Nimmer, "De-contextualization in the Terrorism Discourse: A Social Constructionist View," *ENDC Proceedings* 14 (2011): 229.

⁷This follows the logic that all International Relation is 'area' studies and because the developmental trajectory of Area Studies as a disciplinary enterprise was based on a need to inform the policy-maker's decisions, it follows that 'area' studies is also International Relations.

organizations as willful and acting subjects who are allowed to act and speak about certain objects and concepts, such as war, peace and cooperation. In the case of Pakistan, and especially within the ambit and scope of this research, analysis focuses on three particular subject positions namely, the Pakistan ‘expert’ in universities, area study centers and think tanks. Again, Pakistan ‘expert’ does not imply any Pakistan ‘expert’ but those who have been provided *authoritative* positions by discourse to speak on Pakistan. The measure of who is *authoritative* has been taken in this study as those subjects who have produced most *knowledge* on Pakistan and those who have higher citations of the *knowledge* they have produced on Pakistan. The study of the discourse on Pakistan therefore involved not only an analysis of the texts of these *authoritative* subjects through which ‘Pakistan’ is constructed, but also of the processes through which these texts breathe life into the representational practices which produce Pakistan.

The predominant work on knowledge production continues to explore the marginality of Third World scholars. Within International Relations the study of knowledge-production processes often analyze the production of ‘theory’.⁸ These studies observe the marginality of Third World scholars to theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions in International Relations, and consequently call for decolonizing, decentering and pluralizing the study of International Relations.⁹ However, the study of International Relations is not only about theoretical advancements, methodological rigor and empirical validity; it is also the study of ‘areas’ viewed through these intellectual lenses. Considering how International Relations theory remains eurocentric and under

⁸For example, see Daniel Maliniak et al., “International Relations in the US Academy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 437–64, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00653.x>; Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* (New York and London: Routledge, 2009); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

⁹Robbie Shilliam, ed., *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism, and Investigations of Global Modernity* (Routledge, 2011); David L. Blaney and Arlene B. Tickner, “Worlding, Ontological Politics and the Possibility of a Decolonial IR,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 45, no. 3 (June 12, 2017): 293–311, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829817702446>; Arlene B. Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 627–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494323>; Branwen Gruffydd Jones, ed., *Decolonizing International Relations* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

Anglo-American dominance, it is only to be expected that the study of an 'area' would bring the 'area'-based scholars into mainstream International Relations discourse, given the richness of 'knowledge' about the 'area' that the 'area'-based specialist possesses. However, in the case of Pakistan, even that is not the case. Not only are Pakistan-based scholars disenfranchised from the processes of theory productivity, but their empirical contributions to the literature in International Relations are quite marginal too. The absence of alternative discourses in International Relations affects the study of International Relations in two distinct ways. First, dominant discourses in International Relations remain unchallenged by contributions from the periphery, thus universalizing certain interpretations of world politics which are based on eurocentric conceptions. Secondly, and more grievously, the representations of 'areas' in the study of International Relations continue to garner wider circulation and consequently to define 'truths' about the 'areas' without challenge from indigenous scholars of the 'area'. Because of the intrinsic link of western knowledge producers with western policy-makers, this circulation then plays a vital role in transmitting the 'truths' about 'areas' to policy corridors. This circulation of 'truth' is not only confined to policy circles; rather the universalization of western 'standards' of scholarship allows the 'truth' constructed in such research to dominate other forums of knowledge production, and since Third World knowledge processes continue to remain passive recipients of the scholarship produced in the West, the circulation of the 'truth' about an 'area' travels across the globe and is established as 'truth' elsewhere, even in the 'area' itself.

While International Relations as a discipline continues to myopically follow rationalist-positivist ontology, especially in the study of Pakistan, an alternative source of knowledge production, the spatially and geographically based Area Studies enterprise, constitutes an avenue for producing culturalist-humanist perspectives. This is because Area Studies aspires to be a multidisciplinary melting pot where different disciplinary perspectives, ranging from politics to anthropology to sociology and urban studies, provide alternative knowledges of the areas studied.¹⁰

¹⁰For an overview of various perspectives on the development of Area Studies as an enterprise, see Vicente L. Rafael, "The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States," *Social Text* 41, no. 41 (1994): 91–111, <https://doi.org/10.2307/466834>; Malini J. Schueller, "Area Studies and Multicultural Imperialism: The Project of Decolonizing Knowledge," *Social Text* 25, no. 1 90 (March 1, 2007): 41–62, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00368145-2007-001>.

However, a study of Area Studies journals and top Area Studies centers reveals that these intellectual centers continue to remain dominated by intellectual concerns surrounding Indology, i.e. the study of India, to the detriment of the other states that make up South Asia. An examination of publications in reputable South Asian area studies journals reveals that most of the work on Pakistan not only originates from the West, but also that it is very narrowly focused on the politics of Pakistan's internal and external conflicts. Thus instead of finding studies on Pakistan from various disciplinary vantage points, the study finds that most research articles on Pakistan, and certainly the most cited ones, originate from the disciplinary confines of International Relations and Politics. What this means is that, as far as Pakistan is concerned, Area Studies is International Relations. In this way the 'truth' circulated in International Relations is smuggled into and circulated throughout Area Studies, and again the marginality of Pakistan-based scholars inhibits alternative discourses from challenging this 'truth' and the representations constructed. At the same time, research conducted in most South Asian studies centers is predominantly centered on India. A negligible number of scholars from Pakistan are inducted into Ph.D. and postdoctoral programs in these centers, and again these scholars of Area Studies focus largely on Politics and International Relations. Given that theoretical knowledge remains hostage to eurocentric conceptions, these scholars continue to examine Pakistan through a 'foreign' lens rather than an indigenous one, and thus carry forward the representations of Pakistan originating in the western centers. If International Relations scholarship focuses on Pakistan's security and its relation with 'international' security; if widely cited scholarship on Pakistan in Area Studies journals originates from International Relations and centers exploring Pakistan and its conflicts—domestic, regional and international; if Area Studies centers demonstrate marginal research on Pakistan; if scholars trained on Pakistan in these centers, though working toward Area Studies degrees, are indoctrinated within the discipline of Politics and International Relations—if all these

[org/10.1215/01642472-2006-016](https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2006-016); Katja Mielke and Anna-Katharina Hornidge, eds., *Area Studies at the Crossroads: Knowledge Production After the Mobility Turn* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); David Ludden, "Area Studies in the Age of Globalization," *Frontiers: The Interdisciplinary Journal of Study Abroad* 6 (2000): 1–22; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Area and Regional Studies in the United States," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34, no. 4 (2001): 789–91, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1350268>.

conditions obtain, then it comes as no surprise that the knowledge circulated about Pakistan originating in the discipline of International Relations continues to affix the ‘truth’ about Pakistan’s identity. It can, however, be argued that academic disciplinary writings and instructions are limited in their appeal to those who are already part of the academic club, such as students, researchers and professors, and consequently it can be further argued that such research, with its intricate methodological designs and theory-driven knowledge, is not for the international affairs generalist audience. It can also be argued that academics are confined to their ‘ivory towers’ and hence their involuntary influence does not go beyond students and researchers who scavenge their writings for ‘authentic’ knowledge, hence the prevalent argument that International Relations academics have marginal bearing on foreign-policy processes.¹¹ Hold that thought though.

The relationship between International Relation scholars and policy-makers, and their influence on international affairs generalists is not as linear as it appears, at least when it comes to those studying Pakistan. An examination of publications on Pakistan in ‘academic’ journals clearly demonstrates that many think-tank experts working in policy-proximate roles routinely publish in these journals. On the other hand, many academics write for think-tank-based publications aimed at providing succinct, easy knowledge, unburdened with theory

¹¹This is the general perception about International Relations scholars, especially in the US academe. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Scholars on the Sideline,” *Washington Post*, April 13, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260.html?noredirect=on>; Paul C. Avey and Michael C. Desch, “What Do Policymakers Want from Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers,” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 227–46, <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12111>; Peter Campbell and Michael C. Desch, “Rank Irrelevance,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 15, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-09-15/rank-irrelevance>; Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In,” *International Security* 26, no. 4 (April 29, 2002): 169–83, <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228802753696816>; Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship Between Theory and Practice in International Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (June 15, 2005): 23–48, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104904>; John J. Mearsheimer, “A Self-Enclosed World?” in *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics*, ed. Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 388–94, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492174>.

or methodology, to both the international affairs generalists and policy-makers. In addition, many of those writing in think-tank-based journals and magazines often assume dual roles, for instance being fellows of think tanks but also performing roles as academics in universities, or being academics with various stints in policy-making positions, or think-tank experts with an extensive academic background. The analysis of the most cited works and authors who contributed more research on Pakistan than others, in both International Relations and South Asian studies journals demonstrates, that those writing on Pakistan are mostly connected to US policy circles either through their experience in policy-making or through advocacy and membership in policy networks. Consequently, their research on Pakistan informs decision-makers since they either directly appear for testimony or they are appointed to policy roles. While publishing in academic journals is often based on 'non-biased', 'objective' research, publications in think-tank-based journals and magazines such as *Washington Quarterly*, *Survival* and *Foreign Policy Magazine* are often opinion based and directly targeted at policy-makers. Moreover, these same journals, which become conduits of 'truths' from academic circles to policy-making ones, are assimilated by the generalist international affairs audience. This proliferation of 'truths' from academic to nonacademic domains impregnated with a de-historicized, de-contextualized, presupposed representational identity of Pakistan does not only naturalize the 'identity' of Pakistan based on which policy decisions may or may not be taken, it also informs the generalist international affairs aficionados of what Pakistan 'is'.

Not only has the mainstream discourse on Pakistan continued to circulate above all a particularly American interpretation of Pakistan's identity, but it has sustained its hegemony without the hint of a challenge from alternative discourses on Pakistan. This is clearly the case considering the marginal contribution of Pakistan-based scholars in the dominant discourse in International Relations. Thus, the dominance of particular 'truths' about Pakistan has as much to do with hegemonic eurocentric interpretations as with the absence of Pakistan-based scholarly contributions in reputable international journals. The factors affecting the presence of Pakistan-based scholarship in International Relations, Area Studies and think-tank publications, are both exogenous and endogenous. Prime among the exogenous reasons denying Pakistan-based scholars entry into the elite club of international knowledge production is the entrenchment of knowledge-production processes in neoliberal

capitalist modes of production.¹² The western fascination with ranking ‘quality’ has led to policies of academic management which confer prestige on knowledge-production hubs such as journals and universities by evaluating them on a single yardstick of ‘quality’. This quantification of ‘academic quality’, which has followed neoliberal policies, impedes non-West scholars from contributing in many various ways. First, the introduction of a metric of ‘quality’ such as visibility in the Thompson-Reuters Indexes has standardized and globalized the traditional intellectual prestige of scholars within universities by measuring and quantifying their academic outputs. Intellectuals around the world are now pressured into producing work of ‘academic quality’ symbolized by their visibility in the index. Since publication in academic journals is the central tool for the communication of research work across spatial and territorial divides, the standard for the ‘quality’ of a publication now resides in the ‘quality’ of the journal it is published in.

The mercantilization of higher education continues to favor western knowledge-production centers since corporations in the West maintain oligopolistic control of these processes. The dominance of the West and its control of the knowledge-production process have allowed its agents (publishers, scholars, universities) to police what passes as knowledge.

¹²See Peter A. Jackson, “The Neoliberal University and Global Immobilities of Theory,” in *Area Studies at the Crossroads: Knowledge Production After the Mobility Turn*, ed. Katja Mielke and Anna-Katharina Hornidge (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 27–44, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59834-9_1; Kwang-Yeong Shin, “Globalization and the National Social Science in the Discourse on the SSCI in South Korea,” *Korean Social Science Journal*, XXXIV 34, no. 1 (2007): 93–116; Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, “Redressing the Geographical Bias in Social Science Knowledge,” *Environment and Planning A* 33, no. 1 (2001): 1–9, <https://doi.org/10.1068/a33181>; Sari Hanafi, “University Systems in the Arab East: Publish Globally and Perish Locally vs Publish Locally and Perish Globally,” *Current Sociology* 59, no. 3 (May 28, 2011): 291–309; Fernanda Beigel, “Publishing from the Periphery: Structural Heterogeneity and Segmented Circuits—The Evaluation of Scientific Publications for Tenure in Argentina’s CONICET,” *Current Sociology* 62, no. 5 (September 3, 2014): 743–65; Frederick H. Gareau, “Another Type of Third World Dependency: The Social Sciences,” *International Sociology* 3, no. 2 (June 29, 1988): 171–78; A. Suresh Canagarajah, “‘Nondiscursive’ Requirements in Academic Publishing, Material Resources of Periphery Scholars, and the Politics of Knowledge Production,” *Written Communication* 13, no. 4 (1996): 435–72, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0741088396013004001>; Syed Hussein Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems,” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 28, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 23–45; Syed Farid Alatas, “Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences,” *Current Sociology* 51, no. 6 (November 30, 2003): 599–613.

Consequently, Third World scholars are, for the most part, granted membership of this elite community of knowledge producers only if they conform to the rigorous theoretical, methodological and empirical research standards upheld by this community, standards deemed to have been ‘perfected’ by western intellectuals. Not only that, other requirements include satisfying peer reviewers (who at times are biased or ill-informed about the content of the scholarship), structuring research coherently and seamlessly, and, most importantly, following the rules of ‘academic English’. Consequently, the failure of academic inputs from the non-West to contribute to mainstream knowledge production is often attributed to lack of originality, inadequately structured presentation of written material and issues with writing styles. ‘Academic English’ in International Relations is often distinguished by its use of specialized language, discipline-specific jargons and specific forms of scholarly writing. Consequently, it all boils down to how ‘academic English’ is properly used to present research. The hyper-centrality and imposition of English as *the* language for the communication of research raises significant hurdles for the periphery scholar. The hegemony of the English language as a hierarchy-enforcing agent has not gone unnoticed. Scholars and intellectuals have cogently been arguing that its imperialist potential advertently and inadvertently creates cultural hierarchies. Perpetuated and consolidated through the ISI index, the English language becomes a tool of western force in maintaining the structures of colonialism.¹³ This is because the universalization of a high level of English-language proficiency favors scholars in the West more than those in the periphery, since, despite the prevalence of English as a second language and a medium of instruction in the postcolonial world, those training and teaching in Social Sciences can seldom measure up to the language ability of native English speakers. Proficiency in the English language consequently becomes the measure of academic capability, since no matter how strong a research project may appear, if it does not cleave to the

¹³See, for instance, Alastair Pennycook, *The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language* (Routledge, 1994); Robert Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism* (Oxford University Press, 1992); Robert Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism Continued* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Po King Choi, “Weep for Chinese University”: A Case Study of English Hegemony and Academic Capitalism in Higher Education in Hong Kong,” *Journal of Education Policy* 25, no. 2 (March 2010): 233–52; A. Suresh Canagarajah, *A Geopolitics of Academic Writing* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002).

standards of English maintained by ‘academic capitalists’, there is a high probability it will not be published, and, considering the hierarchy of academic journals established by the ISI index, where the research gets published and where it doesn’t determines the ability of the publishing scholar. This is one reason why Pakistan-based scholars are more content to publish in local journals where the ideational, structural and linguistic requirements are relatively more relaxed.

The dominance of English as the *scholarly* language provides western scholars with a comfortable linguistic platform from which to produce knowledge and construct representations that become ‘truths’ uncontested by alternative discourses from the periphery. (Imagine if the scholarly language for publication was Chinese.) At the same time, the predominantly theoretical nature of knowledge that knowledge producers from the West generate, inhibits the participation of peripheral scholars in international knowledge-production processes. Research on the sociology of knowledge in International Relations has often revealed that non-West scholars have continued to largely remain passive recipients of theoretical and ideational precepts of western knowledge. Within Pakistan, International Relations scholarship is mainly driven by policy concerns, centered on Pakistan’s national interest. For these scholars, International Relations theory is an irrelevant concern and is of use only if it enforces, endorses or addresses a particular dimension of Pakistan’s national interest. Because most scholars in Pakistan vie for proximity to power, they are content to publish locally and perish globally rather than perish locally and publish globally. Pakistan-based scholars’ lack of interest in producing theoretically and methodologically rigorous knowledge prevents them from contributing to internationally reputable journals for whom these are ‘standards’ to uphold. In the case of Pakistan, International Relations scholars are quite narrowly confined to various theoretical trajectories of realism,¹⁴ paradigms which allow endorsement of state behavior and state preferences.¹⁵ Consequently, while the

¹⁴N. Behera, “South Asia: A ‘Realist’ Past and Alternative Futures,” in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, ed. A. Tickner and O. Wæver (London: Routledge, 2009).

¹⁵Ahmed Waqas Waheed, “State Sovereignty and International Relations in Pakistan: Analysing the Realism Stranglehold,” *South Asia Research* 37, no. 3 (2017): 277–95, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728017725624>.

theoretical basis remains the same within the discourse on Pakistan originating from Pakistan and within the discourse originating in the West, albeit situated on different levels of sophistication, the representational identity within the discourse on Pakistan originating from Pakistan is different from the representational identity originating 'internationally'. Theories arriving in the periphery from the West go through processes of sociocultural adoption and adaptation and within these processes alternative representational identities are constructed. Since the alternative representational identity of Pakistan constructed through the local knowledge-production processes is produced and circulated locally with marginal dialogical interaction with western discourse on Pakistan, it remains unsuccessful in challenging the dominant discourse on Pakistan. As a consequence, the representational identity of Pakistan widely produced and circulated in western discourse emerges as the constructed 'truth'.

However, the diminished capacity of Pakistan-based scholars to contribute to the dominant International Relations discourse cannot be entirely blamed on the restrictive nature of its requirements. Endogenous knowledge-production processes are equally responsible for the marginality of Pakistan-based scholars in their contribution to the 'international' discourse on Pakistan. The mercantilization of higher education that dominates knowledge production in the West has also seeped into Pakistan. Similar universalized standards of 'quality' such as publication in impact factor journals, continue, as in the West, to define capability and the professional progress of the academic. For instance, the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan requires their research-intensive scholars to produce 10 publications within a period of 6 years if they are to merit promotion from an assistant professor position to an associate professor one. These publications could either be in internationally reputable journals or local prestigious ones. The problem arises when these two different categories of journals are judged equally. While it is relatively easy to publish in local reputable journals, the lead time for international journals is long, sometimes a couple of years, even assuming that an article submitted to a journal has been accepted in the first instance without being rejected by a number of journals previously. Consequently, the need to publish in quantity supersedes the desire to publish quality. Since most academic journals in Pakistan standardized for publication by the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan are housed in think tanks which are invariably presided over

by former bureaucrats and military Generals, they solicit submissions which follow policy analysis and circle around Pakistan's national interest. In this way, to continue progressing in their careers academics are pushed to publish in these journals, which are heavily focused on policy analysis and unconcerned with theoretical innovations and alternative knowledge production. Concerned of course with keeping their careers afloat, Pakistan-based International Relations scholars are prevented by these structural impediments from contributing meaningfully toward the development of International Relations in Pakistan. The consequences reverberate along multiple trajectories. First, the emulation and enforcement of a western style of knowledge, in style and structure, proves to be damaging to any endeavor to develop indigenous ideas and theories within Pakistan, ideas that could potentially contest the hegemony of foreign conceptions. Secondly, the doctrinal adherence of Pakistan's higher education managers to the dominant neoliberal capitalist modes of production pervasive in western universities implicitly compels Pakistan-based scholars to publish in national journals which do not compete with the international journals in terms of theoretical soundness, methodological rigor, English proficiency and writing styles. Thirdly, and most importantly, these structural impediments substantially restrict the flow of an alternative discourse on Pakistan's identity into the international knowledge-production stream.

Following in the methodological footsteps of Doty,¹⁶ Milliken¹⁷ and Jackson,¹⁸ a discourse analysis of key International Relations, Area Studies and think-tank publications reveals that any theorization of Pakistan bases its analysis on commonsensical assumptions about its actions and identity. The discourse analysis demonstrates that there is a singular dominant interpretation of Pakistan's actions and identity within western *knowledge*. What Pakistan 'is' and what Pakistan 'does' are constructed by *authoritative* subjects through the language they use to order the world. The western discourse on Pakistan is not an objective description or reflection about fact; it is a construction and interpretation of

¹⁶Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*.

¹⁷Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 225–54, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005002003>.

¹⁸Jackson, "Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse."

those facts through a subjective ‘reality’ transmitted through language. The use of theory to explore ‘objective’ knowledge censors certain social realities through de-contextualization and de-historicization. As Jackson argues:

It is crucial to recognise that discourses are significant not just for what they say but also for what they do not say; the silences in a discourse can be as important, or even more important at times, than what is stated. This is because silence can function ideologically in any number of ways. For example, silence can be a deliberate means of distraction or misdirection from uncomfortable subjects or contrasting viewpoints, the suppression or de-legitimation of alternative forms of knowledge or values, the tacit endorsement of particular kinds of practices, setting the boundaries of legitimate knowledge, or as a kind of disciplining process directed against certain actors – among others. In other words, the silences within a text often function as an exercise in power.

The discourse analyses of journal articles on Pakistan demonstrate this phenomenon amply. For instance, within themes dominated by the War on Terror the discourse remains silent on the significant human and economic costs that Pakistan has incurred. Pakistan has lost almost 9000 security personnel and approximately 23,000 civilians because of the War on Terror.¹⁹ In addition, it has incurred a heavy economic cost since 2001, amounting to as much as 250 billion US dollars, which is 7 times higher than the foreign aid Pakistan has received.²⁰ Yet discourse continues to profess the benevolence of US aid to Pakistan and the ‘significant’ contribution it has ‘aspired’ to make in Pakistan.²¹ Similarly the discourse on Pakistan’s nuclear status completely ignores the deep-seated hostility and rivalry between the two states of India and Pakistan, and

¹⁹Neta C. Crawford, “Costs of War Project,” 2018, <https://watson.brown.edu/costsof-war/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/HumanCosts%2CNov82018CoW.pdf>.

²⁰Hafiz A. Pasha, *Growth and Inequality in Pakistan: Volume I* (Islamabad: Freidrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018), <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/pakistan/14113.pdf>; Abdul Qadir, “Growth and Inequality in Pakistan: Interview with Economist Hafiz A. Pasha,” Freidrich Eber Stiftung Connect, 2018, <https://www.fes-connect.org/people/growth-and-inequality-in-pakistan/>.

²¹For a more comprehensive comparison between ‘benevolent’ US aid and Pakistan’s economic losses, see Muhammad R. Shahid, “Pakistan’s Economic Aid and Losses in the War on Terror,” *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis* 6, no. 5 (2014): 10–15.

the historical developments following its partition that led to Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear technology. The power of western discourse to determine what interpretations of knowledge are privileged, who the authoritative subject is, and how the subject is positioned in the discursive field continue to legitimize a specific interpretation of Pakistan's identity and its actions. Understanding how discourse structures our political 'reality', it is time that questions such as 'What do we *know* about Pakistan?' or 'Why Pakistan is the way it is?', be replaced by questions such as 'How do we *know* about Pakistan?'.

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APPENDIX A

See Table [A.1](#).

Table A.1 Journal articles published on Pakistan in top International Relations journals (2006–2016)

Journal Rank + serial no.	Article		Author	
	Name	Year/volume/issue	Title	Citations Name
1.	<i>Living Reviews in European Governance/Austria</i>			
2.	<i>American Journal of Political Science/UK</i>			
3.	<i>International Organization/UK</i>			
4.	<i>World Politics/UK</i>			
5.	<i>Quarterly Journal of Political Science/US</i>			
6.	<i>American Political Science Review/UK</i>			
7.	<i>Political Analysis/UK</i>	2011 / 19 / 4	Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan	102 Will Bullock, Kosuke Imai and Jacob N. Shapiro
8.	<i>Journal of Conflict Resolution/US</i>	2013 / 58 / 5	Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan	26 C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro
9.	<i>International Security/US</i>			
1.		2006 (2005, print) / 30 / 2	India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe (*)	129 S. Paul Kapur
2.		2008 / 32 / 4	No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier	Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>
3.		2009 / 33 / 3	Misunderstanding Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area?
4.		2010 / 34 / 3	Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan
5.		2010 / 34 / 3	Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability
6.		2012 / 37 / 1	The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia
7.		2014 / 39 / 2	Old Habits, New Consequences: Pakistan's Posture toward Afghanistan since 2001
8.		2014–2015 / 39 / 3	Pakistan's Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution to an Exaggerated Threat
9.		2015 / 40 / 1	Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan
10.		2016 / 40 / 4	Correspondence: Battling over Pakistan's Battlefield Nuclear Weapons
11.		2016 / 41 / 2	Bargaining Away Justice: India, Pakistan, and the International Politics of Impunity for the Bangladesh Genocide

(continued)

Kimberly Marten,
Thomas H. Johnson and
M. Chris Mason
Jacob N. Shapiro and
C. Christine Fair
Vipin Narang
S. Paul Kapur and
Sumit Ganguly
Khalid Homayun Nadiri
Jaganath Sankaran
Or Rabinowitz and
Nicholas L. Miller
Christopher Clary,
Gaurav Kampani and
Jaganath Sankaran
Gary J. Bass

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i> <i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i> <i>Name</i>
10.	<i>Journal of Peace Research</i> /US	2010 / 47 / 4 Not Loving Thy Neighbour as Thyself: Trade, Democracy and Military Expenditure Explanations Underlying India–Pakistan Rivalry	23 Syed Mansoob Murshed and Dawood Mamoon
11.	<i>Review of International Organizations</i> /Germany		
12.	<i>Western European Politics</i> /UK		
13.	<i>European Journal of International Relations</i> /US	2013 / 20 / 2 Constructivism Meets Critical Realism: Explaining Pakistan's State Practice in the Aftermath of 9/11	13 Nazya Fiaz
14.	<i>International Studies Quarterly</i> /UK	2016 / 60 / 2 The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan	88 Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi
15.	<i>Conflict Management and Peace Science</i> /US	2014 / 32 / 5 Measuring Political Violence in Pakistan: Insights from the BFRS Dataset	16 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, C. Christine Fair, Jenna Jordan, and Rasul Bakhsh Rais
16.	<i>Post-Soviet Affairs</i> /UK		
17.	<i>Security Dialogue</i> /US		
18.	<i>Philosophy and Public Affairs</i> / UK		
19.	<i>International Theory. A Journal of International Politics, Law and Philosophy</i> / UK		

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations Name</i>
20.	<i>China Quarterly</i> /UK	2009/ 30/ 6	Cognitive Management in an Enduring International Rivalry: The Case of India and Pakistan	15 Peter Suedfeld and Rajiv Jhangiani
21.	<i>Political Psychology</i> /UK			
22.	<i>European Union Politics</i> /US			
23.	<i>Review of International Political Economy</i> /UK			
24.	<i>Perspectives on Politics</i> /UK			
25.	<i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i> /UK			
26.	<i>European Political Science Review</i> /UK			
27.	<i>Security Studies</i> /UK			
1.		2006/ 15/ 4	Why has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict	50 T. V. Paul
2.		2008/ 17/ 2	Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective	50 Paul Staniland
3.		2011 (2005; print)/ 14/ 2	The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (*)	34 Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig
4.		2014/ 23/ 1	Using Manpower Policies to Transform the Force and Society: The Case of the Pakistan Army	04 C. Christine Fair

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

Journal		Article		Author	
Rank + serial no.	Name	Year/volume/issue	Title	Citations	Name
28.	Democratization/UK				
1.		2010/ 17/ 3	Fighting for the Rule of Law: Civil Resistance and the Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan	28	Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Maria J. Stephan
2.		2011/ 18/ 1	Military Extrication and Temporary Democracy: the Case of Pakistan	15	Michael Hoffman
3.		2011/ 18/ 6	Democratic Transition and Social Spending: the Case of Pakistan in the 1990s	03	Elisa Giunchi
4.		2014/ 21/ 6	Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan (2007–2013)	23	Aqil Shah
5.		2015/ 24/ 1	How to Understand Pakistan's Hybrid Regime: the Importance of a Multidimensional Continuum	05	Katharine Adeney
29.	Review of International Studies/UK	2007/ 33/ 1	Universal Human Rights and non-Western Normative Systems: A Comparative Analysis of Violence against Women in Mexico and Pakistan	13	Silvie Bovarnick
30.	Journal of Political Ecology/US				
31.	Journal of Contemporary China/UK				
1.		2011/ 20/ 71	The Terrorist Risk and China's Policy toward Pakistan: Strategic Reassurance and the 'United Front'	12	Mathieu Duchâtel
2.		2011/ 20/ 71	About an 'All-Weather' Relationship: Security Foundations of Sino-Pakistan Relations since 9/11	13	Jian Yang and Rashid Ahmed Siddiqi

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

Journal	Article			Author
Rank + serial no.	Name	Year/volume/issue	Title	Citations Name
3.		2011/ 20/ 71	The Economic Dimension of Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Overview	11 Mathias Hartpence
32.	International Affairs/UK			
1.		2011/ 87/ 3	Why the Pakistan Army is Here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance	31 C. Christine Fair
2.		2013/ 89/ 4	Pakistan's Foreign and Security Policies After the 2013 General Election: The Judge, the Politician and the Military	13 Frédéric Grare
3.		2014/ 90/ 5	Nuclear Fears, Hopes and Realities in Pakistan	07 Pervez Hoodbhoy and Zia Mian
4.		2015/ 91/ 1	British Islamic Extremist Terrorism: The Declining Significance of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan	07 Lewis Herrington
33.	Harvard International Law Journal/US			
34.	Journal of Political Ideologies/UK			
35.	Foreign Policy Analysis/UK			
36.	State Politics and Policy Quarterly/US			
37.	Chinese Journal of International Politics/UK	2014/ 7/ 2	The Politics of Contestation in Asia: How Japan and Pakistan Deal with Their Rising Neighbors	15 Hannes Ebert, Daniel Flenes and Georg Strüver
38.	International Interactions/UK			
39.	Electoral Studies/UK			

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

Rank + serial no.	Journal		Article		Author	
	Name		Year/volume/issue	Title	Citations	Name
40.	<i>Space and Polity</i> /UK		2015 / 19 / 3	Droning, Zoning and Organizing: Kafkaesque Reflections on the Nomos of the Earth in the Northwestern Tribal Belt of Pakistan	0	Muhammad Ali Nasir
41.	<i>Water Alternatives</i> /US					
42.	<i>New Political Economy</i> /UK					
43.	<i>Comparative European Politics</i> /UK					
44.	<i>Annals of Global Analysis and Geometry</i> /Netherlands					
45.	<i>Politics and Society</i> /US					
46.	<i>Critical Social Policy</i> /US					
47.	<i>International Studies Review</i> /UK					
48.	<i>Journal of Refugee Studies</i> /UK		2006 / 19 / 4	Tools for Anticipating Asylum Denials: An Application to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, 1997–2001	0	Lester A. Zeager and John H. P. Williams
1.				Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not Necessarily Afghan?	72	Daniel A. Kronenfeld
2.			2008 / 21 / 1	‘He’s a Cracking Wee Geezer from Pakistan’: Lay Accounts of Refugee Integration Failure and Success in Scotland	08	Steve Kirkwood, Andy McKinlay and Chris McVittie
3.			2015 / 28 / 1			
49.	<i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> /Netherlands					

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Citations Name</i>
50.	<i>Terrorism and Political Violence/UK</i>		
1.		2006 (2005; print)/ 17/ 3	21 Gauvav Ghose and Patrick James
2.		2007/ 20/ 1	83 C. Christine Fair
3.		2010/ 22/ 4	50 C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro
4.		2014 (2015; print)/ 27/ 3	06 Muhammad Sohail Anwar Malik, Michael Sandholzer, M. Zubair Khan and Sajjad Akbar
5.		2014 (2016; print)/ 28/ 1	07 Stephen Tinkel
51.	<i>Journal of European Integration/UK</i>		
52.	<i>The Washington Quarterly/UK</i>		
1.		2008 (2010; online)/ 31/ 2	43 Ashley J. Tellis
2.		2009/ 32/ 2	36 C. Christine Fair
3.		2007 (2010; online)/ 30/ 2	80 Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet
4.		2008 (2010; online)/ 31/ 4	35 Ashley J. Tellis

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
5.		2010/ 33/ 3	China's Caution on Afghanistan–Pakistan	44	Andrew Small
6.		2011 (2010; online)/ 34/ 1	Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies	49	Ayesha Siddiqi
7.		2011 (2010; online)/ 34/ 1	Caught in the Muddle: America's Pakistan Strategy	14	Paul Staniland
8.		2011/ 34/ 4	Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus	08	Andrew Bast
9.		2012 (2011; online)/ 35/ 1	The Pakistan Thorn in China–India–U.S. Relations	34	Harsh V. Pant
10.		2012/ 35/ 2	Reversing Pakistan's Descent: Empowering its Middle Class	02	Xenia Dormandy
11.		2012/ 35/ 2	A Strategy of "Congagement" toward Pakistan	11	Zalmay Khalilzad
12.		2012/ 35/ 3	Recalibrating U.S.–Pakistan Relations	07	Haider Ali Hussain Mullick
13.		2012/ 35/ 4	How to Exercise U.S. Leverage Over Pakistan	12	Paul D. Miller
14.		2013/ 36/ 3	Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà Vu?	30	Shashank Joshi
15.		2014/ 37/ 4	India–Pakistan Relations: Does Modi Matter?	07	Frederic Grare
16.		2015 (2016; online) / 38/ 4	Five Dangerous Myths about Pakistan	0	C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly
17.		2015/ 38/ 1	Modi's Strategic Choice: How to Respond to Terrorism from Pakistan	11	George Perkovich and Toby Dalton
18.		2016/ 39/ 4	Confronting Pakistan's Support for Terrorism: Don't Designate, Calibrate	01	Stephen Tankel

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

Rank + serial no.	Journal		Article		Author	
	Name		Year/volume/issue	Title	Citations	Name
53.	<i>Studies in Comparative International Development</i> /US		2014/ 49/ 4	Shades of Sovereignty: Explaining Political Order and Disorder in Pakistan's Northwest	17	Adnan Naseemullah
54.	<i>American Journal of International Law</i> /US					
1.			? 2009 (2017; online)/ 103/ 1	Reported U.S. Directive Authorizing Clandestine Attacks on Al Qaeda in Numerous Countries; U.S. Strikes in Syria and Pakistan Draw Protests	?	https://doi.org/10.2307/20456742
2.			? 2011 (2017; online)/ 105/ 3	U. S. Special Operations Personnel Raid Compound in Pakistan, Kill Osama bin Laden	?	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0002930000761756
3.			? 2016 (2017; online)/ 110/ 4	U.S. Drone Strike Kills Taliban Leader in Pakistan	?	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0002930000763299
55.	<i>International Studies Perspectives</i> /UK		2012/ 13/ 4	Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan	29	Avery Plaw and Matthew S. Fricker
56.	<i>Latin American Politics and Society</i> /US					
57.	<i>Creativity Studies</i> /UK					
58.	<i>International Political Science Review</i> /US		2016/ 38/ 3	Crossed My Mind, but Ruled it Out: Political Ambition and Gender in the Pakistani Lawyers' Movement 2007–2009	01	Meg Rincker, Ghazia Aslam and Mujtaba Isani
59.	<i>Citizenship Studies</i> /UK					

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i> <i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i> <i>Name</i>
1.		2012/ 16/ 2 Why Education Matters: School 'Choice' and Differing Views on Citizenship in Pakistan	06 Marie Lall
2.		2012 (2013; online)/ 16/ 8 State Management of Religion in Pakistan and Dilemmas of Citizenship	15 Humeira Iqtidar
60.	<i>Cooperation and Conflict/US</i>	2011/ 46/ 1 Escalation of Interstate Crises of Conflictual Dyads Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan	18 Akisato Suzuki and Neophytos Loizides
61.	<i>Common Market Law Review/ Netherlands</i>		
62.	<i>Geopolitics/UK</i>	2014/ 19/ 4 Climatic Disasters and Radical Politics in Southern Pakistan: The Non-linear Connection	12 Ayesha Siddiqi
63.	<i>Review of African Political Economy/UK</i>		
64.	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism/UK</i>		
1.		2007/ 30/ 4 Reforming Militant Madaris in Pakistan	18 Moniza Khokhar
2.		2008/ 31/ 8 Rethinking "Wana": A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conflict in the Tribal Region of Pakistan	11 Rabia Aslam
3.		2008/ 31/ 9 Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond	54 Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i> <i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations Name</i>
4.		2008 / 31 / 11	Consenting to a Child's Decision to Join a Jihad: Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan	56 Victor Asal, C. Christine Fair and Stephen Shellman
5.		2008 / 31 / 11	What's Special about U.S. Muslims? The War on Terrorism as Seen by Muslims in the United States, Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia	22 Clark Meccauley and Sarah Scheckter
6.		2009 / 32 / 2	Making Money in the Mayhem: Funding Taliban Insurrection in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan	40 Arabinda Acharya, Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari and Sadia Sulaiman
7.		2010 / 33 / 4	War Crimes in the Armed Conflict in Pakistan	03 Niaz A. Shah
8.		2010 / 33 / 9	The Sources of Pakistani Attitudes toward Religiously Motivated Terrorism	24 Karl Kaltenthaler, William J. Miller, Stephen Ceccoli and Ron Gellens
9.		2010 / 33 / 10	The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign	119 Brian Glyn Williams
10.		2011 / 34 / 3	Al Qaeda's Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of Foreign Fighters Killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006	18 Anne Stenersen

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
	<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i> <i>Year/volume/issue</i> <i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
	11.	2011/ 34/ 8 Improved Explosive Devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 2002–2009	23	Alec D. Barker
	12.	2013/ 36/ 3 The Effects of Cleric Statements on Suicide Bombings in Pakistan, 2000–2010	03	Bridget Rose Nolan
	13.	2014/ 37/ 6 Sectarian Violence and Social Group Identity in Pakistan	12	Isaac Kfir
	14.	2015/ 38/ 11 The Perils of Weak Organization: Explaining Loyalty and Defection of Militant Organizations Toward Pakistan Ethnicity, Islam, and Pakistani Public Opinion toward the Pakistani Taliban	06	Milos Popovic
	15.	2015/ 38/ 11 Can Knowledge of Islam Explain Lack of Support for Terrorism? Evidence from Pakistan	11	Karl Kaltenthaler and William Miller
	16.	2016 (2017; print)/ 40/ 4 ‘Shot Pakistani Girl’: The Limitations of Girls Education Discourses In UK Newspaper Coverage of Malala Yousafzai	09	C. Christine Fair, Jacob S. Goldstein and Ali Hamza
65.	<i>British Journal of Politics and International Relations</i> /US	2016/ 18/ 3	04	Rosie Walters
66.	<i>Journal of Strategic Studies</i> /UK			
	1.	2008/ 31/ 2 Pakistan’s Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?	22	C. Christine Fair
	2.	2011/ 34/ 1 The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps	22	C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz
	3.	2013/ 36/ 6 Deadly or Impotent? Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan	08	Sébastien Miraglia

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

Rank + serial no.	Journal	Article		Author	
		Name	Title	Citations	Name
4.			2015/ 38/ 6	08	C. Christine Fair, Karl Kaltenhaler and William Miller
5.			2015 (2014; online)/ 38/ 1–2	11	Evan Braden Montgomery and Eric S. Edelman
6.			2016 (2018; print)/ 41/ 4	04	Stephen Taniel
67.		<i>The Journal of Legislative Studies</i> /UK	Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on US Drone Attacks		
68.		<i>German Politics</i> /UK			
69.		<i>Global Governance</i> /US			
70.		<i>Journal of Eastern African Studies</i> /UK			
71.		<i>Research in Labor Economics</i> /UK			
72.		<i>International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics</i> /Netherlands			
73.		<i>Nationalities Papers</i> /UK	2010/ 38/ 6	02	Farhan Siddiqi
74.		<i>Politics</i> /UK			
75.		<i>New Left Review</i> /UK	2012/ 76	10	Jan Bremar
76.		<i>Millennium: Journal of International Studies</i> /US	2014/ 42/ 2	0	Isaac Kfir
77.		<i>Survival</i> /UK			

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
1.		2006 (2005; print)/ 47/ 3	India-Pakistan Deterrence Revisited (*)	15	Michael Quinlan
2.		2007/ 49/ 1	Pakistan's Dangerous Game	70	Seth G. Jones
3.		2009/ 51/ 1	What is Happening in Pakistan?	13	Hilary Symnott
4.		2009 (2011; online)/ 51/ 3	The Unravelling of Pakistan	34	John R. Schmidt
5.		2009 (2011; online)/ 51/ 6	Pakistan's War Within	64	C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones
6.		2011/ 53/ 4	Military Exceptionalism in Pakistan	06	Anatol Lieven
7.		2011/ 53/ 4	Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State	41	C. Christine Fair
8.		2011/ 53/ 4	The Terrorist Threat from Pakistan	12	Seth G. Jones
9.		2011/ 53/ 4	Conspiracy Fever: the US, Pakistan and its Media	19	Huma Yusuf
10.		2012/ 54/ 2	The Enigma of Pakistan (*)	03	Nigel Inkster
11.		2013/ 55/ 1	Pakistan's Populist Foreign Policy	07	William B. Milam and Matthew J. Nelson
12.		2015/ 57/ 1	Can Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers be 'Normalised'?	02	Arundhati Ghose and Manpreet Sethi
13.		2016/ 58/ 6	Raiders in Kashmir: India's Pakistan Problem (*)	0	Shashank Joshi
78.	<i>International Peacekeeping/ UK</i>				
79.	<i>Journal of International Relations and Development/ UK</i>				
80.	<i>Information Society/ UK</i>	2015/ 31/ 4	Digital Divide and Caste in Rural Pakistan	01	Ahsan Abdullah

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i> <i>Name</i>
81.	<i>International Politics/UK</i>			
82.	<i>Foreign Affairs/US</i>			
1.		2007/ 86/ 4	A False Choice in Pakistan	49 Daniel Markey
2.		2008/ 87/ 1	America's Priorities in the War on Terror: Islamists, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan	17 Michael D. Huckabee
3.		2008/ 87/ 6	From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan	146 Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid
4.		2011/ 90/ 4	Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan	85 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann
5.		2011/ 90/ 3	Getting the Military Out of Pakistani Politics: How Aiding the Army Undermines Democracy	19 Aqil Shah
6.		2012/ 91/ 1	Talking Tough to Pakistan: How to End Islamabad's Defiance	27 Stephen D. Krasner
7.		2012/ 91/ 3	Tough Talk Is Cheap: Washington's Real Options in Islamabad	01 Stephen D. Krasner and Alexander Evans
8.		2013/ 92/ 2	Breaking Up Is Not Hard to Do: Why the U.S.-Pakistani Alliance Isn't Worth the Trouble	08 Husain Haqqani
83.	<i>Journal of Intervention and State building/UK</i>	2011 (2012; online)/ 5/ 4	The Sovereignty Dodge and the Responsibility to Control: Should the US Do What Pakistan Won't Do?	04 Theresa Reinold
84.	<i>Critical Studies on Terrorism/UK</i>			
1.		2008/ 1/ 1	Veil and Four Walls: A State of Terror in Pakistan	13 Lisa Sharlach

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
2.		2010/ 3/ 1	War on Terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan: Discursive and Political Contestations	09	Pervaiz Nazir
3.		2011/ 4/ 3	A Critical Evaluation of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Legality, Legitimacy and Prudence	39	M.W. Aslam
4.		2013/ 6/ 2	Class Conflict, State Terrorism and the Pakistani Military: The Okara Military Farms Dispute	03	Eamon Murphy
5.		2016/ 9/ 3	The Discourse and Study of Terrorism in Decolonised States: The Case of Pakistan	02	Muhammad Feyyaz
6.		2016 (2017; print)/ 10/ 1	Reporting Beyond the Pale: UK News Discourse on Drones in Pakistan	02	Mark Pope
85.	<i>European Journal of International Law/UK</i>				
86.	<i>World Economy/UK</i>				
87.	<i>Territory, Politics, Governance/US</i>				
88.	<i>Journal of Peace Education/UK</i>				
89.	<i>Social Policy and Society/UK</i>	2013 (2014; print)/ 13/ 2	The Drivers and Impacts of Family Obligations and Overseas Remittances Practices: A Case Study of Pakistani-Origin Individuals in the UK	03	Nadia Bashir
90.	<i>Regional and Federal Studies/UK</i>				
91.	<i>Review of Political Economy/UK</i>				
92.	<i>Acta Politica/UK</i>				
93.	<i>Nations and Nationalism/UK</i>				
94.	<i>China Perspectives/China</i>				
95.	<i>World Trade Review/UK</i>				

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>			<i>Author</i>
<i>Rank + serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations Name</i>
96.	<i>Journal of East Asian Studies</i> /US			
97.	<i>Civil Wars</i> /US			
98.	<i>Middle East Policy</i> /UK			
1.		2008 / 15 / 1	Pakistan: Terror War Bolsters Islamism, Nationhood	03 Mustafa Malik
2.		2009 / 16 / 2	Pakistan: Can U.S. Policy Save the Day?	05 Mustafa Malik
3.		2009 / 16 / 1	Talking with a Region: Lessons from Iran, Turkey and Pakistan	08 Mahjoob Zweiri and Simon Staffell
99.	<i>Media, War and Conflict</i> /US	2014 / 7 / 2	Mediated Public Diplomacy: US and Taliban Relations with Pakistani Media	08 Rauf Arif, Guy J. Golan and Brian Moritz
100.	<i>Policy and Society</i> /UK	2007 (2017; online) / 26 / 2	Technocratic Solutions versus Political Realities: Implementing Governance Reforms in the Balochistan Province of Pakistan	01 Raza Ahmad and (2) Syed A.A. Akif

APPENDIX B

See Table [B.1](#).

Table B.1 Journal articles published on Pakistan in top Area Studies journals (2006–2016)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
1.	<i>Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East/US</i>	2006/ 26/ 2	A Critical Stage: The Role of Secular Alternative Theatre in Pakistan	0	Aparna Dharwadkar
		2008/ 28/ 3	The (Non)Governance of Divided Territories: A Comparative Study of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Palestine	0	Hayat Alvi-Aziz
		2009/ 29/ 2	Explaining Social Mobilization in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of Baluchistan and Azad Kashmir	6	Shanna Dietz Surendra
		2010/ 30/ 3	Islam as Ideology of Tradition and Change: The “New Jihad” in Swat, Northern Pakistan	9	Aasim Sajjad Akhtar
		2012/ 32/ 1	Poetry, Power, Protest: Reimagining Muslim Nationhood in Northern Pakistan	8	Nosheen Ali
		2012/ 32/ 1	A Door Ajar: National Borders and the Character of Islam in Pakistan	3	Ian Bedford
		2013/ 33/ 3	Nation, Space, and Exception: Pakistan’s Basic Democracies Experiment	1	Tahir H. Naqvi
		2008/ 4/ 3	The Shape of Frontier Rule: Governance and Transition, from the Raj to the Modern Pakistani Frontier	18	Joshua T. White
		2009 (online); 2005 (print)/ 1/ 3	The NPT, the CTBT and Pakistan: Explaining the Non-adherence Posture of a De Facto Nuclear State	5	Bhumitra Chakma

(continued)

Table B.1 (continued)

Journal	Article		Author	
Serial no.	Name	Year/volume/issue	Title	Citations Name
3.	International Relations of the Asia-Pacific/UK	2011/ 7/ 3	Drones over Pakistan: Secrecy, Ethics, and Counterinsurgency	32 Christian Enemark
		2014/ 10/ 3	Coming Together over Trade? A Study of the Resumed Dialogue between India and Pakistan	1 Josefine Pernes and Ulrika Möller
		2016/ 16/ 3	Ideology, territorial saliency, and geographic contiguity: the beginning of India–Pakistan rivalry	1 Surinder Mohan
4.	Asian Politics and Policy/US	2010/ 2/ 2	Negotiations and the Anti-Taliban Counterinsurgency in Pakistan	4 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
		2013/ 5/ 1	Nationalist Hegemony Over Islamist Dreams in Iran and Pakistan: Who Were Shariati and Maududi?	2 Mehmet Talha Paşaoğlu
5.	Asian Affairs/UK	2008/ 39/ 1	Pakistan's Surprising Stability	3 Anatol Lieven
		2009/ 40/ 2	Can Democracy Work In Pakistan?	2 Victoria Schofield
		2009/ 40/ 2	The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border	57 Bijan Omrani
		2010/ 41/ 3	The Situation In Pakistan	10 Ahmed Rashid
		2010/ 41/ 1	Why has Democracy been Less Successful In Pakistan than in India?	9 Kunal Mukherjee
		2011/ 42/ 3	Don't Mention the (Afghan) War: Britain's Curious Relationship with Pakistan	0 Anatol Lieven

(continued)

Table B.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i> <i>Name</i>
6.	<i>Asia Policy/US</i>	2012/ 43/ 3	Identities and the State In Pakistan: A Study of Mentality	0 Ilhan Niaz
		2013/ 44/ 2	Rethinking Democracy in Pakistan	3 Ahmed Waqas Waheed and Javeria Younas Abbasi
		2014/ 45/ 3	Drone Attacks in Afghanistan and the Af-Pak Region: Is there any other option?	1 Amit Ranjan
		2016/ 47/ 3	Jinnah on Governance: The Unheeded Advice of Pakistan's Quaid-I-Azam	1 Ilhan Niaz
		2007/ 4	Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection	48 C. Christine Fair
7.	<i>Contemporary South Asia/UK</i>	2011/ 11 2014/ 17	The Militant Challenge in Pakistan The New Great Game: Pakistan's Approach to Afghanistan after 2014	74 5 C. Christine Fair Larry P. Goodson
		2015/ 19	The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dyad and Regional Nuclear Dynamics	2 P.K. Singh
		2006/ 15/ 3	Celebrating 20 Years of the Lake District Pakistan Workshop	2 Marta Bolognani and Stephen Lyon
		2006/ 15/ 3	The Ideation and Instantiation of Arranging Marriage Within An Urban Community in Pakistan, 1982–2000	13 Michael D. Fischer
		2006/ 15/ 4	Reading Between the Lines: The Mullah–Military Alliance In Pakistan	14 Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Asha Amirali and Muhammad Ali Raza
		2008/ 16/ 1	The Educated Militants of Pakistan: Implications for Pakistan's Domestic Security	15 C. Christine Fair

(continued)

Table B.1 (continued)

Journal	Article		Author		
Serial no.	Name	Year/volume/issue	Title	Citations	Name
		2008/ 16/ 1	The Role of the Military in the Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan	20	Shaun Gregory and James Revill
		2008/ 16/ 1	Pakistan's Afghan policies and their Consequences	29	Marvin G. Weinbaum and Jonathan B. Harder
		2008/ 16/ 2	Karez Versus Tubewell Irrigation: The Comparative Social Acceptability and Practicality of Sustainable Groundwater Development In Balochistan, Pakistan	5	Daanish Mustafa and Muhammad Usman
		2008/ 16/ 1	Kashmiri Separatism and Pakistan in the Current Global Environment	11	Qazi Victoria Schofield
		2008/ 16/ 1	The Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan: An Introduction to the Special Issue	2	Shaun Gregory and C. Christine Fair
		2008/ 16/ 1	Pakistan's Economic and Security Dilemma: Expanded Defence Expenditures and the Relative Governance Syndrome	8	Robert Looney and Robert McNab
		2008/ 16/ 1	Leverage and Largesse: Pakistan's Post-9/11 Partnership with America	11	Robert M. Hathaway
		2010/ 18/ 4	Virtual Protest with Tangible Effects? Some Observations on the Media Strategies of the 2007 Pakistani Anti-Emergency Movement	11	Marta Bolognani
		2011/ 19/ 2	Greed, Creed, and Governance In Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan	18	Rabia Aslam
		2012/ 20/ 1	Judging Democracy in Pakistan: Conflict between the Executive and Judiciary	9	Mohammad Waseem
		2010/ 18/ 4	Texting Islam: Text Messages and Religiosity Among Young Pakistanis	11	Paul Rollier

(continued)

Table B.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
		2012/ 20/ 2	Under the Shadow of Islam: The Plight of the Christian Minority in Pakistan	9	Shaun Gregory
		2012/ 20/ 2	The US–Pakistan Relations after a Decade of the War on Terror	14	C. Christine Fair
		2012/ 20/ 2	The Reorientation of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Toward Its Region	12	Lisa Curtis
		2012/ 20/ 2	Economic Impacts of the Floods in Pakistan	19	Robert Looney
		2012/ 20/ 2	Continuity and Change in Pakistrani Politics	3	Alexander Evans
		2012/ 20/ 2	A State in Flux: Pakistan in the Context of National and Regional Change	1	C. Christine Fair and Shaun Gregory
		2012/ 20/ 2	Beyond Moderation: Dynamics of Political Islam in Pakistan	13	Joshua T. White
		2013/ 21/ 3	Forbidden Exchanges and Gender: Implications for Blood Donation During A Maternal Health Emergency In Punjab, Pakistan	0	Zubia Mumtaz and Adrienne Levy
		2013/ 21/ 3	Given Over To Demand: Excorporation As Commitment	5	Lawrence Cohen
		2014/ 22/ 4	Social Support at a Sufi Lodge in Punjab, Pakistan	1	Uzma Rehman and Peter Lund-Thomsen
		2014/ 22/ 4	Reading Malir Cantonment in Karachi, Pakistan: Some Notes on Residential Barracks and Spatial Dynamics	1	Muhammad Ali Nasir
		2014/ 22/ 3	Faction-building in Pakistan: Sir Francis Mudie and Punjab Politics, 1947–1949	0	Ilyas Chattha
		2015/ 23/ 1	Using Love to Fathom Religious Difference—Contemporary Formats of Sufi Poetry In Pakistan	1	Najia Mukhtar
		2015/ 23/ 3	The Boundary Within: Equality, Hierarchy, and Exclusion In Azad Jammu and Kashmir	0	Miguel Loureiro

(continued)

Table B.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>		
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i> <i>Name</i>	
8.	<i>Asian Affairs/US</i>	2015/ 23/ 3	Local Politics of Reconstruction Along and Across Azad Kashmir's Border with Pakistan	3	Pascale Schild
		2015/ 23/ 4	The Dialectical Constitution of Mobility and Immobility: Recovering from the Atrabad Landslide Disaster, Gojal, Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan	2	Nancy Cook and David Butz
		2015/ 23/ 3	Boundaries and Space in Gilgit-Baltistan	4	Hermann Kreutzmann
		2007/ 34/ 3	In India's Lengthening Shadow: The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Alliance and the War in Afghanistan	18	Robert G. Wirsing
		2009/ 36/ 2	Unraveling the Afghanistan-Pakistan Riddle	15	Lawrence Ziring
		2010/ 37/ 4	The U.S. Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan	19	Ishtiaq Ahmad
		2010/ 37/ 4	Why Borrow Trouble for Yourself and Lend It to Neighbors? Understanding the Historical Roots of Pakistan's Afghan Policy	9	Feisal Khan
		2011/ 38/ 4	The China-Pakistan-United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the "War on Terrorism"	13	Paul J. Smith
		2012/ 39/ 3	Security Dynamics in Pakistani Balochistan: Religious Activism and Ethnic Conflict in the War on Terror	8	Farhan Hanif Siddiqi
		2014/ 41/ 4	Governing Pakistan	1	Paula R. Newberg
		2014/ 41/ 1	The United States Use of Drones in Pakistan: A Politico-Strategic Analysis	3	Mahmood Ahmad
		2015/ 42/ 1	Breaking the Equilibrium? New Leaders and Old Structures in the India-Pakistan Rivalry	5	Ishtiaq Ahmad and Hannes Ebert
		2016/ 43/ 3	Channeling Islam: Religious Narratives on Pakistani Television and Their Influence on Pakistani Youth	2	Yelena Biberman, Sahar Gul and Feryaz Ocakli

(continued)

Table B.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
9.	<i>Asian Journal of Political Science/US</i>	2007/ 15/ 2	Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan	41	Feisal Khan
		2008/ 16/ 3	Resolving the Kashmir Conflict: Pakistan, India, Kashmiris and Religious Militants	14	Rodrigo Tavares
		2010/ 18/ 1	Old Regions, New States: Why is Governance Weak in the Indus-Ganges Plain?	1	Peter Mayer
		2013/ 21/ 3	Exploring Strategies and Implications of an Opportunistic Alliance: A Case Study of Pakistan and China	5	Sangit Sarita Dwivedi
		2014/ 22/ 2	Democrats and Minority Marginalization: The Case of Pakistan	3	Ajay Raina
10.	<i>Asia Pacific Review/US</i>	2016/ 24/ 2	Islamic political parties and the nature of politics in Pakistan	1	Mudasir Nazar
11.	<i>Millennial Asia/US</i>	2013/ 4/ 1	Determinants and Implications of Major Conflicts in Pakistan	4	Usman Mustafa
		2016/ 7/ 2	India-Pakistan Relations: Efficacy of Culture	0	Zainab Akhter
12.	<i>Modern Asian Studies</i>	2008/ 43/ 6	Polygamy, Purdah and Political Representation: Engendering citizenship in 1950s Pakistan	12	Sarah Ansari
		2009/ 43/ 3	'Dealing with Difference: Religious Education and the Challenge of Democracy in Pakistan'	14	Matthew J. Nelson
		2008/ 42/ 2-3	Women, Politics and Islamism in Northern Pakistan	21	Magnus Marsden

(continued)

Table B.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i> <i>Name</i>
		2010/ 44/ 6	God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947–1969	10 Ali Usman Qasmi
		2010/ 45/ 1	From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947–1970	10 Taylor C. Sherman, William Gould and Sarah Ansari
		2011/ 45/ 3	Secularism and the State in Pakistan: Introduction	3 Humeira Iqtidar and David Gilmartin
		2011/ 45/ 3	Embracing the Ummah: Student Politics beyond State Power in Pakistan	6 Matthew J. Nelson
		2011/ 41/ 5	Sovereignty, Governmentality and Development in Ayub's Pakistan: the Case of Korangi Township	24 Markus Daechsel
		2012/ 46/ 5	Competitions for Resources: Partition's Evacuee Property and the Sustenance of Corruption in Pakistan	12 Ilyas Chattha
		2013/ 48/ 1	Purba Pakistan Zindabad: Bengali Visions of Pakistan, 1940–1947	9 Neellesh Bose
		2015/ 49/ 6	The Pre-History of Religious Exclusionism in Contemporary Pakistan: Khatam-e-Nubuwwat 1889–1953	3 Tahir Kamran
		2016/ 50/ 5	The Making of the India–Pakistan Dynamic: Nehru, Liaquat, and the No War Pact correspondence of 1950	0 Pallavi Raghavan
		2007/ 41/ 3	Guns, Slums, and “Yellow Devils”: A Genealogy of Urban Conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan	57 Laurent Gayer
13.	<i>South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies</i>	2007/ 30/ 1	The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence	32 Frédéric Grare

(continued)

Table B.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
14.	<i>South Asia Research/New Delhi (SAGE)</i>	2007/ 30/ 1	Identity Politics and Minorities in Pakistan	17	Rasul Bakhsh Rais
		2008/ 31/ 3	Islamic Banking by Judiciary: The 'Backdoor' for Islamism in Pakistan?	7	Feisal Khan
		2008/ 31/ 2	The Representation of Cultural Diversity in Urdu-language Newspapers in Pakistan: A Study of Jang and Nawaiaqat	18	Jawad Syed
		2008/ 31/ 3	A Line in the Sand: The India–Pakistan Border in the Films of J.P. Dutta	15	Adrian M. Athique
		2011/ 34/ 2	Provincial Administration in Pakistan and the Crisis of Order and Development	3	Ilhan Niaz
		2014/ 37/ 4	Minorities and Representation in a Plural Society: The Case of the Christians of Pakistan	7	Ajay K. Raina
		2014/ 37/ 2	Ayub Khan and Modern Islam: Transforming Citizens and the Nation in Pakistan	6	Yasmin Saikia
		2016/ 39/ 4	Pakistan's 1951 Census: State-Building in Post-Partition Sindh	0	Sarah Ansari
		2016/ 39/ 2	Paper Rights: The Emergence of Documentary Identities in Post-Colonial India, 1950–1967	2	Haimanti Roy
		2016/ 39/ 2	Sexualised Objects and the Embodiment of Honour: Rape in Pakistani Films	1	Sadaf Ahmad
		2006/ 26/ 3	Divine Madness and Cultural Otherness: Diwānas and Faqirs in Northern Pakistan	4	Jürgen Wäsin Frembgen
		2008/ 28/ 3	Socio–Cultural Security, Emotions and Exchange Marriages In An Agrarian Community	19	Muhammad Zaman

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Table B.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>		
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
15.	<i>South Asian Survey/</i> New Delhi (SAGE)	2015/ 35/ 2	Domestic Space and Socio-spatial Relationships in Rural Pakistan	6	Muhammad Aurang Zeb Mughal
		2015/ 33/ 3	Religification of Metrostanis in the Post-9/11 Era	1	Munazza Yaqoob and Amal Sayyid
		2016/ 36/ 2	Pakistan's Frontline Status, War on Terror and the Jama'at-E-Islami Response	7	Mudasir Nazar
		2016/ 36/ 1	Conflicts in South Asia Will Go on and on: A Review Article	0	Amit Ranjan
		2006/ 13/ 2	The Contribution of Track II towards India-Pakistan Relations	5	Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
		2007/ 14/ 2	Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir	9	Syed Rifaat Hussain
		2007/ 14/ 1	The Pakistani-Israeli Courtship: The Underlying Logics	0	P.R. Kumaraswamy
		2007/ 14/ 1	Self-Censorship in the Pakistani Print Media	16	Ramanujan D. Nadadur
		2009/ 16/ 2	Security Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Challenges, Remedies and Future Prospects	6	Salma Malik
		2009/ 16/ 1	Contact Sport: Cricket in India-Pakistan Relations Since 1999	6	Emily Crick
		2012/ 17/ 2	Military and the Foreign Policy of Pakistan	6	Naseem Ahmed
		2010/ 17/ 2	Nuclear Weapon Programmes of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Assessment	2	Suresh Dhandra
		2013/ 18/ 1	Baluchistan Nationalist Movement and Unrest in Pakistan	3	Nasreen Akhtar
		2013/ 18/ 1	Pakistan Factor in India's Domestic Politics	1	Sanjeev Kumar H.M.

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Table B.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Author</i>	
<i>Serial no.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
16.	<i>South Asian Studies</i>	2014/ 18/ 2	India, Pakistan and Dialogue under the Shadow of Terror	1	Anindya Batabyal
		2006/ 22/ 1	An Iconographic Note on a Matrika Relief Sculpture in the National Museum of Pakistan, Karachi	1	Ibrahim Shah
		2007/ 23/ 1	The dynamics of late prehistoric ceramic production and distribution in the Bannu and Gomal Regions, NWFP, Pakistan	2	C.A. Petrie, J.C. Morris, F. Khan, J.R. Knox and K.D. Thomas
		2009/ 25/ 1	Representation within the Landscape of Northern Pakistan: The Meanings of Gandhara	4	Ruth Young
		2011/ 27/ 1	Coat Scales and Correlated Finds from Bir-kot-ghwandai Stratigraphic Context (Swat, Pakistan)	3	Luca M. Olivieri
		2012/ 28/ 2	Before There Were Cities: Excavations at Gandi Umar Khan and New Evidence for Pre-Urban Cultural Transitions on the Gomal Plain, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan	1	Zakirullah Jan

APPENDIX C

See Table C.1.

Table C.1 Journal articles published on Pakistan in *Washington Quarterly* and *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (2006–2016) with author profile

Journal	Article		Authors		
Rank	Name	Year/volume/ issue	Title	Citations	Name Profile
52.	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> / UK				
1.		2008 (2010; online)/ 31/ 2	Pakistan's Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance	43	Ashley J. Tellis Ashley J. Tellis holds the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security and US foreign and defense policy with a special focus on Asia and the Indian subcontinent
2.		2009/ 32/ 2	Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Pakistan	36	C. Christine Fair C. Christine Fair is a Provost's Distinguished Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program within Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She previously served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and a senior research associate at USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. She has served as a Senior Fellow at West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, a Senior Resident Fellow at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (New Delhi)

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Table C.1 (continued)

Journal		Article		Authors		Profile
Rank	Name	Year/volume/ issue	Title	Citations	Name	
3.		2007 (2010; online)/ 30/ 2	When \$10 Billion is not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan	80	Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet	<p>Craig Cohen is Executive Vice President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a bipartisan think tank in Washington, DC. Previously, Mr. Cohen served as Vice President for research and programs, Deputy Chief of Staff, and fellow in the International Security Program. He has served as editor of two anthologies of CSIS work, <i>Global Forecast 2012</i> and <i>Global Forecast 2011</i>, as well as director of a project sponsored by the National Intelligence Council that produced the report <i>Capacity and Resolve</i> on foreign assessments of U.S. power.</p> <p>Derek Chollet is Executive Vice President and senior advisor for security and defense policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). He is also an advisor to Beacon Global Strategies, an adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, and a visiting fellow at the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House. From 2012–2015, Chollet was the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs, where he managed US defense policy toward Europe (including NATO), the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. In that role, he was a senior advisor to two Secretaries of Defense, Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel. Prior to joining the Pentagon, Chollet served at the White House as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for strategic planning on the National Security Council Staff. From 2009 to 2011, he was the Principal Deputy Director of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Policy Planning Staff. From November 2008 to January 2009, he was a member of the Obama-Biden presidential transition team</p>

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Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
4.		2008 (2010; online)/ 31/ 4	The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan	35	Ashley J. Tellis	See article 1
5.		2010/ 33/ 3	China's Caution on Afghanistan–Pakistan	44	Andrew Small	Andrew Small is a senior transatlantic fellow with the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He was based in GMF's Brussels office for five years, where he established the Asia program and the Stockholm China Forum, GMF's biannual China policy conference. He previously worked as the Director of the Foreign Policy Centre's Beijing office; as a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and was an ESU scholar in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy. He has testified before the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission and both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Development Committee of the European Parliament
6.		2011 (2010; online)/ 34/ 1	Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies	49	Ayesha Siddiq	Ayesha Siddiq—She is the only woman and civilian to work with Pakistan Navy as Director of Naval Research. She has worked as an Advisor to the Chairman of National Accountability Bureau (NAB)—Pakistan's Anti-Corruption Watchdog. She is the first Pakistan scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
7.		2011 (2010; online)/ 34/ 1	Caught in the Muddle: America's Pakistan Strategy	14	Paul Staniland	Paul Staniland is Associate Professor of Political Science and Faculty Chair of the Committee on International Relations (CIR). He co-directs the Program on International Security Policy and Program on Political Violence

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Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
8.		2011 / 34 / 4	Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus	08	Andrew Bast	Andrew Bast has been with 60 Minutes and CBS News for seven seasons where he has reported from Afghanistan, the Demilitarized Zone on the border with North Korea, and across much of the United States. His work has won several accolades including a duPont-Columbia award for his work covering the massacre in Newtown, Connecticut, and for his year-long investigation into the Alex Rodriguez doping scandal he won an Emmy
9.		2012 (2011; online) / 35 / 1	The Pakistan Thorn in China-India-U.S. Relations	34	Harsh V. Pant	Harsh V. Pant is professor of international relations in the Defense Studies Department and the India Institute at King's College London. He is Head of Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. He is also an adjunct fellow with the Wadhvani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. His current research is focused on Asian security issues
10.		2012 / 35 / 2	Reversing Pakistan's Descent: Empowering its Middle Class	02	Xenia Dormandy	Xenia Dormandy is the Program Director of the US Project and the Acting Dean of the Academy for Leadership in International Affairs at Chatham House. Prior to this she was the Executive Director of the Peace Nexus Foundation, based just outside Geneva, which she launched in 2009. From 2005 to 2009, Xenia was at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center where she was the Director of the Project on India and the Subcontinent and the Executive Director for Research at the Belfer Center, as well as being a member of the Center's board
						From early 2004 to August 2005, Xenia served as Director for South Asia at the USG's National Security Council (NSC). Prior to her NSC post, Xenia served as a Foreign Affairs Specialist in the Bureau of South Asia at the Department of State

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Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
11.		2012/ 35/ 2	A Strategy of “Congagement” toward Pakistan	11	Zalmay Khalilzad	Zalmay Mamozy Khalilzad is a US diplomat and the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation at the Department of State. Previously, he served as a Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the President of Gryphon Partners and Khalilzad Associates, an international business consulting firm, based in Washington, DC. He has been involved with US policy-makers in the State Department and the Pentagon since the mid-1980s, and he was the highest-ranking Muslim in the George W. Bush administration. He was the US Ambassador to the United Nations under President George W. Bush and, briefly, President Barack Obama. Khalilzad’s previous assignments in the Bush administration included US Ambassador to Afghanistan and US Ambassador to Iraq. In 2017, he was considered for US Secretary of State in the Trump administration
12.		2012/ 35/ 3	Recalibrating U.S.– Pakistan Relations	07	Haider Ali Hussein Mullick	Haider Ali Hussein Mullick teaches graduate seminars on US foreign policy and international security at the Naval War College and the Naval Post Graduate School. He is a Provost Fellow at Tufts University, and Senior Adviser at Red Teaming Associates. Mr. Mullick previously served as a Senior Adviser on South Asia and the Middle East at the Department of Defense, and as a researcher at Brookings, the Hudson Institute and the Wilson Center. He is the Founding Editor in Chief of the Fletcher Security Review

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Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
13.		2012/ 35/ 4	How to Exercise U.S. Leverage Over Pakistan	12	Paul D. Miller	Paul D. Miller is a Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He served as Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the United States National Security Council staff from 2007 through 2009
14.		2013/ 36/ 3	Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà Vu?	30	Shashank Joshi	Shashank Joshi is a Senior Research Fellow at RUSI. He has been a Research Associate of the Changing Character of War Program at Oxford University and is a graduate of the Columbia-Cornell Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS). He has regularly lectured at the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom and given evidence to the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees
15.		2014/ 37/ 4	India–Pakistan Relations: Does Modi Matter?	07	Frederic Grare	Frederic Grare is a nonresident Senior Fellow in Carnegie's South Asia Program. Prior to joining Carnegie, Grare served as head of the Asia bureau at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defense. He also served at the French embassy in Pakistan and, from 1999 to 2003, as director of the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities in New Delhi

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Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ online) / issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
16.		2015 (2016; online) / 38 / 4	Five Dangerous Myths about Pakistan	0	C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly	C. Christine Fair—see above. Sumit Ganguly is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington. He has been a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, a Guest Scholar at the Center for Cooperative Monitoring in Albuquerque and a Visiting Scholar at the German Institute for International and Area Studies in Hamburg. He has also held the Asia Chair at Sciences Po in Paris, and the Ngee Ann Chair in International Politics at the Rajaratnam School for International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi and the Buffet Professor at Northwestern University for 2013–2014. In 2017–2018, he was a Visiting Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. Professor Ganguly is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is an Associate Editor of International Security and serves on the editorial boards of the Asian Security, Current History, the Journal of Democracy, Foreign Policy Analysis, the India Review, the Nonproliferation Review, Pacific Affairs and Security Studies. He is also an Associate Editor of Security Studies

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Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
17.		2015/ 38/ 1	Modi's Strategic Choice: How to Respond to Terrorism from Pakistan	11	George Perkovich and Toby Dalton	George Perkovich is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and Vice President for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program and Nuclear Policy Program. He has advised many agencies of the US government, and testified before both houses of Congress. He has been a member of the National Academy of Science's Committee on Arms Control and International Security, the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Nuclear Policy, and was a principal adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, a joint initiative of the governments of Japan and Australia. He served as a speechwriter and foreign policy adviser to Senator Joe Biden (D-Del.) from 1989 to 1990
18.		2016/ 39/ 4	Confronting Pakistan's Support for Terrorism: Don't Designate, Calibrate	01	Stephen Tinkel	Toby Dalton is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. From 2002 to 2010, Dalton served in a variety of high-level positions at the United States Department of Energy, including acting Director for the Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security and Senior Policy Adviser to the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security. He also established and led the department's office at the US embassy in Pakistan from 2008 to 2009
						Stephen Tinkel is an Associate Professor at American University and an adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He previously served as a Senior Advisor at the Department of Defense. An expert on terrorism, counterterrorism, and security and military affairs in South Asia, Dr. Tinkel frequently advises US policy-makers and members of the Intelligence Community on these issues

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Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ print// 47/ 3 issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
77.	Survival/UK					
1.		2006 (2005; print) // 47/ 3	India-Pakistan Deterrence Revisited	15	Michael Quinlan	Sir Michael Edward Quinlan, GCB (11 August 1930–26 February 2009) was a distinguished former British defense strategist and former Permanent Under-Secretary of State (generally known as the Permanent Secretary) at the British Ministry of Defense
2.		2007 / 49/ 1	Pakistan's Dangerous Game	70	Seth G. Jones	Seth G. Jones holds the Harold Brown Chair, is Director of the Transnational Threats Project, and is a Senior Adviser to the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He teaches at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at the US Naval Postgraduate School. Prior to joining CSIS, Dr. Jones was the Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation. He also served as Representative for the Commander, United States Special Operations Command, to the Assistant Secretary of defense for special operations. Before that, he was a Plans Officer and Adviser to the Commanding General, United States Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan (Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan). In 2014, Dr. Jones served on a congressionally mandated panel that reviewed the FBI's implementation of counterterrorism recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission Report
3.		2009/ 51/ 1	What is Happening in Pakistan?	13	Hilary Synnott	Sir Hilary Nicholas Hugh Synnott KCMG (20 March 1945–8 September 2011) was a British diplomat who was Regional Coordinator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Southern Iraq from 2003 to 2004, before retiring in 2005

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

Journal		Article		Authors		
Rank	Name	Year/volume/ issue	Title	Citations	Name	Profile
4.		2009 (2011; online)/ 51/ 3	The Unravelling of Pakistan	34	John R. Schmidt	John R. Schmidt teaches at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, following a 30-year diplomatic career in which he served in senior positions at the US State Department and the National Security Council, including as Political Counselor at the US Embassy in Islamabad in the three years leading up to the 9/11 attacks
5.		2009 (2011; online)/ 51/ 6	Pakistan's War Within	64	C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones	See above
6.		2011/ 53/ 4	Military Exceptionalism in Pakistan	06	Anatol Lieven	Anatol Lieven, a former Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, previously covered Central Europe for the Financial Times; Pakistan, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, and Russia for the Times (London), and India as a freelance journalist. He was also an editor at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
7.		2011/ 53/ 4	Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State	41	C. Christine Fair	See above
8.		2011/ 53/ 4	The Terrorist Threat from Pakistan	12	Seth G. Jones	See above
9.		2011/ 53/ 4	Conspiracy Fever: the US, Pakistan and its Media	19	Huma Yusuf	Huma Yusuf is a Risk Consultant, working across the fields of political risk analysis and forecasting, business integrity and compliance. She is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Her background is as an award-winning journalist and columnist and media and policy researcher

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>	
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>
10.		2012/ 54/ 2	The Enigma of Pakistan	03	Nigel Inkster
					<i>Profile</i>
					Nigel Inkster has worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) since 2007. He is the former Director of Future Conflict and Cyber Security and currently a Special Adviser at IISS. He has also been engaged in a variety of para-dip-lomatic activities on behalf of the UK government including leading a Sino-UK Track 1.5 Cyber Security Dialogue. Before joining IISS he served for thirty-one years in the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) retiring at the end of 2006 as Assistant Chief and Director of Operations and Intelligence

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
11.		2013/ 55/ 1	Pakistan's Populist Foreign Policy	07	William B. Milam and Matthew J. Nelson	William B. Milam is a Senior Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. Before joining the Wilson Center, he was a career diplomat. He retired from the United States Foreign Service at the end of July 2001, but continues to take on temporary assignments for the State Department; the most recent was as temporary Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Tripoli, Libya from August 2007 to February 2008. His last post before retirement was as Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan where he served from August 1998 to July 2001. Matthew Nelson is a Reader in Politics at SOAS. Before coming to SOAS Dr. Nelson taught at UC Santa Cruz, Bates College, and Yale University. In 2009–2010 Dr. Nelson was the Wolfensohn Family Member at the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) in Princeton; in 2011 he was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) in Washington, DC; in 2014–2015 he was a Fellow at the Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) in Bielefeld (Germany). Dr. Nelson has also served as an elected board member for the American Institute of Pakistan Studies (AIPS), the South Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS), and the Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Dr. Nelson has completed several consultancies for the Brookings Institution, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), the Asia Foundation, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the British Foreign Office (FCO), the British Department for International Development (DFID), and others

(continued)

Table C.1 (continued)

<i>Journal</i>		<i>Article</i>		<i>Authors</i>		<i>Profile</i>
<i>Rank</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Year/volume/ issue</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Citations</i>	<i>Name</i>	
12.		2015/ 57/ 1	Can Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers be 'Normalised'?	02	Arundhati Ghose and Manpreet Sethi	Arundhati Ghose (25 November 1939–25 July 2016) was an Indian diplomat. She was Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva and was head of the Indian delegation that participated in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1996. She also served as Ambassador to South Korea and Egypt Dr. Manpreet Sethi is Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi and heads its Nuclear Security project. From 2008 to 2010 she was an International Relations fellow of the Centre de Sciences Humaines, New Delhi. On the research faculty of Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, from 1997 to 2001, she focused on nuclear energy proliferation, export controls, and disarmament See above
13.		2016/ 58/ 6	Raiders in Kashmir: India's Pakistan Problem	0	Shashank Joshi	

INDEX

A

academia, 21, 22, 27, 42, 44, 46, 62,
99, 121, 145, 152, 154
academic discourse, 5, 110
academic experts, 3, 115, 123
aid, 2, 24, 68, 71, 108, 127, 128, 132,
176
Al-Qaeda, 2, 70, 128
alternative discourse(s), 73, 110, 124,
139, 142, 149, 167, 168, 170,
173, 175
Anglo-American, 19, 40, 48, 167
assumptions, 47, 69, 73, 133, 175

B

benevolence, 69, 108, 127, 176
binary(ies), 26, 68, 71, 105,
109

C

capitalism, 142, 150

circulation, 24, 28, 29, 41, 50, 58–61,
66, 69, 73, 87, 91, 95, 96, 101,
125, 140, 144, 149, 153, 167
civilizing mission, 68, 130
Cold War, 14, 16, 82–84, 96, 100,
107, 131
colonial, 14, 19, 21, 41, 82, 148, 172
colonialism, 19, 41, 106, 147, 172
common sense, 27, 28, 61, 65, 96, 124
conflict, 72, 87, 93, 103, 104, 106,
107, 128, 131
constructivism, 9, 41
control, 1, 19, 24, 46, 70, 72, 73,
143, 171
core–periphery, 40, 46, 141
correlation, 69

D

dangerous, 66, 67, 69, 73, 104, 126,
130, 131
decision-making, 10, 62, 84, 118,
121, 123, 162, 163
decolonization, 21, 118

de-contextualization, 109, 176
 de-historicization, 109, 176
 democracy, 10, 17, 24, 48, 65, 67, 86, 105, 131
 dependence/dependency, 19, 21, 119
 development, 9, 14, 68, 82, 83, 86, 94, 98, 108, 129, 132, 142, 143, 148, 150, 151, 153, 155
 discourse, 2, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 59, 63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 81, 83, 87, 94, 95, 99, 101, 104, 107, 108, 110, 117, 124, 126–128, 130, 131, 140, 142, 144, 146, 149, 155, 162, 165–167, 170, 174, 176
 discourse analysis, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 17, 65, 101, 125, 162
 discursive, 3, 11, 13, 15–17, 22, 24, 28, 29, 49, 50, 66, 81, 85, 103, 104, 110, 117, 119, 124, 125, 133, 147, 155, 162–165, 177
 domination, 15, 19, 24, 85
 drone, 69, 71, 106, 108, 132

E

empire, 26, 70
 empirical, 6, 9, 19, 24, 47, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65, 92, 94, 109, 144, 145, 156, 166, 172
 ethnic, 2, 104, 109
 Europe, 48, 81, 85, 145
 experts, 7, 21–24, 30, 43, 84, 101, 118, 122, 124, 164, 169
 exploitative, 69

F

failed state/failing state, 1, 14, 43, 44, 58, 103, 105, 109, 125

FATA, 69, 70, 106, 109
 foreign aid, 10, 24, 108, 127, 162, 176
 foreign assistance, 12
 foreign policy, 3, 24, 62, 64, 66, 118, 121, 123, 163
 fragile state, 1, 12, 15, 47
 fundamentalists, 2, 104

G

geography, 10–12, 28, 39, 74, 83, 87, 97, 116, 147
 global, 14, 24, 43, 46, 48, 50, 82, 84, 94, 96, 124, 132, 141, 147, 150
 global security, 15
 graduate, 58

H

hegemonic/hegemony, 19, 27, 48, 83, 95, 100, 115, 141, 142, 147, 165, 170, 172, 175
 Higher Education Commission (HEC), 150, 151, 153, 154, 174
 humanistic, 8, 93

I

imperialism, 18, 81, 141, 145
 India, 6, 48, 60, 63, 65, 67, 71, 72, 84, 86, 97–100, 105, 126, 128–131, 161, 168, 176
 influence, 19, 22, 30, 42, 46, 57, 63, 73, 94, 105, 116, 119, 121, 123, 128, 143, 153, 156, 169
 intellectuals, 19, 23, 65, 84, 93, 95, 100, 115, 140, 146, 147, 172
 interdisciplinary, 81
 international system, 10, 106

interpretation, 5, 6, 8, 11, 23, 44,
109, 170, 175
invisibility, 18, 48
Islamist, 2, 61, 66, 68–70, 72, 103,
104, 107, 126, 133
ivory towers, 169

K

knowledge economy, 23, 29, 96, 142
knowledge producers, 22, 28, 42, 100,
143, 167, 172, 173
knowledge production, 13, 17, 19,
21–23, 27, 28, 30, 39, 42, 44,
46, 48, 58, 62, 65, 81, 85, 87,
95, 100, 115, 117, 119, 123,
124, 140–142, 144, 145, 148,
153, 156, 163, 166, 167, 170,
172, 175

L

labels, 9, 66, 103, 125, 133
language, 6, 11, 12, 25, 27, 91, 110,
147, 148, 154, 156, 165, 172,
173, 176

M

marginal, 20, 84, 100, 139, 146, 149,
167, 169, 170, 174
marginalization, 95, 140
mercantilization, 143, 150, 171, 174
modernization, 17, 82, 83

N

narratives, 71, 73, 133
neocolonial, 4
neoliberal, 68, 69, 142, 144, 150,
155, 170, 175

non-discursive, 17, 85, 147
non-West, 46, 94, 142, 144, 145,
149, 172, 173
norms, 8, 9, 69, 71, 106, 163
nuclear, 2, 48, 60, 61, 65, 67, 72, 73,
105, 108, 126, 161, 176

O

objective, 3, 7, 23, 44, 50, 59, 66, 83,
105, 146, 161, 170, 175

P

Pakistani military, 2, 5, 127
Pakistani people, 67, 71, 104, 107,
125, 133
Pakistani state, 4, 24, 65, 67, 70, 86,
91, 103, 107, 109, 125, 127,
129, 130, 161, 164
Pashtuns, 71
patron, 73, 105
peace, 17, 59, 104, 118, 124, 127,
133, 161, 166
periphery, 70, 95, 140, 148, 149, 165,
167, 172–174
policy, 1, 3, 10, 15, 20, 22, 23, 27, 29,
43, 44, 49, 57, 59, 62–64, 69, 70,
73, 81, 83, 84, 87, 91, 95, 103,
110, 117, 118, 120–122, 124,
130, 131, 146, 152–154, 161,
167, 169, 173, 175
policy-making/policy-makers, 3, 22,
24, 30, 42, 50, 57, 63–66, 84,
119, 121, 122, 124, 162, 167,
169, 170
policy relevance, 44, 152
policy-relevant, 23, 63, 124, 153
positivism/positivists, 7, 9, 10, 19, 41
postcolonialism, 40
post-positivists, 9

R

ranking, 28, 41, 142, 150, 171
 rationalism, 7, 8
 realist, 7
 Reflectivist, 8
 representation(s), 1, 3, 9, 10, 14, 16,
 19, 24, 27, 45, 49, 61, 63, 66,
 67, 71, 82, 84, 95, 125, 140,
 149, 155, 162, 167, 168, 173
 representational identity(ies), 3, 20,
 24, 26, 29, 41, 50, 57, 59, 60,
 62, 65–67, 73, 103, 104, 108,
 110, 124, 146, 156, 162, 170,
 174
 representational practices, 4, 12, 15,
 18, 24, 25, 27, 41, 84, 164, 166

S

scientific, 8, 21, 46, 50, 92, 93, 95,
 150, 152
 security, 14, 16, 43, 49, 60, 66, 68,
 70, 73, 93, 100, 103, 104, 108,
 110, 116, 127, 151, 153, 161,
 168, 176
 social sciences, 16, 19, 42, 46, 83, 86,
 92, 101, 139, 140, 147, 151, 156
 stability, 61, 67, 105, 109, 119
 strategic, 10, 21, 45, 69, 72, 98, 105,
 109, 129, 130, 152, 164
 subjugate, 70

T

Taliban, 2, 60, 66, 70, 71, 107, 127,
 130, 161
 Tenure-Track, 151, 154
 terrorism, 2, 14, 24, 44, 48, 60, 61,
 65, 67, 69, 106, 116, 130
 theory, 7, 10, 41, 45, 83, 96, 146,
 148, 153, 154, 166, 169, 173
 Third World, 16
 threat, 15, 43, 60, 68, 72, 104, 107,
 133
 tribal, 2, 69

U

UK, 48, 49, 63, 64, 86, 87, 123
 universality, 45, 58

V

violence, 66, 67, 69, 71, 103, 104, 107
 visibility, 48, 85, 139, 171

W

War on Terror, 11, 14, 101, 108, 125,
 176
 West, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 42, 45,
 49, 73, 94, 99, 108, 110, 140,
 142, 143, 145, 146, 150, 156,
 165, 167, 171, 173, 174